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ABSTRACT
Optimism has been a favourite topic of research in positive psychology.
Optimism, defined as a generalized positive expectancy for the future, is generally
regarded as a positive trait. However, despite positive findings for optimism, some
researchers have suggested that optimism is not beneficial in all contexts. Alternatives to
optimism have been proposed, including flexible optimism (Seligman, 1991; Forgeard &
Seligman, 2012) and cautious optimism (Wallston, 1994). While such criticism of
optimism lacks substantial empirical support, there are a few studies that appear to
support these contentions. Previous research suggests that optimism is associated with
maladaptive persistence in gambling (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004) and poorer health
(de Ridder, Schreurs, & Bensing, 2000). Furthermore, research on defensive pessimism
and unrealistic optimism supports the notion of a “dark side” of optimism.
A new construct is proposed to reconcile these divergent findings: expectancy
flexibility. Expectancy flexibility is defined as the ability to change one’s expectations of
the future in response to contextual cues. It was hypothesized that expectancy flexibility
would moderate or mediate the associations between optimism and various outcomes.
Four studies were conducted to validate the Expectancy Flexibility Scale (EFS),
an instrument developed to measure expectancy flexibility. The first two studies were
used to develop a scale with good internal consistency reliability, a low correlation with
optimism (to provide discriminant validity), and a moderate correlation with theoretically
related constructs (to provide convergent validity). The purpose of the third study was to
test whether shifts in expectations actually occur in response to negative feedback, and
whether these shifts were predicted by scores on the EFS. The fourth study tested
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whether the EFS was associated with constructs believed to be outcomes, including
preventive health behaviours, academic success, and problem gambling. In all four
studies, participants were undergraduate students who were recruited through a
participant pool at a Canadian university. The EFS and several other self-report
questionnaires were completed by participants via an online platform.
The findings of Study 1 and Study 2 supported the reliability and validity of the
EFS. Internal consistency reliability was in the acceptable range (α > 0.70). Supporting
the scale’s convergent validity, expectancy flexibility was associated with related
measures like defensive pessimism and cognitive flexibility. Weak and non-significant
correlations were found between expectancy flexibility and optimism, locus of control,
and coping flexibility, supporting the scale’s discriminant validity.
The findings of Study 3 partially supported the hypothesis that expectancy
flexibility is associated with shifts in expectations. In the gambling scenario, losses were
generally associated with reduced expectations, while gains were associated with no
change or slight increases in gambling expectations. This pattern of findings was not
evident in the academic scenario, where disappointing exam results did not produce a
negative shift in expectations.
In Study 4, expectancy flexibility was positively associated with academic
approach coping, social health, general academic skills, and confidence; it was negatively
related to substance use and problem gambling. Analysis of the qualitative questions
generally supported the hypothesis that expectancy flexibility is associated with shifts in
expectations. However, the moderational and mediational models were not supported.
Overall, the results provide support for the validity of the flexible optimism construct.
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Introduction
Optimism: Is the Conceptual Glass Half Empty (Or Half Full)?
Overview
The field of positive psychology has attempted to refocus research on what is
right with people, rather than what is wrong. One of the most extensively studied topics
in positive psychology is that of optimism. Optimism has usually been defined as a trait
that characterizes individuals who hold positive expectations for the future (Scheier &
Carver, 1985). More than three decades of empirical research have documented the
purported benefits of optimism. Optimism has been associated with positive mood,
perseverance, achievement, and good physical health (Peterson, 2000) and is considered
an important ingredient for achieving a happy and successful life (Seligman, 1991;
Seligman, 2011).
Despite strong evidence for the apparent advantages of optimism, some
researchers have suggested that optimism is not beneficial in all contexts. While a few
published studies support their claims, their criticism of optimism currently lacks
substantial empirical support. One purpose of this research study is to consider a variety
of contexts wherein the costs and benefits of pessimism and optimism vary and to find an
optimal balance between the two extremes. Put another way, when it comes to optimism,
is it possible to have too much of a good thing?
Some psychologists (e.g., Held, 2002; Lazarus, 2003) have expressed concerns
about the potential devolvement of positive psychology into a “fad science” of positive
thinking. In reaction to this criticism, there has been a call (McNulty & Fincham, 2012)
for a more contextual view of psychological processes in positive psychology. McNulty

A Glass Half Full

2

and Fincham (2012) note that “psychological traits and processes are not inherently
positive or negative; instead, whether psychological characteristics promote or undermine
well-being depends on the context in which they operate” (p. 101). This quote suggests
two things. First, there ought to be more attention paid to context in research in positive
psychology. Second, the degree of benefit of a personality trait may be thought of as a
function of an interaction between the trait and the context.
In contrast to the recent consensus regarding the beneficial nature of optimism,
early literary references to optimism were less than positive. Peterson (2000, p. 44) notes
that “a positive psychology should not hold up Dr. Pangloss or Pollyanna as role
models”. This statement refers to two fictional caricatures of positive thinking that have
exemplified negative stereotypes about optimists for more than a century. In Candide,
Voltaire (1759) describes an overly-optimistic character named Dr. Pangloss, who
believes that “everything is for the best and that this is the best of all possible worlds” (a
satire on the optimistic views of Voltaire’s contemporary, the philosopher Leibniz).
Similarly, Porter’s (1913) story of the permanently positive Pollyanna and her “glad
game” (which involved turning every misfortune into a blessing to maintain a façade of
vapid cheerfulness) has been used to paint optimists as being hopelessly naïve or living in
a massive state of denial.
Attitudes toward optimism in the psychological community in the twentieth
century were similarly skeptical. Freud (1928/2012) believed that optimism was a
neurotic delusion, and represented a fundamental denial of reality. Meanwhile, the
psychiatric establishment adopted a disease model of psychopathology primarily focused
on what was wrong with individuals (Maddux, 2002). For many years, optimism was
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generally ignored, and research instead focused on extreme pessimism in the form of
hopelessness (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974).
It was not until the 1980s that research on optimism as a positive personality trait
began (Scheier & Carver, 1985), and optimism research has flourished ever since. Much
of this research can be attributed to the Zeitgeist of the positive psychology movement,
which started as a reaction to deficit-based research (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi,
2000). Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi defined positive psychology as being about valued
subjective experiences, positive individual traits, and civic virtues. This focus on what is
right with people, rather than what is wrong, is a striking departure from past research
and has filled a large gap in the research literature. As stated by Seligman and
Csikszentmihalyi (2000), “This almost exclusive attention to pathology neglects the
fulfilled individual and the thriving community” (p. 5).
Today, optimism is considered a vital component of well-being. Research on
optimism has spurred the development of interventions, such as the Best Possible Self
Intervention (King, 2001; Meevissen, Peters, & Alberts, 2011), that are designed to make
people more optimistic. However, the idea of promulgating optimism is not new, and has
long been the mainstay of self-help authors. From the Power of Positive Thinking (Peale,
1956) to more recent books like The Secret (Byrne, 2008), the promotion of positive
thinking has created a thriving (and lucrative) industry. Even some well-respected
academic researchers (e.g., Lyubomirsky, 2007; Seligman, 2002) have joined the selfhelp bandwagon, though their books are more firmly grounded in psychological research.
But is optimism as beneficial as its advocates claim? In a scathing critique entitled
Bright-Sided, Ehrenreich (2009) claims that the “relentless” promotion of positive
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thinking by self-help authors, positive psychologists, business executives, political
leaders and others has done more harm than good, causing everything from widespread
unhappiness to the Iraq War to the stock market collapse of 2008. Given these potential
negative consequences, researchers ought to take heed and investigate whether such
deleterious effects of optimism do exist. The potential for negative side effects also calls
into question the wisdom of optimism-promoting interventions. It would do no good to
increase optimism at the expense of overall well-being.
Definitions of Optimism and Pessimism. Before discussing the research
literature on optimism, it is necessary to define what optimism is. This is not simple, as
there are several competing definitions of optimism and pessimism in the research
literature. Distinguishing between different definitions of optimism is important because
these definitions of optimism are only modestly associated with one another (e.g.,
Peterson & Vaidya, 2001) and thus cannot be considered interchangeable. Four of these
definitions are reviewed: dispositional optimism, optimistic explanatory style, unrealistic
optimism, and defensive pessimism.
Perhaps the most common conceptualization of optimism is that of dispositional
optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985). Of the four operationalizations of the optimism
construct, dispositional optimism is probably the most similar to the lay usage of the term
(Norem, 2002). Dispositional optimism is defined as a generalized positive outcome
expectancy (Scheier & Carver, 1985). Stated another way, optimists anticipate that good
things (positive) will happen (outcomes) in the future (expectancies). Additionally,
dispositional optimism is generalizable; that is, it is applicable to a range of situations and
is stable over time (Carver & Scheier, 2014). Dispositional optimism is usually
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conceptualized as a bipolar construct, with low levels of dispositional optimism called
dispositional pessimism. It is related to constructs like hope and self-efficacy, which also
involve positive outcome expectancies, but is not confounded by agency or selfconfidence (Carver & Scheier, 2014).
Dispositional optimism is measured using a brief self-report scale known as the
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R), which was developed by Scheier, Carver, and
Bridges (1994) as a modification of the earlier Life Orientation Test (Scheier & Carver,
1985). The LOT-R consists of three items that assess optimism and three reversed-scored
items that assess pessimism. Traditionally, the LOT-R is treated as a unidimensional
measure; however, some authors (Kubzansky, Kubzansky, & Maselko, 2004; Marshall,
Wortman, Kusulas, Hervig, & Vickers, 1992) have suggested that it is better to treat the
dispositional optimism and pessimism items as separate subscales.
Another conceptualization of optimism is that of optimistic explanatory style,
which was based on Seligman’s learned helplessness theory (Seligman, 1972) and Beck’s
cognitive triad (Beck, 1967). According to this view, optimism is how individuals explain
the causes of bad events. People employing an optimistic explanatory style make
unstable, specific, and external attributions for past negative events (Peterson, 2000).
When negative events occur, optimists consider them temporary, particular to that
situation, and due to someone else’s actions. Pessimists, on the other hand, explain
negative events as having stable, global, and internal causes. Stated differently, when bad
things occur, pessimists consider them to be long-lasting, pervasive, and due to their own
actions (justified or not). Optimistic explanatory style is weakly correlated with
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dispositional optimism (Scheier & Carver, 1992), suggesting that the two constructs are
distinctly different, despite the similarity of name.
Explanatory style is usually measured using either the Attributional Style
Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982) or the Content Analysis of Verbatim
Explanations (CAVE; Peterson, Schulman, Castellon, & Seligman, 1992). The ASQ
presents respondents with a series of hypothetical negative events. Participants are asked
to provide the most likely cause of the event, and rate the degree to which they perceive
the cause as internal, stable, and global (Peterson, 2000). In contrast, the CAVE is a
qualitative tool that can be used to code written causal explanations for events.
Researchers score the CAVE by extracting respondents’ explanations for bad events and
rating them as being either internal or external, stable or unstable, and global or specific
(Peterson et al., 1992).
Yet another view of optimism is that of unrealistic optimism, which is sometimes
called optimistic bias or comparative optimism (Shepperd, Waters, Weinstein, & Klein,
2015; Weinstein, 1980). In contrast to dispositional optimism, unrealistic optimism is a
cognitive bias rather than a trait (Schwarzer, 1994). Unrealistic optimists perceive
themselves as being at lower risk of experiencing negative life events in the future
relative to other people. Thus, unrealistic optimism is influenced by social comparison
processes (Klein & Weinstein, 1997).
Unrealistic optimism is often measured by administering a scale developed by
Weinstein (1980) that assesses comparative risk judgments. This scale lists 18 positive
and 24 negative life events. Respondents are asked to judge the likelihood that these
events will happen to them relative to their peers (i.e., a typical person of the same age
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and sex as the respondent). According to the unrealistic optimism perspective, those who
think that positive events are more likely to happen to themselves and negative events are
less likely to happen to themselves are considered unrealistic optimists.
A fourth type of optimism is known as defensive pessimism (its opposite is called
strategic optimism, though this term is not often used). Defensive pessimism is defined as
a strategy where people set their own expectations low in an effort to avoid feelings of
disappointment after failure or to increase their likelihood of a positive outcome in a
performance situation (Norem & Cantor, 1986a). Defensive pessimists differ from their
dispositional pessimist counterparts in that they deliberately set their expectations low in
an effort to cope with anxiety. For example, defensive pessimists differ from depressed
individuals (who are similar to dispositional pessimists) in that they exhibit less avoidant
coping, less residual anxiety, and less rumination after stressful events (Showers &
Ruben, 1990). By setting their expectations low, defensive pessimists harness their
anxiety and convert it into motivation to prevent the negative outcome they anticipate.
Defensive pessimism is usually measured using the Defensive Pessimism
Questionnaire (Norem, 2001). The DPQ is a self-report measure that assesses one’s level
of defensive pessimism. It has typically been used in academic contexts to assess
students’ use of defensive pessimism (e.g., Seginer, 2000), but the scale has also been
used in health (Chang & Sivam, 2004) and athletics (Wilson, Raglin, & Pritchard, 2002).
Optimism is related conceptually to hope (Snyder, Harris & Anderson, 1991) and
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; Sherer, Maddux, Mercandante, Prentice-Dunn, Jacobs, &
Rogers, 1982). Optimism, hope, and self-efficacy share positive expectations for the
future. They are generally moderately correlated with one another, with a typical
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correlation of about .50 (Alarcon, Bowling, & Khazon, 2013). However, both hope and
self-efficacy are conceptually distinct from each other and from optimism (Magaletta &
Oliver, 1999). Briefly, hope is made up of two components: agency (a belief that one will
meet goals in the future) and pathways (the belief that one will be able to generate
successful plans to meet those goals). Optimism is similar to the pathways component of
hope; both pertain to expectancies about outcomes. However, the pathways component of
hope refers only to outcomes obtained by oneself; optimism also includes expectancies
about outcomes obtained through others and forces outside oneself. Similarly, selfefficacy refers to one’s belief in one’s ability to perform a specific behavior that will
produce a desired outcome. Self-efficacy is similar to the agency component of hope;
both pertain to expectancies about one’s ability to perform a behaviour. In contrast, most
definitions of optimism lack this belief in one’s capability.
This variety of definitions suggests that there is no conclusive operationalization
of optimism or pessimism. Whereas the definitions have some overlap, they appear to
measure distinct constructs. Because of the diversity of definitions, studies using different
operationalizations of optimism ought to be considered separately, rather than pooled
together. This is important because different operationalizations of optimism often have
different correlates. The lack of a unitary definition is one of the challenges that confronts
optimism researchers.
Current Skepticism of Optimism. One might expect that positive psychologists
would have an uncritically favourable view of optimism. Surprisingly, some of the most
prominent researchers in positive psychology have been among optimism’s biggest
skeptics. For example, Peterson (2000) noted: “Optimism in some circumstances can
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have drawbacks and costs, although researchers rarely look for these qualifying
conditions.” (p. 44). Even Martin Seligman, often called the father of positive
psychology, has expressed skepticism of optimism. In the closing words to Learned
Optimism, Seligman (1991) said that optimism is not always the answer to every
situation: “What we want is not blind optimism but flexible optimism—optimism with its
eyes open. We must be able to use pessimism’s keen sense of reality when we need it” (p.
292). Forgeard and Seligman (2012) speculated that optimism is the best strategy in most
circumstances because it allows individuals to pursue their goals, be persistent, and be
open to opportunities. However, Seligman thinks that pessimism is the better strategy
when danger is near because pessimism can help re-direct one’s actions (similar
sentiments were expressed previously by Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). In addition,
pessimism may cushion the effects of disappointment if it seems that a desirable goal
cannot be achieved. Thus, Seligman advocates for a careful balance of optimism and
pessimism.
Seligman is not the only researcher who has proposed a re-examination of the
optimism construct. In a brief commentary, Wallston (1994) speculated that there are two
kinds of optimists: cautious optimists and cockeyed optimists. These two types of
optimists, he describes, differ in terms of the certainty of their optimism and this has
consequences for their behaviour. Cautious optimists are fairly certain that favourable
outcomes will occur, while cockeyed optimists are absolutely certain that everything will
work out for the best. Similarly, Wallston speculates that while cautious optimists engage
in actions that they think will produce positive outcomes and ward off negative outcomes,
cockeyed optimists do not engage in actions that could foster positive outcomes or
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prevent negative outcomes. Because of this, Wallston believes that cockeyed optimism is
potentially hazardous to one’s health because these optimists are less likely to engage in
functional health behaviours than cautious optimists. Wallston’s conjecture is thoughtprovoking; unfortunately, more than 20 years have passed since Wallston’s paper was
published, and these speculations have remained untested.
Correlates of optimism
Review of meta-analyses. Several meta-analytic studies have been conducted to
examine the association between optimism and psychological and physical well-being,
coping, and other personality traits across studies. These meta-analyses have found that
optimism is consistently associated with positive constructs, including better physical
health ( Alarcon et al., 2013; Rasmussen et al., 2009), better psychological well-being
(Alarcon et al., 2013; Andersson, 1996), and positive coping strategies (Andersson, 1996;
Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). The hundreds of studies reviewed by these authors appear to
support the idea that optimism is associated with beneficial outcomes. Or do they?
A critical analysis of these findings suggests that optimism may not be as
beneficial as some have claimed. In some cases, the effect sizes found in meta-analyses –
while significant – were quite weak, especially for health-related variables. The effect
sizes (as measured by r) of the associations between optimism and health indices
(Rasmussen et al., 2009) and between optimism and various coping measures (Nes &
Segerstrom, 2006) were generally in the 0.1-0.2 range. These findings suggest that only
1-4% of the variance (as measured by r2) in health and coping measures can be attributed
to optimism. The small magnitude of effects is unsurprising, given that many studies
investigating associations between optimism and health and coping have found null
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results (as reviewed previously). These small effect sizes suggest that optimism has a
limited impact on health. This is sensible considering that one’s health can be affected by
a multitude of factors, many outside of one’s control. To paraphrase Seligman (2011),
being optimistic will not prevent a crane from falling on top of you!
Other associations have been more robust, particularly between optimism and
measures of personality constructs (such as the Big Five) and psychological well-being.
But it is important to note that in cross-sectional studies these affective constructs cannot
be considered outcomes and therefore should not be construed as “benefits” of optimism.
Rather than demonstrating benefit, these findings merely establish that optimism is
associated with theoretically related constructs. As Norem and Chang (2001) caution,
relationships between optimism and affective variables are correlational, not causal.
Constructs like happiness and anxiety are not necessarily the consequences of optimism.
The reverse is equally plausible: perhaps being happy or less anxious results in having a
more optimistic outlook. A third possibility is that optimism and other positive traits are
correlated because they are subtly different facets of the same underlying trait of
positivity.
This begs the question: What are the consequences of optimism? Despite much
research documenting optimism’s relationship to various constructs of psychological
well-being, there has been comparatively little research into the bona fide outcomes of
optimism. Theoretical work in personality research emphasizes the importance of
examining the consequential outcomes of personality factors (Ozer & Benet-Martinez,
2006). Ozer and Benet-Martinez stated that the practical importance of personality
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variables is demonstrated by the degree to which they predict important individual,
interpersonal, and social/institutional outcomes.
Potential Outcomes of Optimism. Most of the research examining hypothesized
effects of optimism has been conducted with constructs like physical health, coping, and
academic success. It can be stated with some degree of confidence that these are the
consequences of trait optimism, rather than contributing factors. The following sections
will review some of the more prominent studies in these domains.
Many studies on optimism have examined its association with subjective wellbeing. Again, it is important to stress that because most of this research is correlational, it
is dubious to infer causality. However, the temporal order of longitudinal studies
strengthens inferences regarding a causal relationship. Several longitudinal studies have
found that optimism is associated with later subjective well-being among people
experiencing stressful health events (note that this does not imply that optimistic people
are less likely to experience negative health outcomes, but instead relates to their
adjustment to negative health events). These studies have found a positive relationship
between optimism and later well-being (usually assessed by a lack of depression or
distress, or better quality of life) in several contexts, including childbirth (Carver &
Gaines, 1987), coronary artery bypass surgery (Fitzgerald, Tennen, Affleck, & Pransky,
1993; Scheier et al., 1989), treatment for breast cancer (Carver et al., 1994; Carver,
Smith, Antoni, Petronis, Weiss, & Derhagopian, 2005), and AIDS (Taylor et al., 1992).
Although the results of these longitudinal studies are compelling, as they can more
convincingly demonstrate (in comparison to studies employing a cross-sectional design)
that optimism can predict subsequent subjective well-being, they are still not causal.
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It is often claimed that optimists are healthier than pessimists, yet research on the
health effects of optimism remains relatively scant. Research on optimism’s relationship
with physical health has examined optimism’s effects on health outcomes in several
disease contexts. Some of the more common contexts are heart disease, cancer, HIV, and
immune function. Each context is reviewed below.
Several studies have examined the relationship between optimism and heart
disease. By examining odds ratios, dispositional optimism has been found to be
associated with slower development of atherosclerosis (Matthews, Raikkonen, SuttonTyrrell, & Kuller, 2004), lower risk of coronary heart disease (Tindle et al., 2009), and
faster recovery from coronary bypass surgery (Scheier et al., 1989). However, Contrada
et al. (2004) found no relationship between dispositional optimism and recovery from
cardiac surgery.
Several studies examining optimism’s association with cancer outcomes have
yielded inconsistent results (Coyne & Tennen, 2010). While optimism was modestly
related to lower mortality risk in head and neck cancer patients (Allison, Guichard, Fung,
& Gilain, 2003) and general cancer mortality risk amongst Black women (Tindle et al.,
2009), optimism was not associated with mortality risk amongst lung cancer patients
(Schofield et al., 2004). In addition, optimism was only associated with lower mortality
risk among younger patients in a mixed cancer sample (Schulz, Bookwala, Knapp,
Scheier, & Williamson, 1996).
Optimism’s associations with HIV-related outcomes have also been mixed.
Optimism has been associated with positive immunological indicators such as higher
natural killer cell cytotoxicity and CD3+CD8+ cell percentage (Byrnes et al., 1998) and
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lower HIV viral load (Milam, Richardson, Marks, Kemper, & McCutchan, 2004).
However, other findings suggest that dispositional optimism had either a curvilinear
relationship with CD4+ cell counts (Milam et al., 2004) or no relationship with CD4+
count (Tomakowsky, Lumley, Markowitz, & Frank, 2001).
Optimists may also have better immune functioning under some circumstances.
Research suggests that optimists generally have stronger immune responses than
pessimists (e.g. Kohut, Cooper, Nickolaus, Russell, & Cunnick, 2002). However,
optimists may have lower immune responses under high-stress conditions (Cohen et al.,
1999; Segerstrom, 2006). Other studies have found no association between optimism and
immune functioning (Segerstrom, 2005; Segerstrom & Sephton, 2010).
Research on coping has been similarly mixed. Optimism tends to be associated
with healthier forms of coping, such as planning, active coping, and positive
reinterpretation (Scheier, Weintraub, & Carver, 1986) and is inversely related to avoidant
coping responses, such as denial, behavioural disengagement, mental disengagement, and
using alcohol or drugs (Carver et al., 1989). However, pessimists scoring high on hope
were found to be less likely to engage in passive coping than pessimists scoring low on
hope (Lopes & Cunha, 2008),
One specific kind of coping germane to health is that of preventive health
behaviours. Preventive health behaviours are defined as activities undertaken by a person
for the purpose of preventing disease (Kasl & Cobb, 1966). These behaviours are
considered a form of approach-based coping (Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010).
Several studies have examined whether optimism is related to preventive health
behaviours. For example, Friedman, Bruce, Webb, Weinberg, and Cooper (1993) found
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that dispositional optimism was associated with a greater frequency of skin selfexamination. Other studies have found that optimists exhibited less delay in seeking
treatment for breast cancer symptoms (Lauver & Tak, 1995) and were more likely to
comply with prescribed health-promoting regimens (Shepperd, Maroto, & Pbert, 1996).
However, previous studies have found no association between optimism and
preventive behaviours relevant to hypertension (O’Brien, VanEgeren, and Mumby, 1995)
or between optimism and intentions to use condoms or get tested for sexually transmitted
infections (Zak-Place & Stern, 2004). In addition, health behaviours only partially
mediated the relationship between optimism and physical health among elderly people
(Steptoe, Wright, Kunz-Ebrecht, & Iliffe, 2006). Several studies have found that
optimistic bias (a.k.a. ‘unrealistic optimism’) in risk perception may actually inhibit
health-promoting behaviours (Schwarzer, 1994; Davidson & Prkachin, 1997).
Evidence for optimism’s salubrious effects in academic contexts is scant and
mixed. In a longitudinal study of first-year university students, optimism and grades were
measured at several points in time (Gibbons, Blanton, Gerrard, Buunk, & Eggleston,
2000). Compared to pessimistic students, optimistic students had higher grades in their
first semester. This pattern (of optimists’ better performance compared to pessimists)
continued for several semesters. A similar association was between LOT-R scores and
GPA (Rand, 2009).
However, Robbins, Spence, and Clark (1991) found no association between
optimism and GPA, with a correlation close to zero for both males and females. In
addition, Haynes et al. (2006) found that the final exam and GPA scores of highly
optimistic students did not differ from that of less optimistic students. One could
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speculate that these null findings mean that optimism is unrelated to academic
performance. However, it could be argued that GPA (the usual measure of academic
performance) may not be the best measure of student success, as some critics have
suggested (Pritchard & Wilson, 2003; Robbins, Lauver, Le, Davis, Langley, & Carlstrom,
2004). These authors instead propose that social and psychological factors are better
predictors of students’ graduation than GPA.
The review above suggests that, on the balance, optimism is generally associated
with positive outcomes. But caution is needed, as optimism does have some negative
consequences. Optimism may “feel good” in the short run, but what about its long-term
effects? Research on the consequences of unrealistic optimism suggests that this type of
optimism could lead to taking unnecessary risks, failing to take health precautions, or
being inadequately prepared for tasks (Shepperd, Pogge, & Howell, 2017). The
consequences of dispositional optimism could be similarly negative, but these potentially
negative consequences have yet to be explored, aside from a handful of studies with what
could be termed “anomalous findings”.
A Review of Anomalous Findings for Optimism
Several studies have reported associations between optimism and undesirable
outcomes and between pessimism and positive outcomes (the focus on these studies in
this paper is a deliberate choice, and should not be construed as suggesting that these
anomalous findings are commonplace in the literature). How can these anomalous
findings be explained and reconciled with findings suggesting salubrious effects of
optimism? As Norem and Chang (2001) put it, “there are potential benefits and costs to
both optimism and pessimism that may be highly sensitive to context” (p. 348).
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A systematic review of the literature yielded six studies. The studies reviewed
found that dispositional optimism was associated with negative outcomes in three
domains: risk-taking behaviour (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004; Hmieleski & Baron,
2009), health (de Ridder, Schreurs, & Bensing, 2000; Milam, Richardson, Marks,
Kemper, & McCutchan, 2004), and academics (Haynes, Ruthig, Perry, Stupnisky, &
Hall, 2006; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2010). Similarly, researchers have found that defensive
pessimism is associated with positive outcomes, like performing preventative behaviours
for SARS (Chang & Sivam, 2004) and passing more classes (Eronen, Nurmi, & SalmelaAro, 1998). These studies are summarized in the next section.
Optimism and monetary risk-taking. Gibson and Sanbonmatsu (2004)
examined the association between dispositional optimism and gambling in a sample of
undergraduate psychology students. They measured optimism using the Life Orientation
Test. The authors found that optimists were more likely than pessimists to: have positive
gambling expectations, maintain these expectations following losses, indicate that
winning money was a primary motivation for their gambling, and remember more near
wins. They also found that pessimists reduced their betting and expectations after
experiencing poor gaming performance. These findings demonstrate that traits such as
optimism are not always useful and may actually be a liability in some contexts. This is
because the optimist’s tendency to persist leads to continued effort (Carver & Scheier,
2001). In contexts where the potential for loss is high (as in gambling), it appears that
optimists’ persistence does them more harm than good. Gibson and Sanbonmatsu
suggested that the tendency to ignore negative feedback causes optimistic gamblers to
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continue gambling even as they continue to lose. Pessimists, on the other hand,
disengaged from gambling when they began to accrue losses.
This association between optimism and persistence in gambling despite failure is
typical of people with gambling problems (Gilovich, 1983). Gibson and Sanbonmatsu
attributed this vulnerability to optimists’ perseverance and illusion of control (the belief
that one will win through effort), which causes them to continue to gambling even after
losing. Normally, persistence is beneficial (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly,
2007), but in a gambling context it can have negative effects. Gibson and Sanbonmatsu
speculated that optimists continue to gamble because they hold onto the optimistic belief
that their luck will turn around. Previous studies have found that having a belief that one
will win at gambling because of good luck or through persistence is related to problem
gambling (Gilovich, 1983; Wohl & Enzle, 2003). Similarly, having a belief in good luck
is related to optimism (Day & Maltby, 2003).
Entrepreneurship, like gambling, is another context that involves monetary risktaking. Hmieleski and Baron (2009) tested the hypothesis that dispositional optimism
would be negatively related to the performance of entrepreneurs’ new ventures.
Participants, who were executive officers of new business ventures, completed the Life
Orientation Test, as well as measures of entrepreneurial experience and performance (as
measured by revenue growth and employment growth). Consistent with their hypothesis,
there was a negative relationship between entrepreneurs’ optimism and the performance
of their new ventures. Interestingly, the negative relationship between entrepreneurs’
optimism and performance was stronger when entrepreneurs had more experience. The
authors speculated that the findings can be attributed to optimists’ high confidence and
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tendency to ignore negative information. These tendencies can interfere with making
good business decisions. These findings highlight the importance of adjusting one’s
expectations in light of new information, especially if it is unfavourable. The implication
of this is that ignorance of unfavourable information may result in impaired decision
making, which can have negative consequences (especially in high-risk contexts).
What can be concluded from both studies is that entrepreneurship and gambling
are similar in that they involve taking risks with money and require some degree of
persistence in order to achieve a successful outcome. But this is often a double-edged
sword. Just as the maladaptive persistence of the problem gambler can lead to large
losses of money, optimism may make entrepreneurs persist in their pursuit of
unmanageable goals, which in turn can lead to impaired business performance.
Optimism and health. In the domain of health, de Ridder and colleagues (2000)
examined the effects of optimism among people diagnosed with two types of chronic
illness: Parkinson’s disease and multiple sclerosis. Although the authors found that
optimism (as measured using the Life Orientation Test) was associated with greater
physical autonomy, social adjustment, and psychological adjustment among people
diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (a disease marked by extreme levels of
uncontrollability and unpredictability), no significant associations were found between
optimism and physical autonomy or social adjustment among people with Parkinson’s
disease (a more controllable disease). The authors speculated that optimism was less
beneficial for people with Parkinson’s disease because it can interfere with behaviours
that help people manage their condition. In addition, they found a curvilinear relationship
between optimism and both task-oriented and avoidant coping for people diagnosed with
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either disease. This suggests that moderate levels of optimism promoted higher levels of
both forms of coping. It is important to note that avoidant coping is not always harmful,
particularly in the context of chronic illness (Suls & Fletcher, 1985). The authors
speculated that high levels of optimism may have inhibited more constructive forms of
coping amongst people who are experiencing chronic stressors.
Milam and colleagues (2004) examined the relationships between dispositional
optimism and pessimism and the course of HIV infection. The participants were patients
diagnosed with HIV who were undergoing antiretroviral therapy. Optimism and
pessimism (assessed using the Life Orientation Test) were examined separately. Disease
progression was assessed by measuring viral load and CD4 counts. While there was a
positive correlation between baseline pessimism and higher viral load, patients who
reported higher levels of optimism had lower CD4 counts (indicating more advanced
HIV) compared to patients with moderate levels of optimism. The authors speculated that
stress occurs when HIV patients who have high levels of optimism are disappointed with
their treatment’s modest benefits, which compromises the immune system. The
implication of this study is that some optimists may experience stress when things go
worse than they expected. These findings support the idea that moderate levels of
optimism may be better than high levels of optimism under adverse conditions.
Chang and Sivam (2004) examined the effects of defensive pessimism on
compliance with direct and indirect SARS-related preventive health behaviours in a
general sample of people from Singapore (the location of a major SARS outbreak). Direct
preventive behaviours were those that limited one’s risk of contracting SARS, such as
wearing a face mask. Indirect preventive behaviours were those that were perceived to
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improve one’s general health, like exercising and taking health supplements. While
defensive pessimism was found to be associated with negative affect and SARS-related
fears, the results also showed that there was a positive correlation between defensive
pessimism and both indirect and direct preventive health-related behaviours. The
implication of this study is that strategically pessimistic expectations can serve to
motivate people into action, rather than inhibit such behaviour with paralyzing anxiety.
These findings are consistent with the idea that pessimism can be beneficial in decisionmaking contexts, where anxiety can lead to protective behaviours to avert possible
negative outcomes (e.g. Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004).
How might optimism lead to being less likely to engage in health behaviours?
Optimists are prone to having an attentional bias for positive stimuli relative to negative
stimuli (Segerstrom, 2001). This ‘blind spot’ may contribute to a sense of personal
invulnerability amongst optimists that may lessen genuine concern about health threats.
Perceived vulnerability is a key component of the Health Belief Model (Janz & Becker,
1984). According to this model, individuals who underestimate the risk of experiencing a
negative health outcome are less likely to take actions in an effort to avoid that outcome
(Rosenstock, 1974). Unrealistic optimism interacts with the Health Belief Model by
reducing risk perception (Clarke, Lovegrove, Williams, & Machperson, 2000). Previous
studies have found that people scoring high on danger invulnerability are less likely to
engage in preventive health behaviours (Ravert & Zimet, 2009) and more likely to
engage in risky behaviours (Ravert, Schwartz, Zamboanga, Kim, Weisskirch, &
Bersamin, 2009). Unrealistic optimism has been found to be associated with
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invulnerability (Lapsley & Hill, 2010). Thus, it is plausible that perceived invulnerability
might moderate the association between optimism and preventive health behaviours.
Optimism and academics. Haynes and colleagues (2006) compared the
academic performance of students who scored either in the lower tertile (“low-optimists”)
or upper tertile (“over-optimists”) on the Life Orientation Test. The authors randomly
assigned university students to either an attributional retraining intervention or a control
group. Attributional retraining (Ruthig, Perry, Hall, & Hladkyj, 2004) is a cognitive
intervention designed to promote the use of internal attributions for poor performance
(e.g. effort or strategy) rather than uncontrollable factors (e.g. test difficulty or instructor
quality). They found students who did not receive attributional retraining and scored high
on optimism showed an increase in maladaptive attributions for poor academic
performance (they attributed poor academic performance to external, uncontrollable
factors such as test difficulty and teacher quality). The authors speculated that these
maladaptive attributions may reduce students’ motivation and achievement performance.
Among students who did not receive the attributional retraining intervention, overoptimists had slightly (but not significantly) lower final exam and GPA scores than lowoptimists. Overall, these findings suggest that optimism (in the absence of attributional
retraining) may have little effect on exam scores.
Sweeny and Shepperd (2010) examined whether optimistic expectations would be
associated with negative affect after receiving feedback in a sample of undergraduate
psychology students. The authors found that optimistic expectations were unrelated to
pre-feedback negative affect after controlling for students’ exam performance. However,
they found that optimistic students experienced an increase in negative affect after
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receiving exam feedback. In contrast, pessimistic students experienced a decrease in
negative affect after receiving exam feedback. The authors concluded that the findings
support the idea that bracing for negative feedback by lowering expectations can be
beneficial for one’s emotional well-being. These findings suggest that in contexts where
there is a good chance that one may receive negative feedback, it may be wise to adopt a
more pessimistic stance in order to prevent feelings of disappointment.
Eronen and colleagues (1998) investigated the effects of several achievement
strategies on students’ academic achievement. Students were classified as using either
defensive pessimistic, optimistic, impulsive, or self-handicapping strategies. Participants
filled out questionnaires measuring achievement strategies, planning strategies, selfesteem, depression, and academic satisfaction. Academic achievement was assessed
using data on the number of classes students passed, which was obtained from university
records. Defensive pessimists passed more courses than students who used an optimistic
strategy in their first two years of university (there was no difference between the two
groups in their third year of study). They also engaged in more rational planning than the
students using the other three strategies. These results suggest that pessimism may be
useful for challenging tasks like exams, where anxiety can be harnessed and used to
motivate preparation (although pessimists may be more likely to give up following
failure).
What mediators might cause the relationship between optimism and academic
performance to turn negative? Eronen et al. attributed defensive pessimists’ better
academic performance to their greater use of rational planning, a type of problem-focused
coping strategy usually associated with optimists (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989).
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Similarly, Haynes et al. (2006) speculated that optimists’ tendency to make external
attributions may make them less likely to engage in proactive learning behaviours (i.e.
attending class regularly, studying, or seeking help from the instructor). In addition,
Shields (2001) found that approach coping strategies were related to academic success.
Summary
As can be seen from this review, there are only a few studies that have found
negative effects of optimism. There are two explanations for the lack of studies showing
a deleterious effect of optimism that will be reviewed here. First, it may be because
optimism is simply far more beneficial than it is harmful, and the ratio of studies is an
accurate reflection of optimism’s benefits relative to its drawbacks. Although this is
plausible, it would be premature to make this inference. In order to draw this conclusion,
more studies allowing for the detection of negative effects of optimism would need to be
conducted. Second, there is a possibility that there are unpublished studies where
researchers did not find support for a directional hypothesis that predicted positive effects
of optimism. A finding of null, non-hypothesized, or contrary results may have dissuaded
researchers from submitting their studies for peer review. This “file-drawer” effect, while
plausible, is impossible to ascertain.
Sobering up: Shifting from Optimism
As suggested by Norem and Chang (2001; 2002), there are benefits and costs to
both optimism and pessimism, and these costs and benefits depend on the context.
Theorists have suggested that situational factors can cause people to “sober up” (Sweeny
& Krizan, 2013) and lower their expectations. In what circumstances do some people
change their expectancies (from optimism to pessimism and vice versa)?
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Insight into why shifts from optimism occur can be drawn from several papers on
bracing (Shepperd et al., 1996; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007; van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van
der Pligt, 2003). Similarly to defensive pessimism, bracing often occurs when individuals
perceive that an undesirable outcome is more likely to occur than would be justified by
objective evidence, in order to prepare for bad news (Carroll et al., 2006; Shepperd,
Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007). While
optimism is considered the most optimal strategy in most circumstances, there are
contexts in which people become more pessimistic. Shifts from optimism are thought to
occur in response to new information and in an attempt to brace for anticipated
disappointment (Sweeny et al., 2006). The authors assert that these shifts from optimism
serve a useful purpose. They propose that these changes in expectancies are the result of a
need for preparedness, which enables individuals to respond in situations with uncertain
outcomes.
First, when outcomes are perceived as important, people tend to shift from
optimism (Shepperd et al., 2000; Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998;
van Dijk et al., 2003). For example, people are more likely to shift from optimism when
the consequences of a disease are severe rather than benign. It is thought that this shift
serves to motivate behaviours intended to avoid risk in high-risk situations.
Second, when people perceive feedback is imminent, people shift from optimism
(Shepperd et al., 1996; van Dijk et al., 2003). It is thought that immediately before
receiving feedback in performance situations, people lower their expectations in order to
prepare for the possibility that they may be disappointed. By lowering expectations right
before receiving feedback, one can remain optimistic (and thus reap the benefits of
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optimism) up until the point at which optimism would become more detrimental than
beneficial (Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007).
Third, when it is easy to imagine undesired outcomes, people are more likely to
shift from optimism (Sanna, 1999). This occurs because people engage in mental
simulations of potential outcomes prior to their occurrence. When negative outcomes are
difficult to imagine, people are less likely to engage in mental simulations of their
occurrence, and thus can remain optimistic. For example, the possibility of failing a
difficult test would be easier for individuals to imagine than failing an easy test (Sweeny
& Shepperd, 2007).
Lastly, when outcomes are perceived to be uncontrollable, people shift from
optimism. For example, students feel a high degree of control at the beginning of the
semester and are thus optimistic (Shepperd et al., 1996). At the final exam, however,
there is little that students can do to affect the outcome, and they become more
pessimistic. Similarly, people feel optimistic when they think they can control the impact
of an undesirable outcome. For example, people perceive controllable diseases as being
less serious than uncontrollable diseases (Carroll et al., 2007).
A New Construct: Expectancy Flexibility
To reconcile the inconsistent findings for optimism and pessimism, I propose that
expectancy flexibility moderates the effects of optimism/pessimism. Expectancy
flexibility is defined as the ability to change one’s expectations of the future in response
to contextual cues. It is my belief that optimism may interact with expectancy flexibility
to influence whether outcomes are positive or negative.
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Expectancy flexibility was inspired by Seligman’s unheeded suggestion that
individuals ought to practice flexible optimism (Forgeard & Seligman, 2012; Seligman,
1991). Seligman (1991) defines flexible optimists as people who are generally optimistic,
but are occasionally pessimistic in some situations: “The most adaptive outlook therefore
seems to be mostly optimistic, tempered with small doses of realistic pessimism when
needed…The key appears to be able to shift between optimism and pessimism, rather
than being locked into constant pessimism, or rigid optimism” (p. 115). Similarly, Norem
and Chang (2001) noted that: “situations where the potential ‘downside’ is either
relatively likely or relatively serious would seem especially to call for a balance of
pessimism and optimism. Currently, almost no research exists on the extent to which
individuals (or on which individuals) are able to achieve this kind of balance or
flexibility” (p. 354). Norem and Chang’s observation that there is a dearth of research in
this area remains true today. The present research aims to rectify this gap in the literature.
In this dissertation, I present a model of flexible optimism. Of particular interest
to the present study is inflexible optimism. Based on the evidence provided above, it
seems that expectancy flexibility is independent of optimism and pessimism. Both
optimists and pessimists have the potential to react flexibly (or inflexibly) to contexts
based on the perceived level of risk and reward in that situation. To this end, I have
developed a measure of expectancy flexibility called the Expectancy Flexibility Scale
(EFS). The development and validation of this scale is described in detail in Studies 1
through 4.
Proposed model of expectancy flexibility. The precise nature of expectancy
flexibility and its correlates is currently unknown. However, several aspects of its nature
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can be deduced from prior research. First, expectancy flexibility is a personality trait
because some people are better able to shift their expectations than others. Second, given
that both optimists and pessimists can adjust their expectations, expectancy flexibility is
distinct from optimism and pessimism. Third, inflexibility is not simply extreme
optimism (or pessimism) and flexibility is not merely the midpoint of optimism and
pessimism. This differs somewhat from Wallston’s (1994) untested speculation that
cockeyed optimists would score higher on the LOT than cautious optimists. If this were
the case, then curvilinear effects for optimism would be evident in the research literature,
but only one study (Milam et al., 2004) supports this notion. It is my belief (based on
what information has been gathered so far) that it is not that being overly optimistic that
is harmful, but rather being optimistic at the wrong time. Thus, it is proposed that
expectancy flexibility is a personality trait distinct from dispositional
optimism/pessimism.
This approach could be used to bring disparate theories on optimism into a unified
framework. Expectancy flexibility may potentially reconcile dispositional optimism
(Scheier & Carver, 1985) with defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986) and
unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1980). Defensive pessimism can be thought of as
analogous to flexible pessimism. Defensive and flexible pessimists both share negative
expectancies for the future, but only in circumstances where pessimism can be beneficial.
Similarly, unrealistic optimism can be thought of as analogous to inflexible optimism.
Both unrealistic and inflexible optimists are positive about the future even when it is
potentially disadvantageous. Lastly, dispositional optimism and pessimism are similar to
flexible optimism and inflexible pessimism, respectively.
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Alternatives to expectancy flexibility. Before creating a new construct and
measure, I consulted the literature to determine whether pre-existing constructs could be
used as a measure of expectancy flexibility. The reason for this is that if a reliable and
valid construct already exists, then there is no need for a new measure. I will review these
considered alternatives in turn.
As an alternative to optimism, several researchers have advocated for realism
(Bortolotti & Antrobus, 2015; Schneider, 2001). However, defining realism is
problematic, as Held (2002) points out. To briefly paraphrase Held’s argument, reality is
too subjective to define objectively because it is subject to individual bias and cultural
influences. Injunctions to “be realistic” are of little help as everyone has their own idea of
subjective probabilities, which may or may not turn out to be accurate. This is a serious
limitation of the unrealistic optimism approach (Weinstein, 1980), which relies on events
with exact probabilities. Although it is possible to compare individuals’ subjective
probabilities with known probabilities for narrowly-defined events (e.g. the probability
that a smoker will develop lung cancer), this approach cannot be applied to most
everyday events, for which probabilities are unknown. Because of these flaws, I believe
flexibility is preferable as it avoids the potential pitfalls of realism in a subjective world.
Other definitions of flexibility exist, including psychological flexibility, cognitive
flexibility, and coping flexibility. Although all of these constructs have flexibility in their
names, they appear to be conceptually distinct from expectancy flexibility. Psychological
flexibility is similar to expectancy flexibility in that it allows people to adjust to
fluctuating situational demands (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010), but in practice has more
to do with having an awareness and acceptance of one’s thoughts and feelings (Hayes,
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Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Similarly, cognitive flexibility (Martin & Rubin, 1995) is
defined as having an awareness that one can behave in many different ways in a given
situation. However, cognitive flexibility is not limited to one’s beliefs about the future.
Lastly, coping flexibility (Kato, 2012) is defined as the ability to stop using coping
strategies when they are ineffective and adopt more effective coping strategies. There is
some similarity between this construct and expectancy flexibility, especially if one views
optimism as a strategy rather than a trait. Even so, coping is a far broader concept than
optimism so it is expected that any association with coping flexibility will be modest.
In a recent article, Hanssen, Vancleef, Vlaeyen, Hayes, Schouten, and Peters
(2015) proposed that the ability to flexibly adjust goals might mediate the relationship
between dispositional optimism and various types of well-being, including general wellbeing, anxiety, and depression. They found that flexible goal adjustment was the primary
mechanism through which dispositional optimism influences well-being. In contrast, no
such mediational effect was found for tenacious goal pursuit. These findings are relevant
because they suggest that flexibility may mediate the beneficial effects of optimism.
However, despite the similarities, Hanssen et al.’s view of flexibility concerns flexible
goal adjustment, rather than flexible expectations (of interest in the present study).
The last alternative to expectancy flexibility is defensive pessimism. While
defensive pessimism has its benefits, it also has negative effects on psychological wellbeing. For example, defensive pessimists have higher levels of anxiety (Showers &
Ruben, 1990). Clearly, the benefits of defensive pessimism are diminished if it is
accompanied with unpleasant feelings of anxiety.
Hypotheses
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Rationale. The first aim of this study is to extend past research to investigate
whether there are some contexts in which optimism is disadvantageous. The second, and
more important, aim is to investigate the mechanism that explains this, i.e. expectancy
flexibility. This study will determine whether expectancy flexibility adds incremental
validity to the prediction of outcomes above and beyond that of optimism. That is, is it
truly better to be a flexible optimist (as Seligman suggests) rather than simply an
optimist?
Three contexts were chosen to test whether optimism can sometimes be
maladaptive: gambling, health behaviours, and academic performance. These contexts
were chosen because past research (e.g. Chang & Sivam, 2004; Eronen et al., 1998;
Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004; Haynes et al., 2006) has suggested that pessimism may be
a better strategy than optimism in these contexts. These contexts may also provide a way
to test whether expectancy flexibility ameliorates the harmful effects of optimism.
Problem gambling behaviours were chosen as an outcome variable based on the
findings of earlier research (e.g. Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004) that suggested that
optimism was related to problem gambling behaviours. Although Gibson and
Sanbonmatsu’s sample was not comprised exclusively of problem gamblers, their
findings suggest that optimists (especially inflexible optimists) may be more vulnerable
to gambling problems. Flexibility’s role in this relationship can be elucidated from a
study of optimism’s effects on entrepreneurial performance (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009).
The qualities that Hmieleski and Baron ascribe to optimistic entrepreneurs (i.e. a
tendency toward unrealistic expectations, overconfidence, and discounting of negative
information) are similar to my conceptualization of inflexibility. It seems plausible that
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expectancy flexibility could reduce maladaptive persistence. Expectancy flexibility could
help optimists get “unstuck” from persistence by lowering their expectations in situations
where their optimism leads them to persevere despite unfavourable odds.
Another context in which optimism may have negative effects is in inhibiting
preventive health behaviours (Chang & Sivam, 2004). How might flexibility affect this
relationship? The finding of a curvilinear relationship between optimism and both taskoriented and avoidant coping suggests that moderate level of optimism may be more
beneficial than the extremes of optimism and pessimism (de Ridder et al., 2000). It is
plausible that flexibility may reduce feelings of invulnerability amongst optimists by
putting them in a more realistic mindset. In the presence of a perceived threat to their
health, flexible optimists may be more likely to undertake preventive health behaviours
than their inflexible counterparts. Taken together, it seems that expectancy flexibility
may influence one’s feelings of invulnerability about one’s health, which in turn
moderates the association between optimism and preventive health behaviours.
In the academic domain, optimism’s negative or null effects on academic
performance (Haynes et al., 2006) may be attributed to expectancy flexibility. I would
propose that this moderating role would manifest in an inverse relationship between
optimism and academic success among those scoring low on flexibility. Based on the
findings reviewed earlier, I would speculate that this association is mediated by approach
coping style. Optimists scoring high on flexibility are thought to be more likely to use
approach forms of coping and less avoidant forms of coping. In contrast, optimists
scoring low on flexibility may be more prone to using more avoidant forms of coping and
less approach forms of coping.
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Current study. The primary purpose of the current study was to investigate the
link between optimism and several outcomes (problem gambling, preventive health
behaviour, and academic success) and the role of expectancy flexibility in these
associations. The primary research question in this study was: Does optimism have
detrimental effects in some contexts? A secondary research question was: What variables
mediate or moderate these effects? A third research question was: Does flexibility
moderate or mediate associations between optimism and its outcomes?
Two moderated mediation models (Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007) and a
mediated moderation model (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) were proposed to examine
these research questions. In both moderated mediation models, optimism was selected as
the independent variable and expectancy flexibility was selected as the moderator. The
models differed with regard to their mediator and outcome. Problem gambling was
thought to be mediated by luck/perseverance and moderated by expectancy flexibility
(Figure 1). Similarly, academic success was thought to be mediated by academic
approach coping and moderated by expectancy flexibility (Figure 3).
In the first model, it was hypothesized that luck/perseverance would mediate the
relationship between optimism and problem gambling such that higher levels of optimism
would lead to higher levels of luck/perseverance, which in turn would lead to higher
levels of problem gambling. It was also hypothesized that expectancy flexibility would
moderate the association between optimism and luck/perseverance. That is, people
scoring high on expectancy flexibility would exhibit a smaller association between
optimism and luck/perseverance.

A Glass Half Full
Figure 1. Moderated mediation model for problem gambling
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In the second model, I examined the moderating effect of expectancy flexibility
on the relationship between optimism and preventive health behaviours, mediated by
invulnerability. Research on defensive pessimism (e.g. Chang & Sivam, 2004), which is
believed to be closely related to expectancy flexibility, suggests that low levels of
expectancy flexibility increase feelings of invulnerability. This, in turn, would weaken
the association between optimism and preventive health behaviours. It was hypothesized
that expectancy flexibility would moderate the positive relationship between optimism
and preventive health behaviours such that it would reduce the effect of optimism on
preventive health behaviours (i.e. lower levels of flexibility would reduce the relationship
between optimism and preventive health behaviours). In addition, this moderating effect
would be mediated by danger invulnerability. That is, it is predicted that individuals
scoring low on expectancy flexibility would score higher on invulnerability, which in
turn would moderate the association between optimism and preventive health behaviours.

A Glass Half Full
Figure 2. Mediated moderation model for preventive health behaviour.
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In the third model, I tested whether academic approach coping would mediate the
relation between optimism and academic success. It was hypothesized that expectancy
flexibility would moderate the indirect effect of optimism on academic success through
academic approach coping. That is, it was predicted that people scoring high on
expectancy flexibility would exhibit a weaker relationship between optimism and
academic approach coping.

A Glass Half Full
Figure 3. Moderated mediation model for academic success
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Study 1
A new scale known as the Expectancy Flexibility Scale (EFS) was developed to
examine the construct of expectancy flexibility. To develop and validate this scale, three
pilot studies were conducted. Items for the new scale were inspired by the writings of
several authors who have written about flexible optimism and related concepts (Forgeard
& Seligman, 2012; Norem & Chang, 2001; Sweeny et al., 2010; Wallston, 1994). In
addition, items needed to be answerable by both optimists and pessimists (which ruled
out items that could only be endorsed by optimists or pessimists). The objective of these
pilot studies was to test the reliability and validity of the EFS. Reliability of the scale was
assessed by examining internal consistency reliability. Validity was assessed by
examining convergent and discriminant validity.
Internal consistency reliability. Internal consistency reliability is defined as the
degree to which test items measure the same construct (Miller, Lovler, & McIntire,
2013). The items of a scale ought to be broad enough in scope so as not to be redundant,
but related enough to be internally consistent. The internal consistency reliability of the
EFS was assessed by examining Cronbach’s α for the entire scale.
Convergent validity. Evidence for convergent validity of a new scale can be
found by correlating it with measures of similar constructs. To establish convergent
validity for the EFS, the EFS was evaluated against several related scales. If an
instrument has good convergent validity, it should be significantly correlated with scales
that are thought to assess similar constructs. However, very strong correlations would be
cause for concern. This is because high correlations would suggest that the EFS
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instrument is a redundant and unnecessary scale (Garson, 2001). Other existing (and
better-validated) measures could be used to assess the construct of expectancy flexibility.
Because expectancy flexibility is thought to explain the phenomenon of defensive
pessimism, the Expectancy Flexibility Scale should be positively correlated with the
Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire and the Cognitive Flexibility Scale. Both concepts
have conceptual overlap with expectancy flexibility. However, defensive pessimism is
conceptualized as a strategy rather than a personality trait. In addition, cognitive
flexibility is not limited to one’s beliefs about the future, but applies to all situations.
Although a robust correlation is expected, a very high correlation (r > .50) would be
concerning because it would suggest that the expectancy flexibility construct strongly
overlaps with an existing construct.
Discriminant validity. Evidence for discriminant validity of a new scale can be
found by correlating it with measures of unrelated constructs. To establish discriminant
validity for the EFS, the EFS was evaluated against several scales that could be related to
expectancy flexibility but should be unrelated. It was expected that the EFS would be
independent of the constructs of social desirability and dispositional optimism. A
significant correlation with social desirability would suggest that EFS scores were
influenced by perceived desirability. It was expected that expectancy flexibility and
optimism would be distinct constructs; thus, it was expected that expectancy flexibility
would have no more than a small correlation with optimism. In other words, as a group,
optimists ought not to be more flexible than pessimists (or vice versa).
In addition, the Coping Flexibility Scale was included as evidence of discriminant
validity. However, despite the similarity in names, this scale does not appear to measure a
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construct similar to expectancy flexibility. It is expected that the Expectancy Flexibility
Scale will not be associated with this scale.
Lastly, expectancy flexibility was thought to be uncorrelated with locus of
control, as measured by the Locus of Control of Behaviour Scale (Craig, Franklin, &
Andrews, 1984). Locus of control (Rotter, 1966) is defined as either being internal (a
sense that one has control over one’s life) or external (one’s life is controlled by luck or
fate). While a modest correlation may be possible (because both inflexibility shares a
sense of fatalism with having an external locus of control), it is expected that locus of
control is a distinct construct from flexibility.
Hypotheses. The hypotheses for Study 1 were:
H1: The EFS scale measures a unitary construct with a single factor.
H2: To demonstrate convergent validity, the EFS will be moderately positively correlated
with conceptually similar constructs (defensive pessimism and cognitive flexibility).
H3: To demonstrate discriminant validity, the EFS will be uncorrelated with conceptually
dissimilar constructs (coping flexibility, social desirability and optimism).
Method (Study 1)
Participants. A sample of 250 students was recruited using the University of
Windsor’s Department of Psychology Participant Pool in the Fall semester of 2014. This
sample size is consistent with the heuristic that for scales with fewer than 40 items, a
sample size of 200 respondents is considered adequate (DeVellis, 2003). No restrictions
were placed on participant recruitment.
The sample was comprised of 210 participants identifying as female and 40
participants identifying as male. No participants identified as transgender. The mean age
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was 20.53 years (range = 17 to 48). The ethnic characteristics of the sample were as
follows, ordered from largest to smallest: White / European (n = 177, 70.8%), Middle
Eastern (n = 17, 6.8%), South Asian / Indian / Pakistani (n = 12, 4.8%), East Asian /
Chinese / Japanese (n = 12, 4.8%), Black / African / Caribbean (n = 11, 4.4%), Bi /
Multiracial (n = 10, 4.0%), Aboriginal / Metis / First Nations (n = 5, 2.0%), “Other” (n =
4, 1.6%), and Latin / South American (n = 2, 0.8%).
Measures. The measures chosen for this study were included in order to test the
convergent and discriminant validity of the EFS. The measures used in this study were
administered in the following order:
Expectancy Flexibility Scale (EFS). Expectancy flexibility was operationally
defined as the ability to adjust one’s expectations for the future depending on contextual
factors. The initial scale was composed of 20 items (consistent with the recommendations
of Clark and Watson, the size of this item pool was intentionally greater than is
necessary). Participants used a 5-point Likert scale to respond to the items, on which a
“0” represented “strongly disagree” and a “4” represented “strongly agree”. This was (by
intention) the same rating scale used for the LOT. The author evaluated each item for its
content validity and clarity. All of the items were tested for readability. The average
reading level of the items as assessed using the Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level was 6.7,
with a range from 3.7 to 9.3 (for comparison, the six non-filler items of the LOT-R have
an average reading level of 5.0). The items were preliminarily tested by asking several
individuals to complete the EFS and to remark on any problematic items. The items
administered to participants in the pilot study are summarized in Table 1, along with the
readability index.
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Table 1
The Expectancy Flexibility Scale (used in Study 1)
Item
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information.
2. I often ignore information that doesn’t fit my expectations.*
3. There are times when I choose to be optimistic.
4. I am optimistic some of the time.
5. I stubbornly refuse to change my expectations.*
6. My expectations for the future are based on similar past events.
7. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well.
8. When I think about the future, I try to put my own biases aside.
9. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect.
10. I lower my expectations when I am facing an important event.
11. I am optimistic only when I think it will help me.
12. I lower my expectations only when I can imagine things could go
badly.
13. I believe that being too optimistic is just as bad as being too
pessimistic.
14. I lower my expectations when future outcomes are beyond my
control.
15. I am pessimistic some of the time.
16. I create the future that I want by preparing for the worst.
17. I become more pessimistic right before I receive my grades.
18. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism.
19. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic.
20. I am pessimistic only when I think it will help me.
* Item was reverse-scored.

Readability
8.0
8.9
3.7
4.0
9.1
8.0
7.8
5.0
8.8
9.1
4.8
8.5
9.3
8.0
4.0
3.8
7.2
7.6
3.7
4.8
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Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. This scale was published by
Crowne and Marlowe (1960). It measures a tendency to respond in a socially desirable
manner and was used by Scheier and Carver (1985) in their validation of the LOT. Most
of the items reflect a desire to present oneself as always behaving appropriately and
lacking in unacceptable impulses. An example item is “I'm always willing to admit it
when I make a mistake.” The scale is composed of 33 items, 15 of which are reversescored. The items are answered using a true-or-false format. Crowne and Marlowe (1960)
reported that the internal consistency coefficient for the scale (using KR-20) was .88 and
found a one-month test-retest correlation of r = .89.
Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire (DPQ). Participants’ defensive pessimism
was measured using the Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire (DPQ), which was
originally published by Norem (2001). The DPQ is a 12-item measure rated on a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all true of me) to 7 (very true of me). Defensive
pessimism is defined as a strategy that involves lowering one’s expectations in order to
help manage anxiety or prevent disappointment.
This scale is designed to measure defensive pessimism in a general situation. An example
item is “Considering what can go wrong helps me prepare.” The DPQ contains no
reversed-scored items. The DPQ demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliability
(α = .78), as reported by Lim (2009).
Coping Flexibility Scale. This scale was designed by Kato (2012) to measure
coping flexibility. Coping flexibility is composed of two subscales: evaluation coping and
adaptive coping. According to Kato, evaluation coping is defined as “the ability to
discontinue an ineffective coping strategy” (p. 262). Adaptive coping is defined as the
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ability to “produce and implement an alternative coping strategy” (p. 262). The scale is
composed of 10 items, and has two 5-item subscales that measure evaluation coping and
adaptive coping. Participants rated each item using a 4-point scale (ranging from 0 = not
applicable to 3 = very applicable). An example item is: “When a stressful situation has
not improved, I try to think of other ways to cope with it.” Kato (2012) reported good
internal consistency for the evaluation coping (α = .72-.88) and adaptive coping (α = .78.89) subscales. Six-week test–retest reliability coefficients were adequate for both the
evaluation coping (r = .73) and adaptive coping (r = .71) subscales.
Cognitive Flexibility Scale. This scale was designed by Martin and Rubin (1995)
to measure one’s ability to change cognitive sets to adapt to environmental change. The
Cognitive Flexibility Scale is composed of 12 items. Four items are reverse-scored.
Participants respond to these items using a 6-point Likert scale that ranges from 1
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Higher scores indicate greater cognitive
flexibility. The internal consistency reliability was reported to be in the good range (α =
.76-.77; Martin & Rubin, 1995). An example item is: “I can communicate an idea in
many different ways”.
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R). Participants’ optimism was assessed
by administering the Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges,
1994). The LOT-R consists of six scored items and four filler items. Three of the items
measure optimism, and the other three items measure pessimism. An example of an
optimism item is: “Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad”. An
example of a pessimism item is: “If something can go wrong for me, it will”. Participants
respond to these items using a Likert scale that ranges from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4
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(strongly agree). The three pessimism items are reverse-scored. Scores can range from 0
to 24, with higher scores meaning greater optimism.
Locus of Control of Behavior Scale. This scale was developed by Craig,
Franklin, and Andrews (1984) to measure individuals’ perception of the degree of control
that they have over their lives. This scale is composed of 17 items that are rated on a sixpoint scale ranging from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Six items (1, 5,
7, 8, 13 and 16) are reverse-scored. Thus, scores can range from 0 to 85, with higher
scores indicating a greater external (rather than internal) locus of control. Craig et al.
(1984) reported that the scale has acceptable internal consistency reliability (α = .79) and
has excellent one-week test-retest reliability (r = .90). An example of an item measuring
(internal) locus of control was: “I can anticipate difficulties and take action to avoid
them”.
Demographics. The participants were asked to provide their age, gender, ethnic
identity, and year of study.
Procedure
The pilot study was conducted using an online survey hosted on FluidSurveys.
The study took approximately 30 minutes to complete. In compensation for their
participation in the study, participants received one-half of a bonus point that could be
added to their grade in a psychology course. The scales were administered in the same
order as they appeared in the Measures section. To ensure that the participants’ responses
to the EFS would not be biased by reading other measures in the questionnaire battery,
participants completed the EFS first.
Data analysis
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Before analyses began, the dataset was examined for missing data. Data were
examined for whether they were missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at
random (MAR), or missing not at random (MNAR). Missing data were replaced using
the multiple imputation technique, which is the preferred method for handling missing
data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).
The scale was refined in three steps (see the flowchart depicted in Figure 4).
These steps are based on published guidelines on scale development (DeVellis, 2003).
The first step was to conduct an analysis of the internal consistency reliability of the EFS
items. This step was intended to remove items that correlated poorly with the scale total.
In the second step, I conducted a factor analysis of the EFS items that remained after the
first step. This step was intended to determine whether or not the scale was multifactorial.
In the third step, I conducted a series of correlations between the EFS items remaining
after the second step with related and unrelated scales. This step was intended to establish
convergent and divergent validity of the EFS.

A Glass Half Full
Figure 4. Algorithm for EFS scale development.
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In the first step, I conducted a reliability analysis of the EFS items. Following
published recommendations for scale developers (Nunnally, 1978; Clark & Watson,
1995), I expected a minimum value for coefficient α of .70 (while this value is arbitrary,
it is the most generally accepted minimum standard for internal consistency reliability of
a scale in the literature). If the scale’s reliability was between .70 and .90, then no
revisions were deemed necessary and I proceeded to the second step. If the alpha
coefficient of the scale was less than .70, corrected item-total correlations were
examined. The item with the lowest item-total correlation was deleted in an effort to
increase the scale’s overall α level. Each time an item was deleted, a new reliability
analysis was performed. This process continued until the alpha level reached .70 or until
there were no items left to remove that would substantially raise the scale’s reliability. If
α > .90, this was also cause for concern. Very high reliabilities indicate that the scale
items may be redundant and that the construct measured may be overly specific (Briggs
& Cheek, 1986; Streiner, 2003). Inter-item correlations were examined. The most
strongly correlated item pair was identified and considered for deletion. In these highlycorrelated item pairs, I removed the item that had the lower item-total correlation. This
process continued until the scale had an alpha coefficient less than .90 or until there were
no items left to remove that would substantially lower the scale’s reliability.
In the second step, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. The purpose of
the factor analysis was to test whether multiple factors were present within the revised
EFS. An oblique (promax) rotation was used to allow for the possibility of correlated
factors. The number of factors was obtained using a parallel analysis (O’Connor, 2000).
Items with low factor loadings (less than .3) were deleted. This number is based on
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Stevens’ (1992) recommendation for a cut-off point for a sample size of 250. If one factor
was obtained (as expected), then I proceeded to the third step. If more than one factor was
obtained, the factor with the lowest correlation with optimism was chosen as a measure
of expectancy flexibility and any items loading on other factors were deleted. This was
done on the basis that flexibility ought to be uncorrelated with optimism. This factor was
re-analyzed for its internal consistency reliability using the steps described in the
previous paragraph.
In the third step, correlations were conducted between the revised EFS and
conceptually similar constructs (defensive pessimism and internal locus of control) and
conceptually dissimilar constructs (coping flexibility, cognitive flexibility, social
desirability and optimism). If correlations between the revised EFS and any of the
conceptually similar constructs were greater than .85 (Garson, 2001), then individual
items of the EFS were examined for their correlation with these measures. The items with
the strongest correlations were deleted, and steps 1-3 were repeated. If the correlations
between the revised EFS and any of the conceptually similar constructs were nonsignificant, then individual items of the EFS were examined for their correlation with
these measures. Items with the weakest (or negative) correlations were deleted, and steps
1-3 were repeated. If correlations between the revised EFS and any of the conceptually
dissimilar constructs were significant, then individual items of the EFS were examined
for their correlation with these measures. The items with the strongest correlations were
deleted, and steps 1-3 were repeated.
Results
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Undergraduate students were recruited through the Psychology participant pool.
Two hundred and fifty participants completed the survey. None of the participants met
criteria for listwise deletion (i.e. none of the participants had more than 20% of their data
missing). Little’s MCAR test indicated that data were missing completely at random.
Because of this, missing data were replaced using the multiple imputation technique.
An analysis of the internal consistency reliability of the original 20-item scale
found an initial overall alpha value of .68. Removal of six of the items (2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and
20) increased the overall reliability of the 14-item scale (α = .79). No further items were
removed because removing them would decrease the scale’s overall reliability. The alpha
value of .79 is very close to the ideal range of .80-.90 and is still considered adequate for
research purposes (Nunnally, 1978).
The correlations between the 14-item version of the EFS and conceptually similar
and dissimilar constructs are shown in Table 2. A high correlation with defensive
pessimism was expected; however, the correlation of greatest interest is the correlation
between the EFS and optimism. The high correlation between optimism and expectancy
flexibility was cause for concern as it suggested an unexpectedly high degree of overlap
between the two measures. Because of this, correlations between individual items of the
EFS and the LOT-R were examined for items that could explain the high correlation.
Items that had a correlation of more than .3 were considered for deletion. An
additional six items (12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17) were shown to have high correlations
with optimism and were deleted. These six items from the EFS and their correlations with
the LOT are shown in Table 3.
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Table 2
Correlations between the EFS and similar and dissimilar constructs
Construct
Defensive pessimism
Internal locus of control
Coping flexibility (EC subscale)
Coping flexibility (AC subscale)
Cognitive flexibility
Social desirability
Optimism
*p < .05, **p < .01

r
.44**
-.28**
-.13*
-.11 (ns)
.04 (ns)
-.31**
-.57**
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Correlations between items removed from the EFS and LOT-R
Item
Item 13
Item 16
Item 17
Item 14
Item 15
Item 12

r
-.44
-.40
-.34
-.33
-.32
-.32
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Table 4
Items comprising the 8-item EFS scale
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information.
6. My expectations for the future are based on similar past events.
7. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well.
9. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect.
10. I lower my expectations when I am facing an important event.
11. I am optimistic only when I think it will help me.
18. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism.
19. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic.
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Correlations between the 8-item EFS and similar and dissimilar constructs
Construct
Convergent validity
Defensive pessimism
Cognitive flexibility
Discriminant validity
Coping flexibility (evaluative coping)
Coping flexibility (adaptive coping)
Internal locus of control
Social desirability
Optimism
*p < .05, **p < .01

r
.37**
-.24**
-.04 (ns)
-.03 (ns)
-.27**
-.29**
-.41**
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The next scale (shown in Table 4) included items 1, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 18, and 19
from the original scale. The correlation between optimism and the remaining eight EFS
items was moderate (r = -.41). This means that the amount of variance in the LOT-R
explained by the EFS was cut in half, decreasing from 33% to 17%. While this is
considerably lower than the initial correlation (r = -.57), it is still relatively high.
However, removing the six items lowered reliability (α = .66).
For Step 3, correlations were re-calculated for the revised EFS and similar and
dissimilar constructs (see Table 5). The correlations between the 8-item EFS and similar
scales were similar to those of the 14-item EFS. As can be seen, there are no major
changes except that the correlation with optimism went down and the correlation with
cognitive flexibility went up.
Brief Discussion
It is clear that there was a trade-off between the reliability of the EFS and the
magnitude of the correlation between the EFS and the LOT-R. That is, the version of the
scale with the highest reliability was strongly associated with pessimism. Conversely, the
version of the scale that had a weaker (though still quite robust) relationship to pessimism
had lower reliability. The low internal consistency of the EFS is also concerning, as it
could have attenuated correlations between it and the other measures. In an attempt to
resolve this issue, another pilot study was conducted to assess whether additional items
could augment the scale’s internal consistency.
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Study 2
Due to the unexpected and disappointingly high correlation between the EFS
scale and LOT-R, another pilot study was conducted. One method commonly used for
increasing scale reliability is to add more items (Kaplan & Sacuzzo, 2012). In the second
pilot study, five more items were added to the EFS (see items 21-25 in Table 6). It was
hoped that new items would increase the scale’s reliability.
Method
Participants. I recruited 190 students from the University of Windsor’s
Department of Psychology Participant Pool in the Winter semester of 2015. Three
participants were removed from the dataset because of large quantities of missing data,
leaving a final total of 187. The sample was composed of 138 participants identifying as
female and 47 participants identifying as male. No participants identified as transgender
and two participants did not indicate their gender. The mean age was 20.73 (range = 18 to
36). The ethnic characteristics of the sample was as follows, in descending order of
frequency: White / European (n = 121), Black / African / Caribbean (n = 16), Middle
Eastern (n = 13), South Asian / Indian / Pakistani (n = 10), Bi / Multiracial (n = 9), East
Asian / Chinese / Japanese (n = 8), Latin / South American (n = 6), and “Other” (n = 4).
Measures. The measures used were identical to those used in Study 1. These
measures were the Expectancy Flexibility Scale, Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Scale, Defensive Pessimism Scale, Coping Flexibility Scale, Cognitive Flexibility Scale,
Life Orientation Test-Revised, and the Locus of Control of Behavior Scale. Five new
items (21-25) were appended to the EFS (see Table 6). Flesch-Kincaid Grade Levels are
shown in parentheses. Asterisks indicate reverse-scored items.
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Table 6
Items included in the EFS for Study 2
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information. (8)
2. I often ignore information that doesn’t fit my expectations.* (8.9)
3. There are times when I choose to be optimistic. (3.7)
4. I am optimistic some of the time. (4)
5. I stubbornly refuse to change my expectations.* (9.1)
6. My expectations for the future are based on similar past events. (8)
7. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well. (7.8)
8. When I think about the future, I try to put my own biases aside. (5)
9. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect. (8.8)
10. I lower my expectations when I am facing an important event. (9.1)
11. I am optimistic only when I think it will help me. (4.8)
12. I lower my expectations only when I can imagine things could go badly. (8.5)
13. I believe that being too optimistic is just as bad as being too pessimistic. (9.3)
14. I lower my expectations when future outcomes are beyond my control. (8.0)
15. I am pessimistic some of the time (4).
16. I create the future that I want by preparing for the worst. (3.8)
17. I become more pessimistic right before I receive my grades. (7.2)
18. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism. (7.6)
19. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic. (3.7)
20. I am pessimistic only when I think it will help me. (4.8)
21. I try to hope for the best but prepare for the worst. (1.9)
22. I am usually optimistic unless the potential ‘downside’ is relatively likely or serious.
(4.9)
23. I adjust my expectations for the future in order to cope with the situation. (9.3)
24. I try to think about all possible outcomes when I think about the future. (6.7)
25. When thinking about the future, I try to be as realistic as possible. (7.6)
*Item was reverse scored
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Procedure. The procedure used in this study was identical to that used in the first
study.
Data analysis. The approach used to address missing data was the same as that
used in the first pilot study. The strategy used to develop the EFS was tried again with the
new data provided by Study 2. Doing so largely replicated the findings of Study 1 and
yielded similarly disappointing results. Because of this, a new approach was used to
develop the EFS.
The approach to scale development used in Study 2 was different from that used
in Study 1. In the second pilot study, an iterative process was used to develop the final
scale. It was decided that the ideal scale should have adequate reliability (α > .70) and a
modest correlation with optimism (r < .30) to demonstrate discriminant validity.
Guidelines for evaluating the discriminant validity of new measures vary greatly;
however, a cutoff of .30 was judged to be appropriate evidence for discriminant validity,
as it is smaller than the correlations between the EFS and similar measures, such as
defensive pessimism. A similar method was used by Lucas, Diener, and Suh (1996) to
assess the discriminant validity of several well-being measures.
Starting at item 1, each item was added to the developing scale depending on how
the addition of the item affected the internal consistency reliability of the overall scale
and the scale’s correlation with optimism. If the item raised α, but lowered r, the item
was added to the scale and was not considered for deletion. If the item raised both α and
r, or lowered both α and r, the item was added to the scale but was considered for
deletion in the second round. If the item lowered α, but raised r, the item was not added
to the scale. If, at the end of this process, α failed to reach .70, or if the correlation with
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optimism exceeded r = -.30, the items were re-examined and considered for deletion.
Once the scale reached a semi-finalized state, previously rejected items correlating highly
with the overall scale were re-considered for addition to the scale if they increased α
and/or decreased r. The scale was finalized when α could not be increased without
substantially raising r. The algorithm for scale construction is depicted visually in Figure
5.
Once a finalized scale was obtained, a factor analysis was conducted. Using
promax rotation (to allow for the possibility of an oblique solution), two factors were
extracted. The rationale for extracting two factors was that there are two scales (EFS and
LOT-R). If the scales were distinct, it was thought that the items from each scale would
load on the same factor (e.g. the EFS items would load on one factor and the LOT-R
items would load on the other factor), with few items that did not load on a factor or
loaded on both factors. If the overall pattern of factor loading was not consistent
(exhibited either by a large amount of cross-loading items or inconsistent loading), this
would suggest that expectancy flexibility and optimism were not distinct constructs.
Lastly, evidence for convergent and discriminant validity was gathered by
correlating the scale with scales that were thought to be conceptually similar (defensive
pessimism and internal locus of control) and conceptually dissimilar (coping flexibility,
cognitive flexibility, social desirability and optimism). Moderate positive correlations
were expected for the EFS and conceptually similar scales; this would provide evidence
for convergent validity. No significant correlations were expected for the EFS and
conceptually dissimilar scales; this would provide evidence for discriminant validity.
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Figure 5. Algorithm for EFS scale development used in Study 2.
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Results
The EFS was constructed using the method stated previously. At the end of the
first step, items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 14, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 were included.
The internal consistency reliability of this scale was marginal (α = .65), but the
correlation with optimism was quite low (r = -.20, p < .01).
Because α was less than .70, the items were re-examined. Items with low itemtotal correlations (r < .30) were examined. These items were 2, 5, 6, 8, and 11. Items
were only removed if the alpha of the EFS could be increased without increasing the
correlation with optimism too much. Items 2, 6, 8, and 11 were removed. At this point,
the scale now consisted of items 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 14, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25. The
internal consistency reliability of this scale increased (α = .67) and the correlation with
optimism remained the same (r = -.20, p < .01).
Lastly, items not previously included that were highly correlated with this combination of
items were considered for inclusion (despite not being included in previous steps). These
items were 10, 12, 16, 17, and 19. Items were only added if the alpha of the EFS could be
increased without increasing the correlation with optimism too much. Of these five items,
only item 19 was included. With the inclusion of item 19, no other items were deleted or
added. The final scale consisted of 14 items (1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24,
and 25). The internal consistency reliability of the scale was acceptable (α = .69). While
the correlation with optimism was significant, it was quite low (r = -.25, p < .01). This
scale is both fairly reliable and relatively uncorrelated with optimism. The 14 items
included in the final scale are shown in Table 7.

A Glass Half Full

63

Table 7
Expectancy Flexibility Scale used in Study 2
1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information.
2. There are times when I choose to be optimistic.
3. I am optimistic some of the time.
4. I stubbornly refuse to change my expectations.
5. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well.
6. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect.
7. I lower my expectations when future outcomes are beyond my control.
8. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism.
9. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic.
10. I try to hope for the best but prepare for the worst.
11. I am usually optimistic unless the potential ‘downside’ is relatively likely or serious.
12. I adjust my expectations for the future in order to cope with the situation.
13. I try to think about all possible outcomes when I think about the future.
14. When thinking about the future, I try to be as realistic as possible.
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An informal analysis of the items included and not included in the final scale
suggests that the empirical method used to select or reject items has face validity. Some
of the rejected items were too suggestive of pessimism (i.e. “I lower my expectations
when I am facing an important event.”). Other items were probably too vague (i.e.
“When I think about the future, I try to put my own biases aside.”). The included items,
however, seem to have little to do with optimism or pessimism but instead seem to
suggest flexible expectations and cautiousness (i.e. “I adjust my expectations for the
future in order to cope with the situation” and “I try to hope for the best but prepare for
the worst.”). It is interesting to note that all five of the new items added to the EFS in the
second pilot study were included in the final scale. Descriptive statistics for the EFS are
shown below in Table 8.
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Table 8
Descriptive statistics for the EFS
Statistic
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum

Value
51.18
52
5.31
-.46
1.36
33
70
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To confirm that the flexibility items were distinct from optimism items, a factor
analysis was conducted. I included all 14 items from the finalized EFS and the six scored
items from the LOT-R. To allow for the possibility of an oblique solution, I used a
promax rotation (a varimax rotation was also tried, and the results were very similar to
the promax rotation). Two factors were extracted. The reason for extracting two factors
was because there were two scales; it was expected that the items from each scale would
load on the same factor. If this pattern was not observed, this would indicate some
overlap between optimism and flexibility items. None of the items were expected to load
on more than one factor. The pattern matrix is shown in Table 9. Only factor loadings
greater than .3 (or less than -.3) are displayed in the table.
The items from the LOT-R all loaded on Factor 1 only. In contrast, all of the
items from the EFS loaded on Factor 2. However, three items from the EFS (items 3, 4,
and 19) also loaded on Factor 1. For items 3 and 19, the magnitude of the loading was
actually greater for Factor 1 than on Factor 2. The positive loading of items 3 and 4 on
Factor 1 makes sense given that both items contain the word “optimistic”. The negative
loading of item 19 on Factor 1 also makes sense given that the item contains the word
“pessimistic” (it is almost identical in wording to item 3). Notwithstanding the crossloading of these three items, the overall pattern suggests that optimism and expectancy
flexibility are distinct constructs.
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Table 9
Factor component matrix for the EFS and LOT-R items
Factor 1
EFS items
1
3
.547
4
.323
5*
7
9
14
18
19
-.385
21
22
23
24
25
LOT-R items
1
.613
3*
.602
4
.673
7*
.719
9*
.644
10
.738
*Item was reverse-scored

Factor 2
.501
.483
.421
.305
.468
.552
.407
.552
.350
.441
.446
.541
.386
.363
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To test the convergent and discriminant validity of the EFS, a series of
correlations was conducted. As shown in Table 10, there was no significant correlation
between the EFS and either subscale of the coping flexibility measure. No significant
correlation was found with internal locus of control. There was a modest (though
significant) positive correlation between the EFS and cognitive flexibility and a negative
correlation between EFS and social desirability. As aforementioned, there was also a
small (though statistically significant) negative correlation between the EFS and
optimism.
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Table 10
Correlations between the EFS and related and unrelated scales.
Construct
Convergent validity
Defensive pessimism
Cognitive flexibility
Discriminant validity
Coping flexibility (EC subscale)
Coping flexibility (AC subscale)
Internal locus of control
Social desirability
Optimism
*p < .05, **p < .01

r
.39**
.17*
.10(ns)
.06(ns)
-.02(ns)
-.26**
-.25**
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Brief Discussion
The moderate positive correlation between expectancy flexibility and defensive
pessimism came as no surprise. It is important to note, however, that the correlation was
not so high as to suggest that expectancy flexibility is synonymous with defensive
pessimism. This finding suggests that expectancy flexibility has considerable conceptual
overlap with defensive pessimism while still remaining a distinct construct. Thus, the
moderate magnitude of the correlation provides support for both convergent and
discriminant validity. This can be explained using the framework outlined above; that is,
expectancy flexibility primarily differs from defensive pessimism in that it is a trait rather
than a strategy. People who score high on expectancy flexibility may engage in defensive
pessimism as a strategy, while still allowing for the possibility that they may also raise
their expectations under some circumstances.
There was no significant correlation between expectancy flexibility and locus of control.
This finding suggests that one’s locus of control has little to do with the amount of
flexibility one has. Individuals who have an internal locus of control were no more
flexible than people who have an external locus of control.
As expected, there was no significant correlation between expectancy flexibility
and either subscale of coping flexibility. It seems that these constructs have little in
common except for having the word “flexibility” in their name. In addition, there was
only a modest positive correlation between expectancy flexibility and cognitive
flexibility. While this is evidence for construct validity, these findings suggest that
expectancy flexibility is not redundant with other types of flexibility that already exist in
the literature.
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Unexpectedly, there was a small negative correlation between expectancy
flexibility and social desirability. People who scored high on expectancy flexibility
tended to score low on social desirability. In contrast, expectancy inflexibility tends to be
associated with social desirability. Although this finding was unexpected, in hindsight it
was unsurprising. Flexible people are probably less prone to attempt to make a good
impression and/or deceive themselves. Instead, they try to see things (including
themselves) as they really are rather than how they want them to be. Meanwhile,
individuals scoring low on flexibility (particularly inflexible optimists) are likely prone to
self-deception (Wallston, 1994).
The significant negative correlation between expectancy flexibility and optimism
was also unexpected. While they are distinct constructs, expectancy flexibility is related
to pessimism. However, it should be emphasized that the effect size of this association is
quite small. The significance of the association is in part due to the large sample size; or
as stated by Furr and Bacharach (2013): “If the correlation is small but the sample is quite
large, then the results might not indicate poor discriminant validity” (p. 267).
It should be noted that this finding appears to dispel the notion of pessimists as
being rigid and inflexible. Instead, pessimists are generally more flexible than their
optimistic counterparts. This suggests that expectancy flexibility resembles a mild,
healthy form of pessimism that differs from the pathological form of pessimism measured
by the LOT-R. Examination of the scatterplot in Figure 6 suggests that flexible optimists,
flexible pessimists, inflexible pessimists, and inflexible optimists are approximately
equally common.
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Figure 6. Scatterplot showing the association between expectancy flexibility (X axis) and
optimism (Y axis).
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Even with five items added, the reliability of the scale was still lower than .70
(albeit very close). One plausible explanation for this low reliability is that the context of
the items could have influenced the respondents’ responses to the items (Knowles, 1988;
Parducci, 1968). That is, the content of the other items not included in the final EFS scale
could have suppressed the overall reliability of the item included in the final EFS scale.
Thus, these items were removed when the scale was administered to participants in Study
3.
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Study 3
A new study was conducted to assess whether receiving negative feedback would
lead to a shift in participants’ expectations. Participants were given a brief academic
vignette, where they were asked to imagine how they expect to perform on an upcoming
exam. They were also given a brief gambling vignette, where they were asked to imagine
how they would respond in a simple gambling scenario (no gambling experience was
required to respond to this vignette). The objective of this study was to examine whether
people who scored high on expectancy flexibility are more likely to react to negative
feedback by raising or lowering their expectations (compared to people scoring low on
expectancy flexibility).
Method
Participants. Two hundred students were recruited in the Fall semester of 2015
from the University of Windsor’s Department of Psychology Participant Pool. Seven
participants were removed from the dataset because of large quantities of missing data,
which resulted in a final sample of 193. One hundred and fifty one females (78%) and 42
males (22%) participated in this study (none of the participants identified as transgender
or did not indicate their gender). The mean age was 21.06 (range = 18 to 40). The ethnic
characteristics of the sample were as follows, in descending order of frequency: White /
European (n = 122, 63%), Middle Eastern (n = 18, 9%), Black / African / Caribbean (n =
15, 8%), South Asian / Indian / Pakistani (n = 12, 6%), East Asian / Chinese / Japanese (n
= 9, 5%), Bi / Multiracial (n = 8, 4%), “Other” (n = 5, 3%), Latin / South American (n =
2, 1%), First Nations/Aboriginal (n = 2, 1%).

A Glass Half Full

75

Measures. Participants completed the EFS, LOT-R, an academic-related vignette,
a gambling-related vignette and a basic demographics questionnaire. The EFS and LOTR have been described before; the vignettes are explained in detail below.
Academic vignette. Participants were asked the following question: “Imagine
that you are taking a midterm test in a course in your major. You have prepared in your
usual way for taking the test. What percentage grade do you expect that you will receive
on this midterm test?” Participants were given six response options, in increments of 10
points. On the next page, all participants received feedback that was 10 points lower than
they had expected (for example, participants who indicated that they would get a 75,
would get ‘feedback’ that said they had received a 65). Participants were then asked,
“Imagine that you received a grade of [a number 10 points lower than expected] on this
midterm test. How do you think you would do on the next exam in this course?”
Participants were given the same response options described above.
Gambling vignette. In the Gambling Vignette, participants were asked to respond
to this hypothetical scenario: “Imagine that you are in a casino playing the slot machines.
You have $40 to gamble with. Each pull is $1 (if you win, you win a dollar; if you lose,
you lose a dollar). Estimate how much you will be up (have more money than you
originally started with) or down (have less money than you originally started with) after
30 pulls.” Participants were given the following response options: “Up by $20”, “Up by
$10”, “Neither up or down”, “Down by $10”, or “Down by $20.” Participants were
randomly directed to one of five situations. “After 30 pulls, you are now [x]. Please
estimate by how much you will be “up” or “down” after an additional 30 pulls.” (in the
brackets, one of the following five scenarios would appear: “up by $20”, “up to $10”,
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“Neither up or down”, “Down by $10”, or “Down by $20”). Participants were given the
same response options described above.
Procedure. After clearance was obtained from the Research Ethics Board of the
University of Windsor, data collection began. Participants for this study were recruited
through the University of Windsor Psychology Department Participant Pool, which
hosted the Study Advertisement. Participants completed the survey online, using
FluidSurveys software.
Individuals who chose to participate in the study were directed to the Letter of
Information page. In the Letter of Information, participants were informed of the purpose
of the study, procedure, right to confidentiality, and right to withdraw from the study.
Participants indicated their consent to participate in the study by clicking “I agree to
participate” at the bottom of the page, which directed them to the survey. Participants
who clicked “I do not agree to participate” did not continue to the survey, and were
directed to the exit page.
Participants completed several questionnaires online. These measures included
the EFS, LOT-R, an academic-related vignette, a gambling-related vignette and a basic
demographics questionnaire, which were described in the previous section. Participants
were given one of two different versions of the survey. The order of the questionnaires
was counterbalanced, so that some participants saw the vignettes first, and the self-report
questionnaires second. Other participants saw the self-report questionnaires first, and the
vignettes second.
Upon completing the survey, participants received 1 bonus point for their
participation, which could be used toward any Psychology or Business course that
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accepted bonus points. Participants were taken to a separate page (also hosted on
FluidSurveys) that asked participants to provide their name for the purpose of assigning
bonus points (identifying information was stored in a dataset separate from the rest of the
data to protect participant confidentiality). After providing their names, participants were
thanked for their participation.
Results
Separate analyses were conducted for the two administration formats; no
noticeable differences in the results were found between the two methods. Thus, the
findings presented here combine data collected using both methods.
In the academic scenario, a new variable was calculated by subtracting the postfeedback expectation scores from the pre-feedback expectation scores. Individuals were
divided into two groups; those who changed their expectations were coded as 1, and
those who did not change their expectations were coded as 0. Those who changed their
expectations were called “flexible” (n = 59) and those who did not change their
expectations were called “inflexible” (n = 134). An independent samples t-test found no
differences in flexibility (as measured by the EFS) between the two groups (t = .028, p =
ns).
For the gambling scenario, only participants who indicated that they had some
experience gambling were included in the analyses. Out of the initial sample of 193, 93
participants (48%) had gambling experience. A series of regressions were conducted,
using only the 93 participants with gambling experience. The pre-feedback score,
optimism scores, and expectancy flexibility scores were entered as independent predictor
variables. Of greatest interest was the association between flexibility and post-feedback

A Glass Half Full

78

gambling expectation scores. Optimism was included as a covariate to demonstrate that it
was not related to post-feedback gambling expectation scores (as would be expected,
given that optimists ought to have high expectations regardless of feedback). The prefeedback score was also included as a covariate. The five groups’ post-feedback
gambling expectation scores served as the dependent variable in each regression.
For the loss of $20 group, there was a marginally-significant association between
flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = -.44, t = -1.94, p =
.07). No such association was found for optimism (β = .31, t = 1.14, p = ns) or prefeedback expectations (β = -.02, t = -.07, p = ns).
For the loss of $10 group, there was no significant association between
expectancy flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = -.22, t = .78, p = ns). In addition (as expected), no associations were found between post-feedback
gambling expectation scores and optimism (β = -.04, t = -.17, p = ns) or pre-feedback
expectations (β = -.38, t = 1.31, p = ns).
For the “no change” group, there was a strong significant association between
flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = .63, t = 3.69, p < .01).
In addition (as expected), no associations were found between post-feedback gambling
expectation scores and optimism (β = -.20, t = -1.19, p = ns) or pre-feedback expectations
(β = -.15, t = .87, p = ns).
For the “gain of $10” group, there was a significant positive association between
expectancy flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = .44, t =
2.05, p = .05). In addition (as expected), no associations were found between post-
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feedback gambling expectation scores and optimism (β = .37, t = 1.68, p = ns) or prefeedback expectations (β = .04, t = .17, p = ns).
For the “gain of $20” group, there was unexpectedly no significant association
between flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores (β = .10, t = .42, p
= ns). In addition (as expected), no associations were found between post-feedback
gambling expectation scores and optimism (β = .01, t = .04, p = ns) or pre-feedback
expectations (β = .30, t = -1.24, p = ns).
Brief Discussion
The findings from the gambling scenario (but not the academic scenario)
supported the idea that shifts in expectations do occur in response to negative
information, and that these shifts are associated with expectancy flexibility. The findings
also demonstrate the complex nature of gambling cognitions. The increase in
expectations for the “gain of $10” group and decrease in expectations for the “loss of
$20” group were unsurprising. However, there were some unexpected findings.
The lack of association between expectancy flexibility and post-feedback
expectations was unexpected. In hindsight, it is not surprising that this occurred. A
slightly negative result would come as no surprise to gamblers, since it is expected that
the “odds favour the house”.
Similarly, the positive association between expectancy flexibility and post-feedback
expectations for the “no change” group was not anticipated. But because people tend to
be slightly pessimistic about gambling (the odds are stacked in favor of the house), even a
neutral outcome may raise gamblers’ hopes.
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Another unanticipated finding was the lack of association between expectancy
flexibility and the post-feedback gambling expectation scores for the “gain of $20”
group, when one includes optimism and pre-feedback expectations in the same model.
After all, one would expect such a positive outcome to be accompanied by an increase in
one’s expectations. I speculate that this is because the participants interpreted such
particularly good fortune as a singular event. This is called the gambler’s fallacy (Ayton
& Fischer, 2004), which is the belief that if an outcome (e.g. a win) happens frequently, it
will be balanced out by the opposite outcome (e.g. a loss) in the future. In the gambler’s
fallacy, a large win may be treated as a rare instance of good luck, and individuals may
think that they will not be so lucky next time.
However, the fact that no pattern of differences was found in the academic
scenario suggests that a shift in expectations may not occur in all contexts. In the
academic scenario, there was no change in expectations that was associated with
expectancy flexibility. It is reasonable to speculate that other processes may operate in
academic contexts to influence grade expectations (Svanum & Bigatti, 2006). For
example, students may feel that their exam grade on an individual exam may have little
influence on their overall grade for the course because there are usually several exams or
assignments during a semester. With these findings in mind, the final study was
conducted.
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Study 4
Method
Participants. Two hundred and fifty undergraduate students were recruited using
the University of Windsor’s Department of Psychology Participant Pool in the
Spring/Summer semesters of 2016. Participants were recruited from pool-eligible courses
in Psychology and Business. One hundred ninety one females (76.4%) and 58 males
(23.2%) participated in this study. None of the participants identified as transgender and
one participant did not indicate their gender. The mean age of the sample was 21.72,
ranging from 17 to 56. The total number of participants identifying as a particular ethnic
group was as follows, in descending order of frequency: 134 identified as White /
European (53.6%), 30 identified as Middle Eastern (12.0%), 22 identified as East Asian /
Chinese / Japanese (8.8%), 21 identified as Black / African / Caribbean (8.4%), 16
identified as South Asian / Indian / Pakistani (6.4%), 13 identified as Bi / Multiracial
(5.2%), two identified as Aboriginal/Metis/First Nations (0.8%), and one identified as
Latin / South American (0.4%). Eleven participants identified as “Other” (4.4%).
Measures. The measures that were used in this study are shown below in Table
11. With the exceptions of the Expectancy Flexibility Scale and qualitative questions,
each scale is an existing measure. The scales are described in more detail below.
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Table 11
Measures Completed by Participants in Study 4
Scale name
Academic Coping Strategies Scale
(ACSS)
Adolescent Invulnerability Scale
(AIS)
Academic Success Inventory for
College Students (ASICS)
Expectancy Flexibility Scale
(EFS)
Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire
(GBQ)
Life Orientation Test-Revised
(LOT-R)
Multidimensional Health Behavior
Inventory (MHBI)

# of items
56

Citation
Sullivan (2010)

21

Lapsley and Duggan (2001)

50

Prevatt et al. (2011)

14

New scale

21

Problem Gambling Severity Index
(PGSI)
Qualitative items

9

Steenbergh, Meyers, May, and
Whelan (2002)
Scheier, Carver, and Bridges
(1994)
Kulbok, Carter, Baldwin,
Gilmartin, and Kirkwood
(1999)
Ferris and Wynne (2001)

7

New scale

10
56
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Demographics. The participants will be asked to provide their age, gender, ethnic
identity, and year of study. The scale is shown in Appendix J.
Expectancy Flexibility Scale (EFS). The EFS was created for the purpose of this
dissertation. The development and validation of this scale is described in Studies 1 and 2.
The final form of the scale can be found in Appendix E.
Academic Coping Strategies Scale (ACSS). The ACSS is a self-report measure
of how students respond to an academic stressor – namely, receiving a grade that was
lower than they had anticipated (Sullivan, 2010). The ACSS is composed of 56 items (22
are filler items that do not load on any subscale). Each item describes a behavioural or
cognitive coping strategy. Respondents are asked to indicate how often they use this
strategy in this context, using a Likert scale (1 = almost never, 5 = almost always). The
ACSS has three subscales: Approach (15 items), Avoidance (11 items), and Social
Support (8 items). Sullivan (2010) reported good internal consistency reliability for all
three subscales: Approach (α = .91), Avoidance (α = .82), and Social Support (α = .81).
The ACSS can be found in Appendix B.
Adolescent Invulnerability Scale (AIS). The Adolescent Invulnerability Scale is
a 21-item self-report measure of personal perceptions of invulnerability (Lapsley &
Duggan, 2001). Individuals respond to the AIS items using a 5-point Likert scale that
ranges from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The scale has been validated in
both adolescent and young adult samples (Duggan, Lapsley, & Norman, 2000). In the
young adult sample (with a mean age of 21.85 years), the authors reported a two-factor
solution. The first factor was a twelve-item “danger invulnerability” subscale (α = .85),
which represented individuals’ invulnerability to external danger. A second factor, a

A Glass Half Full

84

nine-item “psychological invulnerability” subscale (α = .79) measured invulnerability to
psychological distress. In this young adult sample, scores on both subscales were
positively correlated with risk behaviors (Duggan et al., 2000). The AIS can be found in
Appendix C.
Academic Success Inventory for College Students (ASICS). The ASICS was
developed as a holistic measure of student success (Prevatt, Li, Welles, Festa-Dreher,
Yelland, & Lee, 2011). Most studies operationalize student success as grade point
average (GPA); however, GPA has been criticized as being a limited way of predicting
academic outcomes (Pritchard & Wilson, 2003; Robbins et al., 2004). To address this
limitation, the ASICS was developed to efficiently measure several psychosocial
predictors of positive academic outcomes identified by previous research (Astin, 1998;
Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harackiewicz, Barron, Pintrich, Elliot, & Thrash, 2002; Tinto, 1998;
Weiner, 1985). The ASICS has 50 items, and is divided into 10 subscales: General
academic skills, Internal motivation, Perceived instructor efficacy, Confidence, External
motivation, Socializing, Career decidedness, Lack of anxiety, Personal adjustment, and
Self-Regulation. In general, higher scores on each subscale meant greater amounts of that
construct (with the exception of socializing, where higher scores mean less engagement
in negative social behaviours, i.e. partying). Each item is rated on a Likert scale that
ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The internal consistency
reliability of the ASICS subscales was generally good (i.e. α > .70), except for the
External Motivation/Current subscale, which had a Cronbach’s α of .62 (Prevatt et al.,
2011). The ASICS can be found in Appendix D.
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Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ). The GBQ is a self-report measure of
gamblers’ cognitive distortions that was developed by Steenbergh, Meyers, May, and
Whelan (2002). The GBQ consists of 21 items, and each item is rated on a Likert scale
that ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). In the original study, the
authors included non-gamblers, because “gambling status does not dictate the presence or
absence of gambling-related irrational beliefs” (Steenbergh et al., 2002, p. 144). The
GBQ has two subscales: the 13-item Luck/Perseverance subscale, which reflects the
belief that people can make their own good luck if they just keep trying, and the 8-item
Illusion of Control subscale, which reflects the belief that one’s behaviour can influence
chance occurrences. The Luck/Perseverance subscale contains items such as “If I am
gambling and losing, I should continue because I don’t want to miss a win”. In contrast,
the Illusion of Control scale includes items such as “My knowledge and skill in gambling
contribute to the likelihood that I will make money.” These statements resemble the
beliefs of optimistic gamblers (Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). Both the
Luck/Perseverance subscale (α = .90) and the Illusion of Control subscale (α = .84) had
good internal consistency reliability. The GBQ can be found in Appendix F.
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R). The LOT-R was developed by
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) to measure dispositional optimism. The LOT-R
consists of six scored items and four filler items. Three of the scored items measure
optimism, and the other three items measure pessimism. An example of an item
measuring optimism is: “Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad”.
An example of an item measuring pessimism is: “If something can go wrong for me, it
will”. Participants respond to these items using a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from
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“strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). The three pessimism items are reversescored. Higher scores on the scale mean greater optimism. The six items of LOT-R had a
Cronbach’s α of .78, suggesting good internal consistency reliability (Scheier et al.,
1994). The LOT-R can be found in Appendix G.
Multidimensional Health Behavior Inventory (MHBI). The Multidimensional
Health Behavior Inventory was developed to measure young adults’ healthy and risky
behaviors (Kulbok, Carter, Baldwin, Gilmartin & Kirkwood, 1999). The MHBI was
chosen because it was developed to be used with a young adult population and taps a
wide variety of health domains (most health questionnaires are designed for people with
chronic or serious illnesses). The MHBI consists of 58 items, and participants indicate the
relative frequency that they engage in a behaviour using a Likert scale that ranges from 1
(almost never) to 5 (almost always). The MHBI has seven subscales relating to checkup
behaviours (10 items), dietary behaviours (13 items), exercise behaviours (4 items),
safety behaviours (9 items), social behaviours (6 items), stress behaviours (6 items), and
substance use behaviours (10 items). The authors state that the scale is intended to
measure different dimensions of health promotion behaviour, not as a summative scale. A
pair of gender-specific items on the Checkup subscale that pertained to breast selfexamination (for females) and testicular self-examination (for males) were not included
in the present study. All subscales are coded such that higher scores mean higher
functioning (this is of particular relevance to the Substance Use and Stress subscales).
Kulbok et al. (1999) reported that the internal consistency reliability of all seven
subscales were within the acceptable range, from α = .74 (for the Social subscale) to α =
.88 (for the Diet subscale). The MHBI can be found in Appendix H.

A Glass Half Full

87

Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI). The PGSI was developed by as part
of the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). The PGSI consists of
nine items that measure behaviours that suggest a problem with gambling (e.g. betting
more than one could afford), and adverse consequences (e.g. feelings of guilt or financial
problems). Individuals respond to PGSI items using a 4-point Likert scale, with anchors
of ‘never’ (0), ‘sometimes’ (1), ‘most of the time’ (2), or ‘almost always’ (3). The PGSI
is designed to be used in general population samples, rather than for use in a clinical
context. Ferris and Wynne (2001) reported good internal consistency reliability (α = .84).
The PGSI can be found in Appendix I.
Qualitative items. A set of seven items was used to tap into participants’ thought
processes. These items were developed based on previous research on shifts in
expectations (e.g., Carroll, Sweeny, & Shepperd, 2006). Participants were asked to
respond to the following questions: 1) “When something bad happens that you don't
expect, does this influence your expectations of the future? If so, how?”, 2) “If you get a
bad grade, do your expectations for your grade on the next test change? If so, how?”, 3)
“How does getting a bad grade change your behaviour for the next exam?”, 4) “When the
outcome an upcoming future event is uncertain, how optimistic or pessimistic are you
about what will happen?”, 5) “When something happens that far exceeds your
expectations, how does this affect your expectations of the future?”, 6) “When you feel in
control of the outcome, how does this affect your expectations of the future?”, and 7)
“When something unusually good or unusually bad happens, how does this affect your
expectations of the future?”
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Procedure. Prior to collecting data, clearance from the Research Ethics Board of
the University of Windsor was obtained. Participants were recruited through the
University of Windsor Psychology Department Participant Pool. Participants participated
in the study online by clicking on a link provided in the Study Advertisement hosted on
the Participant Pool website.
Individuals who chose to click on the link to the study were directed to the Letter
of Information page (shown in Appendix A). The Letter of Information informed
participants of the purpose of the study, procedure, right to confidentiality, and right to
withdraw from the study. After reading the Letter of Information, participants could
indicate their consent to participate in the study by clicking “I agree to participate” at the
bottom of the page. This link directed them to the survey, which was hosted on
FluidSurveys.com. Participants who opted to click “I do not agree to participate” were
not allowed to continue to the survey, and were instead directed to an exit page.
All of the questionnaires listed in the Measures section were administered.
Participants completed the ACSS, ASICS, AIS, EFS, GBQ, LOT-R, MHBI, PGSI, the
qualitative items, and a brief demographics questionnaire. On average, it took 47 minutes
for participants to complete the survey. Upon completing the survey, participants
received 1 bonus point for their participation, which could be used toward any course in
Psychology or Business that accepted bonus points.
After completing the survey, participants were taken to a separate page (also
hosted on FluidSurveys) that asked participants to provide their name for the purpose of
assigning bonus points. To protect participant confidentiality, this identifying information
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was stored in a dataset separate from the rest of the data. After providing their names,
participants were thanked for their participation.
Data analyses. Prior to conducting the data analyses, the data were inspected for
missing values. Missing data were replaced using a multiple imputation technique.
Descriptive data (such as means, standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis) will be
presented for all study variables. Correlational analyses will focus on expectancy
flexibility, optimism, and cognitive flexibility. All analyses will be performed using
SPSS version 24.
The data analyses tested the hypotheses described earlier. The mediated
moderation and moderated mediation were tested using SPSS PROCESS macros
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Hayes, 2013) designed to estimate indirect effects in simple
mediation models. The SPSS macros included a series of regression analyses to test the
requirements for mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The method developed by Preacher
and Hayes (2004) was chosen because it is considered to be superior to the traditional
procedures for testing mediational analyses developed by Baron and Kenny (1986) and
Sobel (1982). The Baron and Kenny method has been criticized because it is prone to
both Type I and Type II error, it does not directly address the mediation hypothesis, and
has low statistical power (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). The Sobel method has also been
criticized because it requires several assumptions that are rarely met; i.e. a large sample
and that the sampling distributions for mediation paths be normally distributed (Preacher
& Hayes, 2004). The model developed by Preacher and Hayes improves upon these
methods by using a bootstrapping procedure. Bootstrapping is a non-parametric method
that can take a large number of samples (e.g. 1,000) from the raw data of a sample size

A Glass Half Full

90

equal to the original sample size and computes estimates of the indirect effect for each
sample. The bootstrapping macro computes an estimate of the indirect effect, an
estimated standard error for the effect, and the 95% and 99% confidence intervals for the
population value of the indirect effect.
To test the hypotheses, the independent variable (optimism) and the moderator
(expectancy flexibility) were centered (Aiken & West, 1991). Centering was performed
because it resolves the problem of multicollinearity between the independent variable,
moderator, and the interaction terms without affecting the level of significance of the
interaction terms or the simple slopes of regression lines. To center, the sample mean is
subtracted from all participants’ scores, which results in a variable mean of zero. The
interaction variable was calculated by multiplying the centered optimism and expectancy
flexibility variables together (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991).
Three models were tested. In each analysis, optimism served as the independent
variable. In the first model, problem gambling served as the dependent variable. The
Luck/Perseverance subscale of the GBQ served as the mediator, and expectancy
flexibility served as the moderator. In the second model, preventative health behaviors
(as measured by the seven subscales of the MHBI) served as the dependent variable. For
the purposes of this analysis, the Danger Invulnerability subscale of the AIS served as the
mediator, and expectancy flexibility served as the moderator. In the third model, the ten
subscales of the ASICS served as the dependent variable. For the purposes of this
analysis, academic approach coping served as the mediator, and expectancy flexibility
served as the moderator.

A Glass Half Full

91

Results
Data cleaning. Prior to data analysis, data were examined for response patterns
that were contradictory or inattentive (endorsing “strongly agree” to both optimism and
pessimism items). No cases met these criteria. Missing values were identified using
Missing Values Analysis. Less than 5% of data were missing. Using Little’s MCAR test,
it was determined that these data were missing completely at random, χ2(4791) = 843.02,
p = ns. Missing data were imputed using the multiple imputation technique available in
SPSS.
Data were then examined for potential violations of the assumptions of multiple
regression. To test the assumption of normality, skewness and kurtosis were calculated
for each study variable. The acceptable range for skewness is between -3 and 3 and the
acceptable range for kurtosis is between -7 and 7 (Kline, 2005). For every variable except
PGSI, skewness and kurtosis were found to be within the acceptable range. To test the
assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity, residual scatterplots were analyzed. These
scatterplots showed that the data met these assumptions. Next, outliers were identified.
Univariate outliers were those that were less than z = -3.29 or greater than z = 3.29.
Multivariate outliers were those with a Mahalanobis’ distance that was significant (p <
.001), and influential observations were those for which Cook’s distance > 1 and
standardized DFFITS > 2 (Stevens, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The assumption of
multicollinearity was tested by examining Tolerance and VIF statistics. Tolerance scores
less than .10 or VIF scores greater than 10 would indicate a violation of this assumption
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Lastly, the assumption of independence of errors
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was tested by examining the Durbin-Watson statistic, which should be greater than 1 and
less than 3 (Field, 2005).
Basic demographic statistics. Means, standard deviations, floor, ceiling,
skewness, kurtosis, and Cronbach’s α are reported for each scale and subscale in Table
12. Floor and ceiling scores show the percentage of participants scoring at the theoretical
minimum and maximum for the scale. Floors were scores associated with low
functioning and negative well-being; ceilings were scores associated with high
functioning and positive well-being. To test for possible gender differences, a set of ttests was run for each study variable using gender (male/female) as the independent
variable.
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Table 12
Basic descriptive statistics for Study 4
Variable

Mean (SD)

Floor

Ceiling

Skew

Kurt

α

ACSS – approach

51.57
(10.20)
30.58 (6.69)
23.34 (6.27)
25.73 (7.03)
20.12 (6.22)
42.06
(11.22)
19.40 (7.56)
20.30 (5.73)
20.06 (5.21)
28.78 (7.04)
11.16 (4.85)
18.26 (5.92)
25.90 (6.73)
26.09 (6.73)
26.09 (8.09)
53.11 (6.59)
51.47 (5.80)
28.45
(15.53)
21.01
(10.38)
18.72 (4.27)
39.30 (8.74)
42.89 (6.21)
24.86 (6.33)
22.24 (6.67)
21.28 (4.11)
19.22 (4.30)
12.41 (3.98)
1.31 (3.36)

0

0

-.36

.64

.92

0
1.6
0
0
0.4

0
0
2.0
2.8
2.4

.14
-.13
.64
.21
-.22

-.34
-.24
1.16
-.28
-.34

.82
.83
.85
.87
.91

2.0
0

0.8
10.8

0.8
5.6
0.4
0
0.4
13.2
0
0
0

2.0
4.0
0.4
6.4
1.2
0
0
0.8
27.2

.04
.44
-.52
-.53
.24
.25
-.61
-.23
.71
.04
.04
.83

-.84
-.76
-.13
.32
-.82
-.24
-.40
-.56
.14
-.53
.92
-.25

.87
.82
.81
.85
.87
.78
.80
.86
.78
.76
.76
.96

0

20.0

.34

-.86

.90

1.2
0
0
0
0.8
0
0
0.8
0

0.4
0
10.8
0.8
0.8
3.6
1.2
4.4
76.4

-.57
.04
-.87
.41
.14
.04
.21
.07
3.12

.56
.05
-.24
.48
-.33
-.12
-.12
-.79
9.62

.80
.84
.77
.80
.85
.75
.82
.84
.93

ACSS – avoidance
ACSS - social support
AIS-danger invulnerability
AIS-psych. invulnerability
ASICS-General academic
skills
ASICS-Instructor efficacy
ASICS-Career decidedness
ASICS-External motivation
ASICS-Confidence
ASICS-Personal adjustment
ASICS-Self regulation
ASICS-Socializing
ASICS-Internal motivation
ASICS-Lack of anxiety
Cognitive Flexibility Scale
Expectancy Flexibility Scale
GBQ-Luck/Perseverance
GBQ-Illusion of Control
LOT-R
MHBI-Diet
MHBI-Substance Use
MHBI-Safety/Environment
MHBI-Checkup
MHBI-Social
MHBI-Stress/Rest
MHBI-Exercise
PGSI
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Gender differences were found for the following variables: AIS-danger
invulnerability, AIS-psychological vulnerability, PGSI, ASICS-social support, ASICSskills, ASICS-career decidedness, ASICS-socializing, ASICS-lack of anxiety, GBQ-luck,
GBQ-illusion of control, MHBI-social. Males scored higher than females on danger
invulnerability, t (78.74) = 4.52, p < .01; psychological invulnerability, t (247) = 4.89, p
< .01; PGSI, t (75.04) = 2.68, p < .01; ASICS-lack of anxiety, t (247) = 3.36, p < .01;
GBQ-luck, t (247) = 4.65, p < .01; and GBQ-illusion of control, t (247) = 4.09, p < .01.
Females scored higher than males on ASICS-social support, t (247) = 2.29, p < .05;
ASICS-skills, t (247) = 2.79, p < .01; ASICS-career decidedness, t (247) = 2.04, p < .05;
ASICS-socializing, t (247) = 3.75, p < .01; and MHBI-social, t (247) = 3.04, p < .01.
Outliers. Analysis of z scores showed that there were several univariate outliers,
i.e. z scores greater than 3.29 or less than -3.29. There were seven participants with z
scores greater than 3.29 on the PGSI, one participant with a z score less than -3.29 on the
ACSS approach subscale, and one participant with a z score greater than 3.29 on the
danger invulnerability subscale of the AIS. Analyses were run with and without outliers
removed. The analyses showed only slight differences (likely due to the fact that the
outliers did not greatly exceed the cutoff of |3.29|); the results shown here are without
outliers removed.
Internal consistency reliability. Variables were also examined for internal
consistency reliability. Cronbach’s α values greater than .70 were deemed acceptable. As
shown in Table 12, every variable exceeded this threshold (notably, including the EFS).
Overall, these values were similar to those reported in previous studies (Sullivan, 2010;
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Lapsley & Duggan, 2001; Prevatt et al., 2011; Steenbergh et al., 2002; Scheier et al.,
1994; Kulbok et al., 1999; Ferris & Wynne, 2001).
Correlational analyses. Tables 13 and 14 show the Pearson correlations between
all of the variables used in this study for all participants. Of greatest interest were the
correlations between expectancy flexibility and optimism with the other variables.
Correlations between cognitive flexibility and all other study variables were also
examined for comparison purposes. Separate correlational analyses were conducted with
males and females only; however, there were no substantial differences in magnitude or
direction of association (although many associations were non-significant in the maleonly sample; this is likely due to the smaller sample size).
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Table 13
Correlation matrix among predictor, mediator, and moderator variables

EFS

LOT-R

CFS

ACSS
APP

EFS
LOT-R

.218

.326**

1

ACSS approach

.160*

.306**

.444**

**

**

-.425**

0.016

0.121

**

-0.022

**

AIS Danger invulnerability
AIS Psychological invulnerability
GBQ Luck/Perseverance
GBQ Illusion of control

*p < .05, **p < .01

DI

PI

LP

IOC

1

CFS

ACSS social support

SS

GBQ

1
-0.109
**

ACSS avoidance

AVO

AIS

-0.006
0.098
-0.087
-0.043
*

-.134

-0.003

-.292

**

.272

0.005
-0.019

-.332

-.208

**

.190

**

-.286

**

-.229

1
1

.373

-.234**

1

-0.098

.252**

-0.119

0.037

*

-.147

.429**

1

-0.036

.457**

.166**

-0.024

**

*

*

.146

-0.023
0.027

*

.135

*

.152

1

.365

.132

1
.819**

1
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Table 14
Correlations between EFS and dependent variables
MHBI
EFS
EFS

DIET

SUB

SAFE

CHK

SOC

ASICS
STR

EXR

SKI

EFF

CAR

EXT

CNF

PA

SR

SOC

INT

LAX

1

MHBI diet

0.105

1

MHBI substance

.145*

0.084

1

MHBI safety

0.043

.425**

0.069

1

MHBI checkup

0.062

.379**

0.086

.644**

1

MHBI social

.161*

.126*

0.085

.277**

.334**

1

MHBI stress

0.101

.202**

.146*

.316**

.311**

.470**

1

MHBI exercise

0.058

.540**

0.029

.339**

.251**

.278**

.374**

1

ASICS skills

.181**

.177**

.274**

.356**

.298**

.295**

.245**

.297**

1

ASICS efficacy

-0.059

0.01

-0.04

0

0.023

0.04

-0.028

-0.006

0.017

1

ASICS career

0.066

0.032

.192**

.130*

0.114

.233**

0.035

.124*

.393**

0.118

1

ASICS external

.146*

0.021

.160*

.142*

0.089

.140*

-0.027

0.092

.474**

.178**

.344**

1

ASICS confidence

.217**

0.085

.193**

.157*

.165**

.251**

.275**

.258**

.531**

0.094

.388**

.525**

1

ASICS personal adj.

-0.037

0.026

.131*

0.016

0.06

0.056

.219**

0.092

0.092

0.057

.127*

-.175**

0.011

1

ASICS self-reg.

-0.031

0.114

0.104

.283**

.126*

0.117

.240**

.203**

.558**

0.12

.194**

.317**

.403**

0.12

1

ASICS socializing

-0.033

0.063

.584**

0.058

0.053

-0.049

-0.02

-0.04

.338**

0.087

.221**

0.087

0.109

.252**

.267**

1

ASICS internal

-0.004

0.063

0.059

.225**

0.123

.150*

0.08

.162*

.466**

.481**

.294**

.561**

.551**

-0.106

.522**

.130*

1

-0.114

**

*

**

0.003

**

*

**

**

-0.085

**

0.116

-0.086

-0.036

1

-0.023

**

-0.01

.175**

ASICS lack of anx.
PGSI

PGSI

**

-.273

**

-.182

*p < .05, **p < .01

0.044

-.183

**

-.411

-.156

0.093

-.167

0.066

**

-.199

**

-.170

0.054
0.009

-0.008

-.235

*

-.147

.126

-0.038

-.167

*

-.126

-.213

-0.124

-0.078

.191

-0.023

-.266

1
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Expectancy flexibility was positively correlated with three ASICS subscales:
General Academic Skills (r = .18, p < .05), External Motivation (r = .15, p < .05), and
Confidence (r = .22, p < .01), and was negatively correlated with the ASICS Lack of
Anxiety subscale (r = .27, p < .01). However, expectancy flexibility was not significantly
correlated with the other six subscales of the ASICS (i.e., Personal Adjustment, Selfregulation, Socializing, Instructor Efficacy, Career Decidedness, or Internal Motivation).
Expectancy flexibility was positively correlated with two MHBI subscales:
Substance Use (r = .14, p < .05), and Social Health (r = .16, p < .05); however, it was not
significantly correlated with the other five subscales of the MHBI. Expectancy flexibility
was only significantly correlated with one of three ACSS subscales, i.e. Approach coping
(r = .16, p < .05). Expectancy flexibility was negatively correlated with PGSI scores (r =
-.18, p < .01) and luck beliefs in gambling (r = -.13, p < .05), but was uncorrelated with
illusion of control beliefs in gambling.
Optimism was positively correlated with five ASICS subscales, including
confidence, personal adjustment, self-regulation, socializing, and lack of anxiety. No
significant correlation was found between optimism and the other ASICS subscales (i.e.,
skills, instructor efficacy, career decidedness, external, or internal). Optimism was
positively correlated with cognitive flexibility. Optimism was positively correlated with
ACSS approach coping and negatively correlated with ACSS avoidance coping, but
uncorrelated with ACSS social support. Optimism was also positively correlated with
three MHBI subscales, including (lack of) substance use, social health, and (lack of)
stress, but uncorrelated with exercise, safety, checkup, or diet behaviours. Optimism was
positively correlated with psychological invulnerability, but uncorrelated with danger
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invulnerability. Optimism was not significantly correlated with any of the gamblingrelated measures.
Mediational/moderational analyses. It was hypothesized that luck/perseverance
would mediate the relationship between optimism and problem gambling such that higher
levels of optimism would lead to higher levels of luck/perseverance, which in turn would
lead to higher levels of problem gambling. It was also hypothesized that expectancy
flexibility would moderate the association between optimism and luck/perseverance. That
is, people scoring high on expectancy flexibility would exhibit a smaller association
between optimism and luck/perseverance.
Baron and Kenny (1986) identified three criteria for determining mediation. First,
the independent variable must be significantly associated with the dependent variable.
Second, the independent variable must be significantly associated with the mediating
variable. Third, the mediator must be associated with the outcome variable in analyses
that include both the independent variable and the mediator. Mediational analyses were
conducted only when the first two criteria could be established.
Contrary to expectations, no association was found between optimism and
problem gambling (β = -.04, p = ns). Since this violated the first criterion, there was no
effect to mediate or moderate. Thus, no additional analyses were conducted with the first
model.
The second model examined the moderating effect of expectancy flexibility on
the relationship between optimism and preventive health behaviours, mediated by
invulnerability. Research on unrealistic optimism (Weinstein, 1987), which I believe to
be closely related to expectancy inflexibility, suggests that feelings of invulnerability may
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be associated with low levels of expectancy flexibility. This, in turn, would weaken the
association between optimism and preventive health behaviours. It was hypothesized that
expectancy flexibility would moderate the positive relationship between optimism and
preventive health behaviours such that it would reduce the effect of optimism on
preventive health behaviours (i.e. lower levels of flexibility would reduce the relationship
between optimism and preventive health behaviours). In addition, this moderating effect
would be mediated by danger invulnerability. That is, it is predicted that individuals
scoring low on expectancy flexibility would score higher on danger invulnerability,
which in turn would moderate the association between optimism and preventive health
behaviours.
Mediated moderation was tested in three steps (Muller et al., 2005). First, the
predictor, moderator, and their interaction term are regressed on the dependent variable
(this is the same as a test of moderation). Second, the predictor, moderator, and their
interaction term are regressed on the mediator variable. Third, the predictor, moderator,
mediator, interaction of the predictor and moderator, and the interaction of the mediator
and moderator are all regressed on the dependent variable. If there is a significant
interaction (predictor x moderator) in the first step, and this interaction becomes nonsignificant in third step, then moderation is mediated. Thus, at minimum, this interaction
term must be significant before additional analyses can be conducted.
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Table 15
Regression (beta) weights for moderation analysis
DV

Optimism

Expectancy

Optimism x

flexibility

Expectancy
flexibility

MHBI-Diet

.10

.11

.12

MHBI-Substance Use

.23**

.17**

.04

MHBI-

.07

.05

.02

MHBI-Checkup

.08

.07

.05

MHBI-Social

.20**

.18**

-.09

MHBI-Stress/Rest

.47**

.15*

-.04

.08

.07

.02

Safety/Environment

MHBI-Exercise
*p < .05, **p < .01
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As shown in Table 15 above, although both optimism and expectancy flexibility
were significantly associated with three of the MHBI subscales (Substance use, Social,
and Stress/Rest), all of the interaction terms were non-significant. Because of this, no
additional analyses were conducted.
The third model investigated the mediating effect of academic approach coping
on the association between optimism and academic success. This model initially tested
whether academic approach coping would mediate the relation between optimism and
academic success. It was hypothesized that expectancy flexibility would moderate the
indirect effect of optimism on academic success through academic approach coping. That
is, it was predicted that people scoring high on expectancy flexibility would exhibit a
weaker relationship between optimism and academic approach coping.
Ten separate models were examined, one for each of the academic success
subscales (which were used as dependent variables). In each of the models, optimism
served as the predictor variable, academic approach coping served as the mediator, and
expectancy flexibility served as the moderator. The same criteria described above were
used for determining the existence of mediation. The Sobel test was used to determine
whether the decrease in β resulting from mediation was statistically significant. To
reiterate, the independent variable must be significantly associated with the dependent
variable, the independent variable must be significantly associated with the mediating
variable, and the mediator must be associated with the outcome variable in analyses that
include both the independent variable and the mediator. Mediational analyses were
conducted only when the first two criteria could be established.
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As shown in Table 13, no association was found between optimism and the skills
(r = .11, p = ns), instructor efficacy (r = -.07, p = ns), career decidedness (r = .11, p = ns),
external (r = -.08, p = ns), and internal (r = -.02, p = ns) subscales. This violated the first
criteria of mediation; as a result, no mediational analyses were conducted using these
dependent variables. However, there was a significant association between optimism and
confidence (r = .25, p < .01), personal adjustment (r = .28, p < .01), self-regulation (r =
.15, p < .05), socialization (r = .13, p < .05), and lack of anxiety (r = .15, p < .05). These
subscales were entered into the mediational analyses as dependent variables. Since
optimism was significantly associated with the academic approach coping (r = .31, p <
.01), the second criterion could be established.
Full mediational effects were found for academic approach coping on the
association between optimism and self-regulation and between optimism and
socialization. With the inclusion of academic approach coping in the model, optimism
had no significant direct effect on self-regulation (β = .07, p = ns). This association was
lower in magnitude than the significant direct effect of optimism without academic
approach coping (β = .15, p < .05). Results of the Sobel test indicated that this
mediational effect was significant (Sobel’s z = 3.23, p = .001).
For socialization, with the inclusion of academic approach coping in the model,
optimism had no significant direct effect on self-regulation (β = .07, p = ns). This
association was smaller in magnitude than the significant direct effect of optimism
without academic approach coping (β = .13, p < .05). Results of the Sobel test indicated
that this mediational effect was significant (Sobel’s z = 2.61, p = .04).
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A partial mediation effect was found for academic approach coping on the
association between optimism and confidence. Although optimism was still significantly
associated with confidence (β = .15, p < .05), the magnitude of this association was
considerably smaller than the direct effect of optimism without academic approach
coping (β = .25, p < .01). Results of the Sobel test indicated that this mediational effect
was significant (Sobel’s z = 3.81, p < .001). Thus, academic approach coping partially
mediated optimism’s association with confidence.
However, academic approach coping did not mediate the effect of optimism on
personal adjustment and lack of anxiety. The effect of optimism on personal adjustment
with academic approach coping included (β = .27, p < .05) was only slightly lower than
the direct effect of optimism without academic approach coping (β = .28, p < .01), and
the Sobel test was non-significant (Sobel’s z = .70, p = ns). For the lack of anxiety
variable, not only was there no mediational effect, there was evidence for a suppressor
effect (Conger, 1974). With the inclusion of academic approach coping in the model,
optimism had a significant direct effect on lack of anxiety (β = .21, p < .01), but this was
unexpectedly greater in magnitude than the direct effect without academic approach
coping (β = .15, p < .05). Results of the Sobel test indicated that this mediational effect
was significant (Sobel’s z = -2.60, p = .01).
Moderated mediation. In the next series of analyses, I tested the moderated
mediation hypotheses. The first step was to conduct a simple moderation analysis.
Expectancy flexibility was predicted to moderate the effect of optimism on academic
success. Models previously shown to exhibit a mediation effect were examined to
determine whether these mediational effects were moderated by expectancy flexibility.
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Evidence for moderation would be given by a significant interaction effect. If moderation
was supported, a second moderation analysis would be conducted wherein expectancy
flexibility would moderate the effect of optimism on academic success, with academic
approach coping treated as a covariate. Lastly, a final analysis combining moderation and
mediation was conducted that included all four variables (i.e., optimism, academic
success, academic approach coping, and expectancy flexibility).
In the first set of analyses, optimism, expectancy flexibility, and their interaction
were entered into a regression as independent variables. Confidence, self-regulation, and
socialization were treated as dependent variables in three separate regressions. Table 16
shows the results of these analyses.
Confidence was predicted by optimism (β = 0.27, p < .01), expectancy flexibility
(β = 0.25, p < .01), but not the optimism x expectancy flexibility interaction (β = -0.08, p
= ns). Self-regulation was predicted by optimism (β = 0.14, p < .05), but not expectancy
flexibility (β = -0.02, p = ns) or the optimism x expectancy flexibility interaction (β = 0.11, p = ns). Socialization was predicted by optimism (β = 0.13, p < 0.05), but not
expectancy flexibility (β = -0.02, p = ns) or the optimism x expectancy flexibility
interaction (β = -0.01, p = ns). The lack of a significant interaction effect in all three
analyses suggested that moderated mediation was not present; therefore, no additional
analyses were conducted.
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Table 16
Regression beta-weights for moderated mediation analyses

Confidence
Self-regulation
Socialization
**p < .01, *p < .05

Optimism

Expectancy
flexibility

.27**
.14*
.13*

.25**
-.02
-.02

Optimism x
Expectancy
flexibility
-.08
-.11
-.01
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Analysis of Qualitative Items. The qualitative items were analyzed to determine
whether meaningful differences could be found between different types of participants.
Participants were divided into four groups: flexible optimists (those scoring above the
median on both the LOT-R and EFS), flexible pessimists (those scoring below the
median on the LOT-R, but above the median on the EFS), inflexible optimists (those
scoring above the median on the LOT-R, but below the median on the EFS), and
inflexible pessimists (those scoring below the median on both the LOT-R and EFS).
Scores of 52 or greater for the EFS were coded as “flexible” and scores 19 and over for
the LOT-R were coded as “optimistic”. Scores of 51 or lower on the EFS and 18 or
lower on the LOT-R were coded as “inflexible” and “pessimistic”, respectively. This
method yielded four groups of approximately equal size: 73 flexible optimists, 61 flexible
pessimists, 66 inflexible optimists, and 50 inflexible pessimists. Twenty-one percent of
flexible optimists were male (n = 15), 21% of flexible pessimists were male (n = 13),
21% of inflexible optimists were male (n = 14), and 32% of inflexible pessimists were
male (n = 16). The remaining participants in each group were female. The proportion of
males in each group did not significantly differ (χ2 = 2.73, p = ns).
Participant responses were read and coded by the author and were organized into
various themes (often, more than one theme was identified in a participant’s responses).
Participant responses were discarded if they were too brief (e.g., a simple yes/no) or were
not relevant (e.g. did not answer the question with a cogent response).
The order of the questions started off general and became more specific, so as to
avoid “priming”. For each question, two to five themes were identified. The proportion
and frequency of each theme is given below, for each of the four groups identified above
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(i.e., flexible optimists, flexible pessimists, inflexible optimists, and inflexible pessimists.
Percentages may not add to 100% because some participants expressed multiple themes,
or their responses could not be easily categorized. These results are summarized in Tables
17-23.
Question 1: “When something bad happens that you don't expect, does this
influence your expectations of the future? If so, how?”
Two-hundred and forty participants responded to this item. An additional 19
responses were discarded because they were too brief or were not relevant. This left 221
responses, which was composed of 67 flexible optimists, 54 flexible pessimists, 58
inflexible optimists, and 42 inflexible pessimists. Several themes emerged from the
responses to this item. In general, the responses to this item were mostly in the
affirmative, suggesting that most participants became more pessimistic in these
situations. Four common themes were identified: contingent shift, hopelessness/doubt,
approach coping, and positive thinking. These results are shown in Table 17.
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Table 17
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 1

Themes
Contingent shift
Hopelessness/doubt
Approach coping
Positive thinking

Flexible
optimists
25 (37%)
12 (18%)
19 (28%)
11 (16%)

Flexible
pessimists
17 (32%)
15 (28%)
14 (26%)
4 (7%)

Inflexible
optimists
7 (12%)
8 (14%)
9 (16%)
22 (38%)

Inflexible
pessimists
8 (19%)
17 (41%)
4 (9%)
4 (9%)
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Most participants (regardless of their level of optimism or expectancy flexibility)
indicated that such an event would shift their expectations toward pessimism. However,
most participants stated that this shift toward pessimism was temporary. A subgroup of
participants indicated that they would become more pessimistic, but only in the face of a
severely negative event. As one participant put it, “It depends on the situation, but yes,
sometimes if something bad and unexpected happens it will cause anxiety and distress in
me.” This “contingent shift” in expectations was quite common among flexible optimists
(37%) and flexible pessimists alike (32%), and less common among inflexible pessimists
(19%) and inflexible optimists (12%). Another subset of participants expressed a loss of
confidence, hopelessness, and self-doubt in the face of negative events. This was dubbed
the “hopelessness/doubt” theme. For example, one participant said that such negative
events “often can lead to bringing up other feelings and I can get depressed very easily.”
Unsurprisingly, many inflexible pessimists expressed this theme (41%), though flexible
pessimists (28%) also commonly expressed this kind of thinking. These participants
typically made what Seligman et al. have called “pessimistic attributions” (stable and
global negative beliefs about the future). Both inflexible (14%) and flexible optimists
(18%) expressed this theme, but were less likely to do so than both groups of pessimists.
Other participants expressed what could be called “positive thinking.” These
participants expressed that negative events would not change their expectations. This was
common among inflexible optimists (38%) and less common among the other groups:
16% of flexible optimists, 9% of inflexible pessimists, and 7% of flexible pessimists.
These participants expressed an unflappable optimism even in the face of adversity (as
one participant put it, “My hope will never drop”). But not all such participants were
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cockeyed optimists. In some cases, their responses included coping styles like positive
reframing, wherein individuals try to see negative situations in a more positive light.
Some participants indicated that negative events would cause them to reappraise
the situation or be better prepared for the future. This “approach” style was often
accompanied by a shift in expectations. That is, a shift toward pessimism often motivated
participants into action. Often participants saw it as an opportunity for self-improvement
or said that they would deal with it by talking it over with someone or that they would
find another way to reach their goals, e.g. “When something bad happens, I question
myself as to why it had to happen... I try to prevent the same thing to happen [sic] in the
future.” This theme was most common among flexible optimists (28%) and flexible
pessimists (26%) and less common among the other groups: 16% of inflexible optimists,
and 9% of inflexible pessimists.
Question 2: “If you get a bad grade, do your expectations for your grade on the
next test change? If so, how?”
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 240, 96%). Here, the responses
were more mixed. An additional 17 responses were discarded because they were either
too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not relevant. This left 223 responses, which was
composed of 67 flexible optimists, 54 flexible pessimists, 56 inflexible optimists, and 46
inflexible pessimists. Three primary themes were identified: “discouragement”, “lowered
expectations” and “motivation” (many participants also believed that a poor exam grade
would not change their expectations for the future, but there was little difference between
optimists and pessimists and between inflexible and flexible participants). These results
were summarized in Table 18.
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Table 18
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 2
Themes
Discouragement
Lowered expectations
Motivation

Flexible
optimists
12 (18%)
4 (6%)
43 (64%)

Flexible
pessimists
10 (19%)
17 (31%)
28 (51%)

Inflexible
optimists
7 (13%)
1 (2%)
27 (48%)

Inflexible
pessimists
21 (45%)
13 (28%)
14 (31%)
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Participants expressing discouragement believed that getting a bad exam grade
was a sign of failure or inability to succeed in their coursework. They generally did not
indicate that they would change their behavior for the next exam. As one participant put
it, “If I get a bad grade on a test, then I have the expectation that I will do poorly again.”
This was common among inflexible pessimists (45%), but uncommon among flexible
pessimists (19%), flexible optimists (18%) and inflexible optimists (13%).
Some participants indicated that they would intentionally lower their expectations
about their next grade. For example, on participant stated, “I usually tend to lower my
expectations for the next test…then there is less room for disappointment if another bad
grade is received.” This theme was sometimes accompanied by a belief that they would
take action to do better on the next exam. Lowered expectations were common among
both flexible pessimists (31%) and inflexible pessimists (28%), but less common among
flexible optimists (6%) and rare among inflexible optimists (2%).
Many participants indicated that getting a bad grade would motivate them to work
harder on the next exam. These participants indicated that they were determined to do
better to raise their average by making “adjustments” to their study strategy. For
example, one participant stated, “Yes, I start to work a lot harder so I can obtain the grade
I want.” This was common among flexible optimists (64%) and flexible pessimists
(51%), with smaller percentages among inflexible optimists (48%) and inflexible
pessimists (31%). However, flexible optimists and flexible pessimists were differentiated
primarily in what motivated them. Flexible pessimists said that the fear of getting another
bad grade motivated them into action, while flexible optimists said that the hope of
getting a good grade provided them with motivation.
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Question 3: “How does getting a bad grade change your behaviour for the next
exam?”
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 238, 95%). An additional 12
responses were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not
relevant. This left 226 responses, which was composed of 68 flexible optimists, 55
flexible pessimists, 58 inflexible optimists, and 45 inflexible pessimists. Due to the
similarity to the previous question, similar themes appeared. Predictably, almost all
(82%) of the participants indicated that getting a bad grade would motivate them to study
more. Three themes appeared, specifically: “anxiety-as-motivation”, “motivation without
anxiety” and “feelings of failure”. These results were summarized in Table 19.
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Table 19
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 3
Themes
Anxiety-as-motivation
Feelings of failure
Motivation

Flexible
optimists
14 (21%)
1 (2%)
47 (69%)

Flexible
pessimists
29 (53%)
4 (8%)
24 (44%)

Inflexible
optimists
5 (8%)
9 (15%)
38 (65%)

Inflexible
pessimists
5 (12%)
13 (28%)
25 (56%)
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This anxiety-as-motivation theme was particularly common amongst flexible
pessimists (53% of flexible pessimists expressed this theme, compared to 21% of flexible
optimists, 12% of inflexible pessimists, and 8% of inflexible optimists). Both flexible
optimists and inflexible optimists were motivated to study harder, with little anxiety.
Feelings of failure were endorsed by relatively few participants (9% overall).
These feelings were largely confined to inflexible pessimists (28%); however, it was also
a common theme amongst inflexible optimists (15%). Many of these participants did not
express a motivation to study harder (suggesting helplessness). Flexible pessimists (8%)
and flexible optimists (2%) were unlikely to express these themes.
The last theme was called “motivation without anxiety”. This theme was similar
to the anxiety-as-motivation theme, except the motivation that participants felt was
accompanied by relatively little anxiety. For example, one participant responded,
“No…One bad grade motivates me to try harder to achieve my expected grade on the
next test.” This theme was quite common amongst all four groups (69% of flexible
optimists expressed this theme, compared to 65% of inflexible optimists, 56% of
inflexible pessimists, and 44% of flexible pessimists).
Question 4: “When the outcome an upcoming future event is uncertain, how
optimistic or pessimistic are you about what will happen?”
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 234, 94%), but 15 responses
were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not relevant. This
left 219 responses (66 flexible optimists, 53 flexible pessimists, 56 inflexible optimists,
and 44 inflexible pessimists). Four themes emerged: “optimistic”, “defensive
pessimistic”, “mixed”, and “pessimistic”. These results were summarized in Table 20.
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Table 20
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 4
Themes
Optimistic
Defensive pessimistic
Mixed
Pessimistic

Flexible
optimists
26 (39%)
12 (18%)
14 (21%)
0 (0%)

Flexible
pessimists
18 (34%)
22 (41%)
15 (28%)
10 (22%)

Inflexible
optimists
43 (76%)
4 (8%)
5 (9%)
3 (6%)

Inflexible
pessimists
7 (15%)
7 (15%)
2 (5%)
32 (72%)
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The optimistic theme was characterized by positive expectations about the future.
These participants said that their optimism helped them cope with uncertain outcomes. It
was most common among inflexible optimists (76%), with smaller numbers among
flexible optimists (39%), flexible pessimists (34%), and inflexible pessimists (15%). This
theme was occasionally accompanied by magical thinking, e.g., “I believe…that
something good will happen if I think positive.”
The defensive-pessimistic theme was characterized by a deliberately setting
expectations low so as not to be disappointed, e.g., “I usually try to set my expectations
low because it's always nice to be pleasantly surprised.” One common statement that
emerged for the defensive pessimistic theme was a sentiment of “hope for the best,
prepare for the worst” (one participant stated this verbatim). It was most common among
flexible pessimists (41%), with smaller numbers among flexible optimists (18%),
inflexible pessimists (15%), and inflexible optimists (8%).
The “mixed” theme was characterized by a mix of pessimistic and optimistic
beliefs. It was common among flexible pessimists (28%) and flexible optimists (21%),
and rarer among inflexible optimists (9%) and inflexible pessimists (5%). Participants
endorsing this theme often emphasized their neutrality or equanimity in the face of such
an event. Participants often qualified their response by saying that their optimism or
pessimism would depend on their familiarity or confidence with the event, e.g., “If I feel
fairly confident in the event, I would be optimistic... If it is an event I'm not familiar with,
than I usually am pessimistic.”
The pessimistic theme was most common among inflexible pessimists (72%),
with smaller amounts among flexible pessimists (22%), inflexible optimists (6%), and no
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occurrences among flexible optimists. This theme was characterized by negative
expectations about the future, but unlike the defensive pessimistic theme, participants did
not express this a strategic lowering of expectations to prevent possible disappointment,
e.g., “I am highly pessimistic about the future event being negative.”
Question 5: “When something happens that far exceeds your expectations, how
does this affect your expectations of the future?”
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 235, 95%). An additional 21
responses were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not
relevant. This left 214 responses, which was composed of 65 flexible optimists, 52
flexible pessimists, 56 inflexible optimists, and 41 inflexible pessimists. Several themes
emerged for this question, including: “shift toward optimism”, “defensive pessimism”
and “no change in expectations”. These results were summarized in Table 21.
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Table 21
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 5
Themes
Shift toward optimism
Defensive pessimism
No change in expectations

Flexible
optimists
33 (51%)
5 (8%)
16 (25%)

Flexible
pessimists
17 (32%)
10 (19%)
11 (20%)

Inflexible
optimists
27 (48%)
1 (2%)
13 (23%)

Inflexible
pessimists
10 (25%)
11 (28%)
12 (29%)
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Many participants expressed a shift toward optimism as a consequence of a very
positive event. In many cases, these participants thought that it would lead to other good
things (e.g., “It makes me feel more excited for the future, like more good things will
keep happening”). This theme was most common among flexible optimists (51%) and
inflexible optimists (48%); though it was also quite common among flexible pessimists
(32%) and inflexible pessimists (25%).
Some participants reported that such a rare event would have no effect on their
expectations. These participants stated that although such a positive outcome improved
their mood and gave them a “big confidence boost”, it would not make them more
optimistic. A few (mostly inflexible pessimists) shrugged it off, attributing such good
fortune to luck or other people, e.g., “must of [sic] been luck... or something someone did
to help.” This theme was widely endorsed; 29% of inflexible pessimists, 25% of flexible
optimists, 23% of inflexible optimists, and 20% of flexible pessimists expressed this
theme.
Other participants indicated that they did not raise their expectations to prevent
getting their hopes up too much. As expressed by one participant, “In the past, high
grades or outstanding feedback has made me so confident that I could even get cocky…I
would study less for the second midterm if I did really well on the first midterm because I
didn’t think I needed to study as much. I got too confident and then had to pay for it later
when I had a bad mark on my second midterm from not studying as much”). This theme
was most common among inflexible pessimists (28%), and flexible pessimists (19%), and
less common among flexible optimists (8%) and inflexible optimists (2%).
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Question 6: “When you feel in control of the outcome, how does this affect your
expectations of the future?”
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 238, 96%). An additional 28
responses were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not
relevant. This left 210 responses, which was composed of 65 flexible optimists, 51
flexible pessimists, 53 inflexible optimists, and 41 inflexible pessimists. Several themes
emerged: An “optimistic” theme and a “pessimistic” theme. These results were
summarized in Table 22.

A Glass Half Full
Table 22
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 6
Themes
Optimistic
Pessimistic

Flexible
optimists
65 (100%)
0 (0%)

Flexible
pessimists
45 (88%)
6 (12%)

Inflexible
optimists
50 (95%)
3 (5%)

Inflexible
pessimists
33 (81%)
8 (19%)
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Participants who expressed optimism said that a sense of control made them feel
more confident in a positive outcome. As one participant put it, “I feel more confident
and get more done.” As one would expect, the optimistic theme was almost universal
among inflexible optimists (95%) and flexible optimists (100%), but was also expressed
by most flexible pessimists (88%) and inflexible pessimists (81%).
Participants who expressed pessimism were unaffected by having a sense of
control (e.g. “I usually feel like things could still go wrong”). This theme was much rarer
than the optimistic theme, even among inflexible pessimists (19%) and flexible
pessimists (12%). None of the flexible optimists and only 5% of inflexible optimists
expressed this pessimistic theme.
Question 7: “When something unusually good or unusually bad happens, how
does this affect your expectations of the future?”
Most of the respondents completed this item (n = 237, 95%). An additional 26
responses were discarded because they were too brief (a simple yes/no) or were not
relevant. This left 211 responses, which was composed of 65 flexible optimists, 52
flexible pessimists, 54 inflexible optimists, and 40 inflexible pessimists. In general, the
responses to this question were similar to those of Question 5. However, the three major
themes that emerged were subtly different: “shift to optimism (but not pessimism)”, “no
change”, and “pessimistic”. These results were summarized in Table 23.
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Table 23
Frequencies and percentages for each theme for Question 7
Themes
Shift to optimism
No change
Pessimistic

Flexible
optimists
18 (28%)
38 (58%)
10 (15%)

Flexible
pessimists
13 (25%)
13 (25%)
19 (37%)

Inflexible
optimists
21 (39%)
22 (41%)
5 (9%)

Inflexible
pessimists
4 (11%)
7 (18%)
25 (62%)
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Some participants said that regardless of how good or bad the event, their
expectations would remain unchanged. This theme was endorsed by 58% of flexible
optimists (as one flexible optimist put it, “It doesn't usually affect my expectation for the
future”). Forty-one percent of inflexible optimists, 25% of flexible pessimists and 18% of
inflexible pessimists also expressed this theme in their responses.
Other participants said that a positive, but not a negative event, would change
their expectations, e.g., “If it is something unusually good my expectations tend to
increase for the future; however if it is something bad they may decrease but not to same
scale.” This theme was most common among inflexible optimists (39%) and flexible
optimists (28%). However, about one quarter flexible pessimists also expressed this
theme (though only 11% of inflexible pessimists expressed this theme).
A third group of participants expressed a pessimistic attitude even in the face of
positive events, e.g. “I expect that good things won't last for long and when very bad
things happen I feel hopeless and like I cannot reach my expectations anymore.” This
theme was especially prevalent among inflexible pessimists (62%), though 37% of
flexible pessimists also expressed this theme. Fifteen percent of flexible optimists and
nine percent of inflexible optimists expressed pessimism.
Brief Discussion
The above findings demonstrate that both expectancy flexibility and optimism
were related to many indices of psychological and physical well-being. These
associations between expectancy flexibility and various measures were independent from
those of optimism. The findings reported in the previous section are interpreted below.
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Expectancy flexibility was positively associated with academic approach coping.
This finding is consistent with the idea of flexibility promoting preparedness. People who
scored high on expectancy flexibility may be more apt to change their behaviour to
achieve their desired future (or avoid a negative alternative future). By engaging in
approach coping, it is plausible that students may be better prepared for exams and
graded assignments.
In terms of health outcomes, expectancy flexibility was negatively related to
substance use and positively related to social health. These findings suggested that
individuals who are more flexible may consider the negative consequences that excessive
engagement in substance use might have. Meanwhile, individuals scoring high on
expectancy flexibility were more likely to engage in positive social activities.
Expectancy flexibility was also related to less problem gambling. This suggested
that, consistent with predictions, having flexible expectations allows people to disengage
when persistence is a bad strategy. Expectancy flexibility was also associated with
several subscales on the ASICS. The positive association with General Academic Skills
suggests that individuals scoring high on flexibility are more likely to have better study
skills; this is not unusual, given that flexibility is thought to motivate people into taking
anticipatory action. This was consistent with the association between expectancy
flexibility and confidence. Perhaps their confidence comes from the ability of flexible
people to be prepared, and this sense of preparedness gives them a sense of selfassurance, despite higher levels of anxiety (the negative association between expectancy
flexibility and the lack of anxiety subscale means higher scores on expectancy flexibility
were associated with higher levels of anxiety). Given expectancy flexibility’s association
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with defensive pessimism, this association was not surprising. Although anxiety is an
unpleasant emotion and is considered a clinical disorder in its extreme, anxiety need not
be unhealthy and at mild levels could motivate students to engage in proactive behaviour
(Raffety, Smith, & Ptacek, 1997). Lastly, the positive association with External
Motivation suggested that individuals scoring high in expectancy flexibility are motivated
by extrinsic rewards (i.e. grades).
Unlike expectancy flexibility, there is already an extensive literature base on
optimism. Thus, the findings for optimism can be compared and contrasted with past
findings. These correlations between optimism and the other study measures were largely
consistent with those of previous studies, though there were a few new findings. These
comparisons are described in the section below.
Optimism was positively correlated with several ASICS subscales, including
Confidence, Personal adjustment, Self-regulation, Socializing, and Lack of Anxiety
subscales. This was consistent with previous research that has shown that optimists have
greater confidence (Grove & Heard, 1997), better personal adjustment (Chemers, Hu, &
Garcia, 2001), better self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 2001), and have less anxiety
(Scheier et al., 1994). The finding that optimists were less likely to engage in negative
socializing was unexpected, and suggests that some pessimists may engage in partying as
a form of self-handicapping (Graham & Williams, 2009). However, null findings for the
other five subscales (i.e. Career Decidedness, Skills, Instructor Efficacy, Internal, and
External) contradicted previous findings suggesting that optimism was related to career
decision-making self-efficacy and both intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivation
(Creed, Patton, & Bartrum, 2002; Hoekman, McCormick, & Barnett, 2005). The lack of
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association between optimism and perceived instructor efficacy was unsurprising,
considering that optimism has little conceptual relationship to the perceived efficacy and
competence of others.
Optimism’s positive association with cognitive flexibility and approach coping
and negative association with avoidance coping suggests that the optimists engaged in
healthier coping styles than did pessimists. This was consistent with previous findings for
optimism and coping (Carver et al., 1989; Scheier et al., 1986).
Optimism’s positive association with the substance use subscale of the MHBI
(because this scale is reverse-scored this means that more optimism was associated with
less substance use) suggested that optimism may have a buffering effect against
substance use, consistent with the findings of other studies (Carvajal, Clair, Nash, &
Evans, 1998). This finding, however, contradicted studies suggesting that unrealistic
optimism may be related to negative experiences related to alcohol (Dillard, Midboe, &
Klein, 2009). Optimism was also positively associated with the Social and Stress
subscales of the MHBI, indicating that optimists had better social health and lower stress
than pessimists. This was consistent with previous literature suggesting that optimists are
more likely to seek social support and have less stress than pessimists (Brissette, Scheier,
& Carver, 2002).
Because no association between optimism and problem gambling was found,
there was a lack of support for the first model. This contradicts previous findings,
suggesting that optimism would be associated with problematic gambling behaviours
(Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004). However, because Gibson and Sanbonmatsu did not
employ a comprehensive measure of problem gambling in their study, it was uncertain
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whether the findings of the present study contradict their findings. Because of the lack of
association, no further analyses were conducted.
The lack of support for a moderating effect for the second model was unexpected.
The lack of an interaction contradicts the results of prior studies suggesting an association
between invulnerability and health/risk behaviours and between health/risk behaviours
and optimism (Lapsley & Hill, 2010; Ravert et al., 2009; Ravert & Zimet, 2009).
However, no known studies have used this moderational model before. It is possible that
invulnerability does not moderate the relationship between optimism and health
behaviours.
There was limited support for the third model. Full mediational effects were
found for academic approach coping on the association between optimism and both selfregulation and socialization, and a partial mediation effect for academic approach coping
on the association between optimism and confidence. This was consistent with previous
findings suggesting that optimism’s effects on academic success can be explained by
academic approach coping (Chemers et al., 2001). It is plausible that optimists were more
apt to engage in approach coping in academic situations. This in turn may increase selfregulation and boost confidence, while reducing activities that may potentially inhibit
academic performance, like excessive partying.
Qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions generally supported the
hypothesis that expectancy flexibility was associated with shifts in expectations.
However, shifts were not always seen, particularly for events perceived as uniquely
positive or negative. Flexible optimists were the most likely to modify their expectations
in the face of negative feedback. This observed shift in expectations may have been an
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effort to reduce disappointment (van Dijk et al., 2003). Flexible pessimists showed a
similar pattern of expectation shifts. Lastly, both inflexible optimists and pessimists
tended to maintain their expectations regardless of the context. That is, inflexible
optimists remained positive in light of negative events and inflexible pessimists remained
negative in light of positive events.
General Discussion
The findings of these studies generally supported the validity of the EFS scale and
associated hypotheses. Yet, one should exercise cautious optimism about this new
measure, because some of the hypotheses were not supported. Consistent with previous
research on defensive pessimism, lowering one’s expectations may have value as a
strategic form of coping, and ought not to be perceived as merely being a symptom of
hopelessness. Furthermore, these findings lend support to the existence of the construct
that Seligman calls “flexible optimism.” The findings of Study 3 suggest that people do
shift their expectations under some circumstances. Consistent with hypotheses, these
shifts appear to be related to receiving negative feedback. Bracing for potentially
negative situations may help people to be better prepared for them when they occur.
Maintaining unrealistic optimism in such situations may do more harm than good.
The first aim of this study, which was to extend past research to investigate
whether there are some contexts in which optimism is disadvantageous, found no support
for the purported negative effects of optimism. Instead, the associations between
optimism and positive outcomes (including the lack of negative outcomes) were either
positive or non-significant. This suggests one of two things: either the negative effects of
optimism are limited or the sample used was not sensitive to finding such negative
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effects. In the latter case, perhaps negative effects of optimism would have been evident
in a sample of problem gamblers or alcoholics.
The second aim was to determine whether expectancy flexibility adds incremental
validity to the prediction of outcomes above and beyond that of optimism. Expectancy
flexibility was associated with several positive outcomes, including greater academic
approach coping, social health, general academic skills, and academic confidence, and
less substance use and problem gambling. Notably, optimism was not associated with
general academic skills or with problem gambling. Thus, it is fair to say that expectancy
flexibility had incremental validity.
Three models were tested in Study 4. Unfortunately, for the most part, the results
did not support the hypotheses. There was no support for the first model because no
association between optimism and problem gambling was found. There was also no
support for a moderational effect of expectancy flexibility on the association between
optimism and health behaviours. There was, however, limited support for the hypothesis
that academic approach coping would mediate the association between optimism and
several aspects of academic success, including self-regulation, socialization, and
confidence.
This study had several limitations which limit the interpretability of the findings.
First, studies 1, 2, and 4 used a cross-sectional, correlational design. This means that (like
previous studies) causality cannot be inferred. It is possible that optimism is the outcome
of good health or positive coping, to name a few examples. Another possibility is that a
third variable explains these relationships.
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Another limitation involves sampling. This study employed a general sample of
university students, who were disproportionately young and female. This is particularly
relevant for the gambling measures. Most individuals in the sample had little experience
with gambling. A sample of people who have more gambling experience (not necessarily
problem gamblers) may have been a better choice for testing the hypothesis that
expectancy flexibility would be inversely related with problem gambling.
Another set of limitations concerned the EFS scale itself. Its internal consistency
reliability, while in the acceptable range, was relatively low (ideally, Cronbach’s α should
be greater than .80). The low reliability may have attenuated some of the correlations.
Additionally, no data were collected on the test-retest reliability of the EFS, which could
have been used to demonstrate the temporal stability of the construct. That being said, the
EFS demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity. More refinement of the
EFS may be necessary to better capture the nature of the expectancy flexibility construct.
Despite these limitations, the findings of the present study have important
implications for future research. Of particular interest would be an examination the
effects of flexible optimism in a population of individuals diagnosed as having a
gambling addiction. Some of the hypotheses regarding gambling were not supported in
this sample; this could be attributed to the low base rate of problem gambling in the
general population of university students (Gainsbury, Russell, & Blaszczynski, 2014;
Lesieur et al., 1991). Similarly, the effects of expectancy flexibility on health would be
better tested using a large population of middle-aged and older adults studied over a
period of several years. With sufficient time and funding, such a study could be
undertaken, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Another interesting line of inquiry would be to test whether there are crosscultural differences in expectancy flexibility. Research from the United States suggests
that Caucasian Americans are generally more optimistic than other racial and ethnic
groups. For example, Chang (1996) found that Asian Americans were more pessimistic,
but not less optimistic, than Caucasian Americans, and no difference in measures of
positive and negative affect was found between the two groups. This somewhat
contradictory finding could be explained by expectancy flexibility; perhaps people of
Asian ancestry are more pessimistic, but also more flexible, than Caucasians living in
North America. Similarly, researchers ought to examine whether expectancy flexibility
has differing effects based on age. This was not possible in the present study due to the
restricted age range associated with university student samples; however, research
suggests that associations between optimism and affect differ by age (Palgi, Shrira, BenEzra, Cohen-Fridel, & Bodner, 2011). It is possible that similar patterns exist for
expectancy flexibility.
The findings of the present study also have applied value for interventions.
Current optimism-promoting interventions are potentially flawed. The most common
optimism-boosting intervention is the “best possible self” intervention, which typically
involves instructing individuals to imagine an ideal future and to think about goals that
they would like to attain. There are two potential problems with this type of intervention.
First, there is very little research to suggest that optimism-boosting interventions create
long-term changes in optimism. Malouff and Schutte (2017) found that studies of
optimism-promoting interventions that collected outcome data within a day of the end of
the intervention had more than twice the effect size of studies that collected data more
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than one day after the intervention commenced. It is plausible that changes in optimism
as a result of these interventions are only short-term. Worse yet, if individuals fail to
realize their best possible selves, do they fall back into despair? Second, it is possible that
optimism interventions could make individuals maladaptively and inflexibly optimistic.
Replacing pessimism with a superficial optimism may do more harm than good:
individuals may become more prone to taking unnecessary risks in order to achieve their
goals. Lastly, attempts to reduce unrealistic optimism have fared poorly. Interventions to
reduce unrealistic optimism have been mostly unsuccessful in changing behaviour
(Weinstein & Klein, 1995). It is reasonable to speculate that these interventions may
make individuals defensive or they may simply lapse into bad habits.
It may be more prudent to recommend cultivating flexible optimism, while
emphasizing that lowering expectations may be preferable in some contexts. Potentially,
researchers could develop interventions boosting expectancy flexibility alongside
optimism. A particularly fruitful use of such interventions would be in circumstances
where a constant optimism may not be beneficial. Judging by the findings of the present
study, expectancy flexibility interventions could be particularly useful in increasing
academic confidence and skills, and reducing problem gambling. Interventions that
promote expectancy flexibility could be used to treat problem gambling by dampening
some of the unrealistically optimistic expectations that some gamblers may have (Gibson
& Sanbonmatsu, 2004).
Expectancy flexibility interventions would likely take different forms depending
on the age of the individuals targeted by the intervention. Interventions developed for
young adult and adolescent populations might address drug and alcohol abuse, sexual
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health (e.g. condom and birth control use), and academic skills. In older populations,
interventions could be developed to reduce the risk of severe health conditions. Such
interventions could promote taking preventive action against health threats, including
eating well, getting sufficient exercise, quitting smoking, and obtaining regular health
screening (e.g. mammograms, prostate exams, colonoscopies). People who are inflexibly
optimistic might be prone to ignoring or discounting important health cues and warnings
(Norem & Chang, 2001), while those who are inflexibly pessimistic might tend towards
despair and apathy about their health. Promoting flexibility could reduce these disparate
barriers to better health in both populations. Interventions could even be developed for
young children as well, similar to what has been developed for optimism (Seligman,
2007). For example, children could be shown how to temper their expectations in order to
deal with potential disappointment and to remain optimistic in the face of negative
outcomes.
The findings of the present study may be of relevance to clinicians. Clients who
manifest with depressive or anxious symptoms may be prone to extreme inflexible
pessimism and may benefit from being more flexible in their expectations. It may be
more effective to help these clients to become more flexible, rather than trying to replace
their pessimism with optimism. Although no single diagnosis corresponds to extreme
inflexible optimism (there is no such thing as clinical optimism, though perhaps there
ought to be), I speculate that people diagnosed with addictive disorders or bipolar
disorder may be at high risk. Inflexible optimism may also be in part a defensive reaction
against extreme pessimism. For inflexibly optimistic clients, a dose of reality may be
beneficial, as is often emphasized in cognitive-behavioural approaches.

A Glass Half Full

137

Expectancy flexibility could also be applied to organizational contexts. Extending
the findings of Hmieleski and Baron (2009), perhaps expectancy flexibility could
dissuade businesses from making risky decisions. In social contexts, expectancy
flexibility may promote “big optimism” (Peterson, 2000), the collective optimism of
groups. Social movements, to an extent, depend on the optimism of group members.
Extreme pessimism often leads to apathy, while extreme optimism may cause
disappointment if the movement initially fails in its objectives. Expectancy flexibility
may help social movements succeed by reducing apathy, but not raising expectations so
high that they lead to disappointment in the face of failure. This raises the possibility that
expectancy flexibility may be related to resilience or self-efficacy.
In conclusion, the findings of the present study provide tentative support for the
notion that expectancy flexibility can have beneficial effects. Individuals who can
flexibly adjust their expectations may be better able to cope with challenging situations in
ways that those who express blind optimism cannot. Pessimism may occasionally be
beneficial, even if optimism feels better in the short-run. Occasionally, we must “have the
courage to endure pessimism” (Seligman, 1991, p. 292).

A Glass Half Full

138

REFERENCES
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting
interactions. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Alarcon, G. M., Bowling, N. A., & Khazon, S. (2013). Great expectations: A metaanalytic examination of optimism and hope. Personality and Individual
Differences, 54, 821-827. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2012.12.004
Allison, P. J., Guichard, C., Fung, K., & Gilain, L. (2003). Dispositional optimism
predicts survival status 1 year after diagnosis in head and neck cancer patients.
Journal of Clinical Oncology, 21(3), 543-548. doi: 10.1200/JCO.2003.10.092
Andersson, G. (1996). The benefits of optimism: A meta-analytic review of the Life
Orientation Test. Personality and Individual Differences, 21(5), 719-725. doi:
10.1016/0191-8869(96)00118-3
Astin, A. W. (1998). The changing American college student: Thirty-year trends, 19661996. The Review of Higher Education, 21, 115-135.
Ayton, P., & Fischer, I. (2004). The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: Two
faces of subjective randomness? Memory & Cognition, 32(8), 1369-1378.
doi:10.3758/BF03206327
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change.
Psychological Review, 84(2), 191-215. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.191
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in
social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical considerations.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173-1182.
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical aspects.

A Glass Half Full

139

Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Beck, A. T., Weissman, A., Lester, D., & Trexler, L. (1974). The measurement of
pessimism: The Hopelessness Scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 42(6), 861-865.
Bortolotti, L., & Antrobus, M. (2015). Costs and benefits of realism and optimism.
Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 28(2), 194-198. doi:
10.1097/YCO.0000000000000143
Brissette, I., Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (2002). The role of optimism in social
network development, coping, and psychological adjustment during a life
transition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(1), 102–111. doi:
10.1037//0022-3514.82.1.102
Byrne, R. (2008). The secret. New York: Atria Books.
Byrnes, D. M., Antoni, M. H., Goodkin, K., Efantis-Potter, J., Asthana, D., Simon, T., ...
Fletcher, M. A. (1998). Stressful events, pessimism, natural killer cell
cytotoxicity, and cytotoxic/suppressor T cells in HIV+ black women at risk for
cervical cancer. Psychosomatic Medicine, 60(6), 714-722.
Cantor, N., & Norem, J. K. (1989). Defensive pessimism and stress and coping. Social
Cognition, 7, 92-112. doi: 10.1521/soco.1989.7.2.92
Carroll, P., Sweeny, K., & Shepperd, J. A. (2006). Forsaking optimism. Review of
General Psychology, 10(1), 56-73. doi: 10.1037/1089-2680.10.1.56
Carvajal, S. C., Clair, S. D., Nash, S. G., & Evans, R. I. (1998). Relating optimism, hope,
and self-esteem to social influences in deterring substance use in adolescents.
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 17(4), 443-465.

A Glass Half Full

140

Carver, C. S., & Gaines, J. G. (1987). Optimism, pessimism, and postpartum depression.
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11(4), 449–462.
Carver, C. S., Pozo‐Kaderman, C., Harris, S. D., Noriega, V., Scheier, M. F., Robinson,
D. S., ... & Clark, K. C. (1994). Optimism versus pessimism predicts the quality
of women's adjustment to early stage breast cancer. Cancer, 73(4), 1213-1220.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (2001). Optimism, pessimism, and self-regulation. In E.
C. Chang (Ed.), Optimism and pessimism: Implications for theory, research, and
practice (pp. 31-52). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (2014). Dispositional optimism. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 18(6), 293–299. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.02.003
Carver, C. S., Scheier, M. F., & Segerstrom, S. C. (2010). Optimism. Clinical psychology
review, 30(7), 879–889. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2010.01.006
Carver, C. S., Scheier, M. F., & Weintraub, J. K. (1989). Assessing coping strategies: A
theoretically based approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
56(2), 267-283.
Carver, C. S., Smith, R. G., Antoni, M. H., Petronis, V. M., Weiss, S., & Derhagopian, R.
P. (2005). Optimistic personality and psychosocial well-being during treatment
predict psychosocial well-being among long-term survivors of breast cancer.
Health Psychology, 24(5), 508-516. doi: 10.1037/0278-6133.24.5.508
Chang, E. C. (1996). Evidence for the cultural specificity of pessimism in Asians vs.
Caucasians: A test of a general negativity hypothesis. Personality and Individual
Differences, 21, 819–822.
Chang, W. C., & Sivam, R.-W. (2004). Constant vigilance: Heritage values and defensive

A Glass Half Full

141

pessimism in coping with severe acute respiratory syndrome in Singapore. Asian
Journal of Social Psychology, 7, 35–53. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-839X.2004.00133.x
Chemers, M. M., Hu, L. T., & Garcia, B. F. (2001). Academic self-efficacy and first-year
college student performance and adjustment. Journal of Educational Psychology,
93(1), 55–64. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.93.1.55
Clark, L. A., & Watson, D. (1995). Constructing validity: Basic issues in objective scale
development. Psychological Assessment, 7(30), 309-319.
Clarke, V. A., Lovegrove, H., Williams, A., & Machperson, M. (2000). Unrealistic
optimism and the health belief model. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 23(4),
367-376. doi:10.1023/A:1005500917875
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (1983). Applied multiple
regression/correlation analysis for the social sciences. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cohen, F., Kearney, K. A., Zegans, L. S., Kemeny, M. E., Neuhaus, J. M., & Stites, D. P.
(1999). Differential immune system changes with acute and persistent stress for
optimists vs pessimists. Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 13(2), 155-174. doi:
10.1006/brbi.1998.0531
Conger, A. J. (1974). A revised definition for suppressor variables: A guide to their
identification and interpretation. Educational Psychological Measurement, 34,
35–46.
Contrada, R. J., Goyal, T. M., Cather, C., Rafalson, L., Idler, E. L., & Krause, T. J.
(2004). Psychosocial factors in outcomes of heart surgery: The impact of religious
involvement and depressive symptoms. Health Psychology, 23(3), 227-238. doi:
10.1037/0278-6133.23.3.227

A Glass Half Full

142

Coyne, J. C., & Tennen, H. (2010). Positive psychology in cancer care: Bad science,
exaggerated claims, and unproven medicine. Annals of Behavioral Medicine,
39(1), 16–26. doi: 10.1007/s12160-009-9154-z
Craig, A. R., Franklin, J. A., & Andrews, G. (1984). A scale to measure locus of control
of behavior. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 57, 173-180.
Creed, P. A., Patton, W., & Bartrum, D. (2002). Multidimensional properties of the LOTR: Effects of optimism and pessimism on career and well-being related variables
in adolescents. Journal of Career Assessment, 10(1) 42-61. doi:
10.1177/1069072702010001003
Davidson, K., & Prkachin, K. (1997). Optimism and unrealistic optimism have an
interacting impact on health-promoting behavior and knowledge changes.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(6), 617-625. doi:
10.1177/0146167297236005
Day, L., & Maltby, J. (2003). Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: The
mediating role of optimism and irrational beliefs. The Journal of Psychology,
137(1), 99-110. doi:10.1080/00223980309600602
Deci, E., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human
behavior. New York, NY: Plenum Press.
de Ridder, D., Schreurs, K., & Bensing, J. (2000). The relative benefits of being
optimistic: Optimism as a coping resource in multiple sclerosis and Parkinson’s
disease. British Journal of Health Psychology, 5(2), 141–155. doi:
10.1348/135910700168829
DeVellis, R. F. (2003). Scale development: Theory and applications (2nd ed). Newbury

A Glass Half Full

143

Park, CA: Sage.
Dillard, A. J., Midboe, A. M., & Klein, W. M. (2009). The dark side of optimism:
Unrealistic optimism about problems with alcohol predicts subsequent negative
event experiences. Personality and social psychology bulletin, 35(11), 1540-1550.
Duckworth, A. L., Peterson, C., Matthews, M. D., & Kelly, D. R. (2007). Grit:
Perseverance and passion for long-term goals. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 92(6), 1087-1101. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.92.6.1087
Duggan, P. M., Lapsley, D. K. & Norman, K. (2000, April). Adolescent invulnerability
and personal uniqueness: Scale development and initial construct validation.
Paper presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research on
Adolescence, Chicago, IL.
Ehrenreich, B. (2009). Bright-sided: How the relentless promotion of positive thinking
has undermined America. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Elliot, A. J., & Church, M. A. (2003). Motivational analysis of defensive pessimism and
self-handicapping. Journal of Personality, 71(3), 369-396. doi: 10.1111/14676494.7103005
Eronen, S., & Nurmi, J.-K., & Salmela-Aro, K. (1998). Optimistic, defensive-pessimistic,
impulsive, and self-handicapping strategies in university environments. Learning
and Instruction, 8(2), 159-177.
Ferris, J., & Wynne, H. J. (2001). The Canadian Problem Gambling Index final report.
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse.
Fitzgerald, T. E., Tennen, H., Affleck, G., & Pransky, G. S. (1993). The relative

A Glass Half Full

144

importance of dispositional optimism and control appraisals in quality of life after
coronary artery bypass surgery. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 16(1), 25–43.
Forgeard, M. J. C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2012). Seeing the glass half full: A review of
the causes and consequences of optimism. Pratiques Psychologiques, 18, 107–
120. doi:10.1016/j.prps.2012.02.002
Freud, S. (2012). The future of an illusion. (T. Dufresne & G. C. Richter, Trans.).
Toronto: Broadview Press. (Original work published 1927)
Friedman, L. C., Bruce, S., Webb, J. A., Weinberg, A. D., & Cooper, H. P. (1993). Skin
self-examination in a population at increased risk for skin cancer. American
Journal of Preventive Medicine, 9(6), 359-364.
Furr, R. M., & Bacharach, V. R. (2013). Psychometrics: An introduction. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Gainsbury, S. M., Russell, A., & Blaszczynski, A. (2014). Are psychology university
student gamblers representative of non-university students and general gamblers?
A comparative analysis. Journal of Gambling Studies, 30(1), 11-25. doi:
10.1007/s10899-012-9334-9
Garson, G. D. (2001). Guide to writing empirical papers, theses, and dissertations. New
York: Marcel Dekker.
Gibbons, F. X., Blanton, H., Gerrard, M., Buunk, B., & Eggleston, T. (2000). Does social
comparison make a difference? Optimism as a moderator of the relation between
comparison level and academic performance. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 26(5), 637-648. doi: 10.1177/0146167200267011
Gibson, B., & Sanbonmatsu, D. M. (2004). Optimism, pessimism, and gambling: The

A Glass Half Full

145

downside of optimism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(2), 149160. doi: 10.1177/0146167203259929
Gilovich, T. (1983). Biased evaluation and persistence in gambling. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 44(6), 1110-1126.
Graham, S., & Williams, C. (2009). An attributional approach to motivation in school. In
K. R. Wentzel & A. Wigfield (Eds.), Handbook of motivation at school (pp. 11–
34). New York: Routledge.Grant, A. M., & Schwartz, B. (2011). Too much of a
good thing: The challenge and opportunity of the inverted U. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 6(1), 61-76. doi: 10.1177/1745691610393523
Hanssen, M. M., Vancleef, L. M. G., Vlaeyen, J. W. S., Hayes, A. F., Schouten, E. G. W.,
& Peters, M. L. (2015). Optimism, motivational coping and well-being: Evidence
supporting the importance of flexible goal adjustment. Journal of Happiness
Studies, 16(6), 1525-1537. doi: 10.1007/s10902-014-9572-x
Harackiewicz, J., Barron, K. E., Pintrich, P. R., Elliot, A. J. & Thrash, T. M. (2002).
Revision of achievement goal theory: Necessary and illuminating. Journal of
Educational Psychology, 94(3), 638-645. doi: 10.1037/0022-0663.94.3.638
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process
analysis: A regression-based approach. New York: Guilford.
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment therapy:
An experimental approach to behavior change. New York: Guilford Press.
Haynes, T. L., Ruthig, J. C., Perry, R. P., Stupnisky, R. H., & Hall, N. C. (2006).

A Glass Half Full

146

Reducing the academic risks of over-optimism: The longitudinal effects of
attributional retraining on cognition and achievement. Research in Higher
Education, 47(7), 755-779. doi:10.1007/s11162-006-9014-7
Held, B. S. (2002). The tyranny of the positive attitude in America: Observation and
speculation. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 58(9), 965-992. doi:
10.1002/jclp.10093
Hmieleski, K. M., & Baron, R. A. (2009). Entrepreneurs’ optimism and new venture
performance: A social cognitive perspective. Academy of Management Journal,
52(3), 473–488. doi: 10.5465/AMJ.2009.41330755
Hoekman, K., McCormick, J., & Barnett, K. (2005). The important role of optimism in a
motivational investigation of the education of gifted adolescents. Gifted Child
Quarterly, 49(2), 99-110.
Janz, N. K., & Becker, M. H. (1984). The health belief model: A decade later. Health
Education & Behavior, 11(1), 1-47.
Kaplan, R., & Saccuzzo, D. (2012). Psychological testing: Principles, applications, and
issues (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning.
Kashdan, T. B., & Rottenberg, J. (2010). Psychological flexibility as a fundamental
aspect of health. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(7), 865–878.
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2010.03.001
Kasl, S. V., & Cobb, S. (1966). Health behavior, illness behavior and sick role behavior:
I. Health and illness behavior. Archives of Environmental Health: An
International Journal, 12(2), 246-266.
King, L. A. (2001). The health benefits of writing about life goals. Personality and Social

A Glass Half Full

147

Psychology Bulletin, 27(7), 798-807.
Klein, W. M., & Weinstein, N. D. (1997). Social comparison and unrealistic optimism
about personal risk. In B. P. Buunk & F. X. Gibbons (Eds.), Health, Coping, and
Wellbeing: Perspectives from Social Comparison Theory (pp. 25-62). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Kline, R. (2005). Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (2nd edition).
London: Guilford Press.
Knowles, E. S. (1988). Item context effects on personality scales: Measuring changes the
measure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(2), 312-320. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.55.2.312
Kohut, M. L., Cooper, M. M., Nickolaus, M. S., Russell, D. R., & Cunnick, J. E. (2002).
Exercise and psychosocial factors modulate immunity to influenza vaccine in
elderly individuals. The Journals of Gerontology Series A: Biological Sciences
and Medical Sciences, 57(9), M557-M562. doi: 10.1093/gerona/57.9.M557
Kubzansky, L. D., Kubzansky, P. E., & Maselko, J. (2004). Optimism and pessimism in
the context of health: Bipolar opposites or separate constructs? Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(8), 943-956. doi: 10.1177/0146167203262086
Kulbok, P. A., Carter, K. F., Baldwin, J. H., Gilmartin, M. J., & Kirkwood, B. (1999).
The Multidimensional Health Behavior Inventory. Journal of Nursing
Measurement, 7(2), 177-195.
Lapsley, D. K., & Duggan, P. M. (2001, April). The adolescent invulnerability scale:
Factor structure and construct validity. Paper presented at the biennial meeting of
the Society for Research in Child Development, Minneapolis.

A Glass Half Full

148

Lapsley, D. K., & Hill, P. L. (2010). Subjective invulnerability, optimism bias and
adjustment in emerging adulthood. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 39(8), 847857. doi: 10.1007/s10964-009-9409-9
Lauver, D., & Tak, Y. (1995). Optimism and coping with a breast cancer symptom.
Nursing Research, 44(4), 202-207.
Lazarus, R. S. (2003). Does the positive psychology movement have legs? Psychological
Inquiry, 14(2), 93-109.
Lesieur, H. R., Cross, J., Frank, M., Welch, M., White, C. M., Rubenstein, G., ... & Mark,
M. (1991). Gambling and pathological gambling among university students.
Addictive Behaviors, 16(6), 517-527.
Lopes, M. P., & Cunha, M. P. E. (2008). Who is more proactive, the optimist or the
pessimist? Exploring the role of hope as a moderator. The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 3(2), 100-109. doi:10.1080/17439760701760575
Lucas, R., Diener, E., & Suh, E. (1996). Discriminant validity of well-being measures.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(3), 616-628. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.71.3.616
Lyubomirsky, S. (2007). The how of happiness: A scientific approach to getting the
life you want. New York: Penguin.
Maddux, J. E. (2002). Stopping the madness: Positive psychology and the deconstruction
of the illness ideology and the DSM. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds),
Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 13–25). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Magaletta, P. R., & Oliver, J. M. (1999). The hope construct, will, and ways: Their

A Glass Half Full

149

relations with self‐efficacy, optimism, and general well‐being. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 55(5), 539-551.
Malouff, J. M., & Schutte, N. S. (2017). Can psychological interventions increase
optimism? A meta-analysis. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 11, 1-11. doi:
10.1080/17439760.2016.1221122
Marshall, G. N., Wortman, C. B., Kusulas, J. W., Hervig, L. K., & Vickers, R. R., Jr.
(1992). Distinguishing optimism from pessimism: Relations to fundamental
dimensions of mood and personality. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 62(6), 1067-1074. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.62.6.1067
Matthews, K., Raikkonen, K., Sutton-Tyrrell, K., & Kuller, L. (2004). Optimistic
attitudes protect against progression of carotid atherosclerosis in healthy middleaged women. Psychosomatic Medicine, 66(5), 640–644. doi:
10.1097/01.psy.0000139999.99756.a5
McNulty, J. K., & Fincham, F. D. (2012). Beyond positive psychology? Toward a
contextual view of psychological processes and well-being. American
Psychologist, 67(2), 101-110. doi: 10.1037/a0024572
Meevissen, Y. M., Peters, M. L., & Alberts, H. J. (2011). Become more optimistic by
imagining a best possible self: Effects of a two week intervention. Journal of
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 42(3), 371-378.
Milam, J. E., Richardson, J. L., Marks, G., Kemper, C. A., & McCutchan, A. J. (2004).
The roles of dispositional optimism and pessimism in HIV disease progression.
Psychology and Health, 19(2), 167–181. doi: 10.1080/08870440310001652696
Miller, L. A., Lovler, R. L., & McIntire, S. A. (2013). Foundations of psychological

A Glass Half Full

150

testing: A practical approach (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Sage.
Muller, D., Judd, C. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2005). When moderation is mediated and
mediation is moderated. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6),
852-863. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.852
Nes, L. S., & Segerstrom, S. C. (2006). Dispositional optimism and coping: A metaanalytic review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(3), 235-251. doi:
10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_3
Norem, J. K. (2001). The positive power of negative thinking: Using defensive pessimism
to harness anxiety and perform at your peak. New York: Basic Books.
Norem, J. K. (2002). Pessimism: Accentuating the positive possibilities. In E. C. Chang
& L. Sanna (Eds.), Personality, strategy, and adjustment: Beyond virtue and vice
(pp. 91-104). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Norem, J. K. (2008). Defensive pessimism, anxiety, and the complexity of evaluating
self-regulation. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(1), 121-134, doi:
10.1111/j.1751-9004.2007.00053.x
Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986a). Anticipatory and post hoc cushioning strategies:
Optimism and defensive pessimism in ‘risky’ situations. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 10(3), 347-362.
Norem, J. K., & Cantor, N. (1986b). Defensive pessimism: Harnessing anxiety as
motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1208-1217.
Norem, J. K., & Chang, E. C. (2001). A very full glass: Adding complexity to our
thinking about the implications and applications of optimism and pessimism
research. In E.C. Chang (Ed.), Optimism and pessimism: Implications for theory,

A Glass Half Full

151

research, and practice (pp. 347-367).Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.
Norem, J. K., & Chang, E. C. (2002). The positive psychology of negative thinking.
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 58(9), 993-1001. doi: 10.1002/jclp.10094
Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric theory (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
O’Brien, W. H., VanEgeren, L., & Mumby, P. B. (1995). Predicting health behaviors
using measures of optimism and perceived risk. Health Values: The Journal of
Health Behavior, Education & Promotion, 19(1), 21-28.
O’Connor, B. P. (2000). SPSS and SAS programs for determining the number of
components using parallel analysis and Velicer's MAP test. Behavior Research
Methods, Instrumentation, and Computers, 32, 396-402.
Ozer, D. J., & Benet-Martinez, V. (2006). Personality and the prediction of consequential
outcomes. Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 401-421. doi:
10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190127
Palgi, Y., Shrira, A., Ben-Ezra, M., Cohen-Fridel, S., & Bodner, E. (2011). The
relationships between daily optimism, daily pessimism, and affect differ in young
and old age. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(8), 1294-1299.
Parducci, A. (1968). The relativism of absolute judgments. Scientific American, 219(6),
84-90.
Peale, N. V. (1956). The power of positive thinking. New York: Prentice Hall.
Peterson, C. (2000). The future of optimism. American Psychologist, 55(1), 44-55. doi:
10.1037//0003-066X.55.1.44
Peterson, C., Schulman, P., Castellon, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1992). CAVE: Content

A Glass Half Full

152

analysis of verbatim explanations. In C. P. Smith (Ed.), Motivation and
personality: Handbook of thematic content analysis (pp. 383-392). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Peterson, C., Semmel, A., von Baeyer, C., Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Seligman,
M. E. P. (1982). The Attributional Style Questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 6, 287-299.
Peterson, C., & Vaidya, R. S. (2001). Explanatory style, expectations, and depressive
symptoms. Personality and Individual Differences, 31(7), 1217−1223.
doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00221-X
Porter, E. H. (1913). Pollyanna. London: Harrap.
Preacher, K., & Hayes, A. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect
effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, &
Computers, 36(4), 717-731. doi: 10.3758/BF03206553
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing moderated mediation
hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions. Multivariate Behavioral
Research, 42(1), 185-227. doi: 10.1080/00273170701341316
Prevatt, F., Li, H., Welles, T., Festa-Dreher, D., Yelland, S., & Lee, J. (2011). The
Academic Success Inventory for College Students: Scale development and
practical implications for use with students. Journal of College Admission, 211,
26-31.
Pritchard, M. E., & Wilson, G. S. (2003). Using emotional and social factors to predict
student success. Journal of College Student Development, 44(1), 18-28. doi:
10.1353/csd.2003.0008

A Glass Half Full

153

Raffety, B. D., Smith, R. E., & Ptacek, J. T. (1997). Facilitating and debilitating trait
anxiety, situational anxiety, and coping with an anticipated stressor: A process
analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(4), 892.
Rand, K. L. (2009). Hope and optimism: Latent structures and influences on grade
expectancy and academic performance. Journal of Personality, 77(1), 231-260.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00544.x
Rasmussen, H. N., Scheier, M. F., & Greenhouse, J. B. (2009). Optimism and physical
health: A meta-analytic review. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 37(3), 239-256.
doi: 10.1007/s12160-009-9111-x
Ravert, R. D., & Zimet, G. D. (2009). College student invulnerability beliefs and HIV
vaccine acceptability. American Journal of Health Behavior, 33(4), 391-399. doi:
10.5993/AJHB.33.4.5
Ravert, R. D., Schwartz, S. J., Zamboanga, B. L., Kim, S. Y., Weisskirch, R. S., &
Bersamin, M. (2009). Sensation seeking and danger invulnerability: Paths to
college student risk-taking. Personality and Individual Differences, 47(7), 763768. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2009.06.017
Robbins, A. S., Spence, J. T., & Clark, H. (1991). Psychological determinants of health
and performance: The tangled web of desirable and undesirable characteristics.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61(1), 755-765.
Robbins, S. B., Lauver, K., Le, H., Davis, D., Langley, R., & Carlstrom, A. (2004). Do
psychosocial and study skill factors predict college outcomes: A meta-analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 130(2), 261-288. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.130.2.261
Rosenstock, I. M. (1974). The health belief model and preventive health behavior. Health

A Glass Half Full

154

Education Monographs, 2(4), 354-386.
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement: Psychological Monographs: General & Applied, 80(1), 1-28.
Ruthig, J. C., Perry, R. P., Hall, N. C., & Hladkyj, S. (2004). Optimism and attributional
retraining: Longitudinal effects on academic achievement, test anxiety, and
voluntary course withdrawal. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34(4), 709–
730. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02566.x
Sanna, L. (1999). Mental simulations, affect, and subjective confidence: Timing is
everything. Psychological Science, 10(4), 339-345.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1985). Optimism, coping, and health: Assessment and
implications of generalized outcome expectancies. Health Psychology, 4(3), 219247.
Scheier, M. F. & Carver, C. S. (1992). Effects of optimism on psychological and physical
well-being: Theoretical overview and empirical update. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 16(2), 201-228.
Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S., & Bridges, M. W. (1994). Distinguishing optimism from
neuroticism (and trait anxiety, self-mastery, and self-esteem): A reevaluation of
the Life Orientation Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6),
1063-1078.
Scheier, M. F., Matthews, K. A., Owens, J. F., Magovern, G. J., Lefebvre, R. C., Abbott,
R. A., & Carver, C. S. (1989). Dispositional optimism and recovery from
coronary artery bypass surgery: the beneficial effects on physical and

A Glass Half Full

155

psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(6),
1024-1040.
Scheier, M. F., Weintraub, J. K., & Carver, C. S. (1986). Coping with stress: Divergent
strategies of optimists and pessimists. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 51(6), 1257-1264.
Schneider, S. L. (2001). In search of realistic optimism: Meaning, knowledge, and warm
fuzziness. American Psychologist, 56(3), 250-263. doi: 10.1037//0003066X.56.3.250
Schofield, P., Ball, D., Smith, J. G., Borland, R., O’Brien, P., Davis, S., ... Joseph, D.
(2004). Optimism and survival in lung carcinoma patients. Cancer, 100(6), 12761282. doi: 10.1002/cncr.20076
Schulz, R., Bookwala, J., Knapp, J. E., Scheier, M., & Williamson, G. M. (1996).
Pessimism, age, and cancer mortality. Psychology and Aging, 11(2), 304-309.
Schwarzer, R. (1994). Optimism, vulnerability, and self-beliefs as health-related
cognitions: A systematic overview. Psychology & Health, 9(3), 161-180.
Segerstrom, S. C. (2001). Optimism and attentional bias for negative and positive stimuli.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(10), 1334–1343. doi:
10.1177/01461672012710009
Segerstrom, S. C. (2005). Optimism and immunity: Do positive thoughts always lead to
positive effects? Brain, Behavior, and Immunity, 19, 195–200.
doi:10.1016/j.bbi.2004.08.003
Segerstrom, S. C. (2006). How does optimism suppress immunity? Evaluation of three

A Glass Half Full

156

affective pathways. Health Psychology, 25(5), 653–657. doi: 10.1037/02786133.25.5.653
Segerstrom, S. C., & Sephton, S. E. (2010). Optimistic expectancies and cell-mediated
immunity: The role of positive affect. Psychological Science, 21(3), 448-455. doi:
10.1177/0956797610362061
Seginer, R. (2000). Defensive pessimism and optimism correlates of adolescent future
orientation: A domain-specific analysis. Journal of Adolescent Research, 15(3),
307-326. doi: 10.1177/0743558400153001
Seligman, M. E. P. (1972). Learned helplessness. Annual Review of Medicine, 23(1), 407412.
Seligman, M. E. P. (1991). Learned optimism. New York: Knopf.
Seligman, M. E. P. (2002). Authentic happiness: Using the new positive psychology to
realize your potential for lasting fulfillment. New York: Free Press.
Seligman, M. E. P. (2007). The optimistic child: A proven program to safeguard children
against depression and build lifelong resilience. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Seligman, M. E. P. (2011). Flourish: A visionary new understanding of happiness and
well-being. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An
introduction. American Psychologist, 55(1), 5–14. doi: 10.1037//0003066X.55.1.5
Shepperd, J. A., Findley-Klein, C., Kwavnick, K. D., Walker, D., & Perez, S. (2000).
Bracing for loss. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(4), 620–634.
doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.78.4.620

A Glass Half Full

157

Shepperd, J. A., Maroto, J. J., & Pbert, L. A. (1996). Dispositional optimism as a
predictor of health changes among cardiac patients. Journal of Research in
Personality, 30(4), 517-534. doi: 10.1006/jrpe.1996.0038
Shepperd, J. A., Ouellette, J. A., & Fernandez, J. K. (1996). Abandoning unrealistic
optimism: Performance estimates and the temporal proximity of self-relevant
feedback. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(4), 844-855.
Shepperd, J. A., Pogge, G., & Howell, J. L. (2017). Assessing the consequences of
unrealistic optimism: Challenges and recommendations. Consciousness and
Cognition, 50, 69-78. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2016.07.004
Shepperd, J. A., Waters, E. A., Weinstein, N. D., & Klein, W. M. (2015). A primer on
unrealistic optimism. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(3), 232237. doi: 10.1177/0963721414568341
Sherer, M., Maddux, J. E., Mercandante, B., Prentice-Dunn, S., Jacobs, B., & Rogers, R.
W. (1982). The self-efficacy scale: Construction and validation. Psychological
Reports, 51(2), 663-671.
Shields, N. (2001). Stress, active coping, and academic performance among persisting
and nonpersisting college students. Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research,
6(2), 65-81. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9861.2001.tb00107.x
Showers, C., & Ruben, C. (1990). Distinguishing defensive pessimism from depression:
Negative expectations and positive coping mechanisms. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 14(4), 385–399.
Snyder, C. R., Harris, C., Anderson, J. R., Holleran, S. A., Irving, L. M., Sigmon, S. T.,
... Harney, P. (1991). The will and the ways: development and validation of an

A Glass Half Full

158

individual-differences measure of hope. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 60(4), 570-585. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.60.4.570
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural
equation models. In S. Leinhart (Ed.), Sociological methodology 1982 (pp. 290312). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Spencer, S. M., & Norem, J. K. (1996). Reflection and distraction: Defensive pessimism,
strategic optimism, and performance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
22(4), 354-365. doi: 10.1177/0146167296224003
Steenbergh, T. A., Meyers, A. W., May, R. K., & Whelan, J. P. (2002). Development and
validation of the Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire. Psychology of Addictive
Behaviors, 16(2), 143-149. doi: 10.1037//0893-164X.16.2.143
Steptoe, A., Wright, C., Kunz‐Ebrecht, S. R., & Iliffe, S. (2006). Dispositional optimism
and health behaviour in community‐dwelling older people: Associations with
healthy ageing. British Journal of Health Psychology, 11(1), 71-84. doi:
10.1348/135910705X42850
Stevens, J. P. (1992). Applied multivariate statistics for the social sciences (2nd edition).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Streiner, D. L. (2003). Starting at the beginning: An introduction to coefficient alpha and
internal consistency. Journal of Personality Assessment, 80(1), 99-103. doi:
10.1207/S15327752JPA8001_18
Sullivan, J. R. (2010). Preliminary psychometric data for the academic coping strategies
scale. Assessment for Effective Intervention, 35(2), 114-127. doi:
10.1177/1534508408327609

A Glass Half Full

159

Suls, J., & Fletcher, B. (1985). The relative efficacy of avoidant and nonavoidant coping
strategies: A meta-analysis. Health Psychology, 4(3), 249-288. doi:
10.1037/0278-6133.4.3.249
Svanum, S., & Bigatti, S. (2006). Grade expectations: Informed or uninformed optimism,
or both? Teaching of Psychology, 33(1), 14-18. doi:
10.1207/s15328023top3301_4
Sweeny, K., Carroll, P., & Shepperd, J. A. (2006). Is optimism always best? Future
outlooks and preparedness. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(6),
302–306. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00457.x
Sweeny, K., & Krizan, Z. (2013). Sobering up: a quantitative review of temporal declines
in expectations. Psychological Bulletin, 139(3), 702-724. doi: 10.1037/a0029951
Sweeny, K. & Shepperd, J. A. (2007). Do people brace sensibly? Risk judgments and
event likelihood. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(8), 1064-1075.
doi: 10.1177/0146167207301024
Sweeny, K., & Shepperd, J. A. (2010). The costs of optimism and the benefits of
pessimism. Emotion, 10(5), 750-753. doi: 10.1037/a0019016
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2006). Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.). Boston,
MA: Allyn & Bacon/Pearson Education.
Taylor, K. M., & Shepperd, J. A. (1998). Bracing for the worst: Severity, testing and
feedback as moderators of the optimistic bias. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 24(9), 915–926. doi: 10.1177/0146167298249001
Taylor, S. E., Kemeny, M. E., Aspinwall, L. G., Schneider, S. G., Rodriguez, R., &
Herbert, M. (1992). Optimism, coping, psychological distress, and high-risk

A Glass Half Full

160

sexual behavior among men at risk for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(3), 460–473.
Tennen, H., & Affleck, G. (1987). The costs and benefits of optimistic explanations and
dispositional optimism. Journal of Personality, 55(2), 377-393.
Tindle, H. A., Chang, Y.-F., Kuller, L. H., Manson, J. E., Robinson, J. G., Rosal, M. C.,
… Matthews, K. A. (2009). Optimism, cynical hostility, and incident coronary
heart disease and mortality in the Women’s Health Initiative. Circulation, 120(8),
656-662. doi: 10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.108.827642
Tinto, V. (1998). Colleges as communities: Taking research on student persistence
seriously. The Review of Higher Education, 21, 167-177.
Tomakowsky, J., Lumley, M. A., Markowitz, N., & Frank, C. (2001). Optimistic
explanatory style and dispositional optimism in HIV-infected men. Journal of
Psychosomatic Research, 51(4), 577–587. doi: 10.1016/S0022-3999(01)00249-5
van Dijk, W. W., Zeelenberg, M., & van der Pligt, J. (2003). Blessed are those who
expect nothing: Lowering expectations as a way of avoiding disappointment.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 24, 505–516. doi: 10.1016/S01674870(02)00211-8
VanVoorhis, C. R. W., & Morgan, B. L. (2007). Understanding power and rules of thumb
for determining sample sizes. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology,
3(2), 43-50.
Voltaire, F. (1928). Candide (R. Kent, Trans.). New York: Random House (Original
work published 1759)
Wallston, K. A. (1994). Cautious optimism vs. cockeyed optimism. Psychology and

A Glass Half Full

161

Health, 9, 201-203.
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion.
Psychological Review, 92, 548-573.
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5), 806-820. doi: 10.1037/00223514.39.5.806
Weinstein, N. D. (1987). Unrealistic optimism about susceptibility to health problems:
Conclusions from a community-wide sample. Journal of Behavioral Medicine,
10(5), 481-500.
Weinstein, N. D., & Klein, W. M. (1995). Resistance of personal risk perceptions to
debiasing interventions. Health Psychology, 14(2), 132-140.
Wilson, G. S., Raglin, J. S., & Pritchard, M. E. (2002). Optimism, pessimism, and
precompetition anxiety in college athletes. Personality and Individual
Differences, 32(5), 893-902. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00094-0
Wohl, M. J., & Enzle, M. E. (2003). The effects of near wins and near losses on selfperceived personal luck and subsequent gambling behavior. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 39(2), 184-191. doi: 10.1016/S00221031(02)00525-5
Zak-Place, J., & Stern, M. (2004). Health belief factors and dispositional optimism as
predictors of STD and HIV preventive behavior. Journal of American College
Health, 52(5), 229-236. doi: 10.3200/JACH.52.5.229-236

A Glass Half Full

162

APPENDICES
Appendix A
Letter of Information

LETTER OF INFORMATION FOR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
Title of Study: Student Health and Well-being Study
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Mr. Phillip Ianni and Dr.
Kathryn Lafreniere, from the Psychology Department at the University of Windsor. The
data collected from this study will contribute to Mr. Ianni’s dissertation. This research
will be conducted under the supervision of Dr. Lafreniere. If you have any questions or
concerns about the research, please feel free to contact the principal investigator, Phillip
Ianni, Psychology Dept., University of Windsor. Phone: (519) 253-3000 ext. 2233, email:
ianni1@uwindsor.ca or the faculty supervisor: Dr. Kathryn Lafreniere, Psychology Dept.,
University of Windsor. Phone: (519) 253-3000 ext. 2233, email: lafren1@uwindsor.ca
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study will examine the relationships between several personality measures and
several indices of well-being (health, gambling behaviour, and academic success).
PROCEDURES
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to: Go to the survey by
clicking on the link at the end of this form. The survey will involve a number of different
sections that ask about your personality tendencies, particularly your expectations about
the future. You will also be asked to provide some background information about
yourself. It is expected that it will take no more than 60 minutes to complete the
questionnaire, including the time it takes to read this consent form and get started.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
This research involves minimal risk to you. However, if you feel uncomfortable
answering some of the questions, you are free to skip them.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY
Participating in this study will allow you to experience research in the area of personality,
which may be useful for you if you will conduct research or read about research in this
area in the future. Your participation is important, since findings from research studies
such as this one contribute to scientific knowledge about the design of personality tests.
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION
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Participants will receive 1 bonus point for up to 60 minutes of participation towards the
Psychology Participant Pool, if registered in the pool and enrolled in one or more eligible
courses. You will not receive payment for your participation.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified
with you will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. Your
questionnaire responses will be stored separately from your identifying information, and
will be grouped with other people's responses so that your identifying information will
never be linked with the data that you provide. All the information you provide will be
stored on a secure, password-protected computer that will only be accessed by the
researchers.
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You can choose whether to be in this study or not. If you volunteer to be in this study,
you may withdraw at any time without consequences of any kind. You may also refuse to
answer any questions you don't want to answer and still be in the study. The investigator
may withdraw you from this research if circumstances rise which warrant doing so. You
can remove yourself at any time during the study before completion by discontinuing
your participation and exiting your browser. However, if you discontinue your
participation in the study by exiting your browser, you will not be eligible to receive
credit for participation. You can choose to skip questions and complete the survey and
still be eligible to receive credit for your participation. You can withdraw up to the point
of submitting your survey data. You cannot withdraw after you have submitted your data.
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS
The findings for this research study will be analyzed by September 1, 2016. Once the
results are analyzed, a summary of the findings of this study will be posted on the
Research Ethics Board website. Web address: www.uwindsor.ca/reb/study-resultsDate
when results are available: September 1, 2016
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research
Ethics Coordinator, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca
Please click the button below "I agree to participate" in order to continue to the survey.
I agree to participate
I do not wish to participate
PLEASE PRINT A COPY OF THIS FORM AND KEEP IT FOR YOUR
RECORDS (you can use your browser’s ‘Print’ option to print this page)
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Appendix B
Academic Coping Strategies Scale (ACSS)
Think about a time when you received a low grade on an important exam, significantly
lower than what you usually get. Indicate below how often you used each strategy.
1

2

3

4

5

Almost never

Hardly ever

Sometimes

Often

Almost always

1.I tried to stay calm
2. I talked to another student for emotional support
3. I left the problem situation altogether
4. I got other peoples’ perspective of the problem
5. I talked to a friend from outside school, or a family member, for specific advice on
how to solve the problem
6. I tried to find out what I did wrong
7. I avoided talking to anyone about the problem
8. I used drugs or alcohol
9. I tried to gain control over the problem
10. I thought about hurting myself
11. I talked to a professor/supervisor for specific advice on how to solve the problem
12. I drew on my past experiences to help me solve the problem
13. I engaged in physical activity or exercise
14. I gave up
15. I hid my feelings from others, keeping my feelings to myself
16. I wished that I was more capable of dealing with the problem situation
17. I told myself the problem isn’t that important
18. I ignored the problem
19. I expressed my emotions to someone
20. I thought positively about the problem
21. I brainstormed a variety of possible solutions to the problem
22. I gathered additional information about the problem, finding out more about the
problem
23. I tried to learn something from the experience
24. I withdrew from other people
25. I put forth more effort into developing skills to master the problem
26. I tried to learn from my mistakes
27. I engaged in activities to distract myself from the problem (reading, watching a
movie, watching TV, listening to music)
28. I tell myself that everything will be all right
29. I adjust my priorities
30. I talked to a friend from outside school, or a family member, for emotional support
31. I got advice from someone who has had the same problem
32. I denied that the problem exists
33. I expressed my emotions by crying
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34. I kept a sense of humor about the problem
35. I avoided people or things that reminded me of the problem
36. I tried to think about the problem carefully before acting
37. I spent time with someone I care about
38. I did nothing about the problem
39. I wished that the problem would go away on its own
40. I was persistent in trying to solve or fix the problem
41. I set specific goals for solving the problem
42. I hoped that the problem would fix itself
43. I tried to avoid thinking about the problem
44. I thought of something good that will come from the problem situation
45. I created a specific plan of action for solving the problem
46. I worked hard to solve the problem
47. I asked questions about the problem
48. I hoped for the best
49. I accepted responsibility for the problem
50. I talked to a professor/supervisor for emotional support
51. I blamed others for the problem
52. I talked to someone about my feelings
53. I blamed myself for the problem
54. I got angry about the problem
55. I talked to another student for specific advice on how to solve the problem
56. I accepted that I can’t do anything about the problem
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Appendix C
Adolescent Invulnerability Scale (AIS)
How well do the following statements describe you? Rate each statement below:
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

1.I’m unlikely to be injured in an accident.
2. My feelings don’t get hurt.
3. Nothing bad will happen to me when I go to a place by myself.
4. Nothing seems to bother me.
5. There are times when I think I am indestructible
6. I could probably drink and drive without getting into an accident.
7. My feelings are easily hurt.
8. I’m unlikely to get hurt if I did a dangerous thing.
9. I’m a fragile person.
10. Special problems, like getting an illness or disease, are not likely to happen to me.
11. Nothing can harm me.
12. The problems that happen to people my age are unlikely to happen to me.
13. The opinions of other people just don’t bother me.
14. What people say about me has no effect on me at all.
15. Driving very fast wouldn’t be dangerous if I were driving.
16. I feel very badly when I know there is gossip about me.
17. Taking safety precautions is far more important for other people than it is for me.
18. Safety rules do not apply to me.
19. It is just impossible for people to hurt my feelings.
20. It is not necessary for me to worry about being injured or harmed.
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Appendix D
Academic Success Inventory for College Students (ASICS).
When responding the statements below, think about one class that has been the hardest or
most difficult for you within the past year.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Neutral

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1.I studied a lot for this class
2. The instructor really motivated me to do well
3. I am certain about what occupation I want after I graduate
4. I need to do well to get a good job later on
5. I was able to pick out the main, important ideas in lectures and on tests
6. Personal problems kept me from doing well
7. It was easy to keep my mind from wandering
8. Sometimes I partied when I should have been studying
9. I got satisfaction from learning new material
10. I was nervous for tests even when I was well prepared
11. I tried everything I could to do well in this class
12. I was disappointed in the quality of the instructor
13. I know what I want to do after I graduate
14. This class is important to my future success
15. I felt confident I could understand even the most difficult material
16. I would have done much better if I didn't have to deal with other problems in my life
17. I had an easy time concentrating
18. My grades suffered because of my active social life
19. I enjoyed the challenge of just learning for learning's sake
20. Studying for this class made me anxious
21. I worked really hard in this class
22. I did poorly because the instructor was not effective
23. I am certain that my major is a good fit for me
24. In the future I will use the material I learned in this class
25. I was pretty sure I could get an A or a B
26. I had some personal difficulties that affected my performance
27. I paid attention in this class
28. I got behind because I spent too much time partying or hanging out with friends
29. I worked hard because I wanted to understand the material
30. I got anxious when taking tests in this class
31. I kept on a good schedule in this class
32. What I learned I learned on my own
33. I'm having a hard time choosing a major
34. This class will be very useful to me in my career
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35. I knew that if I worked hard I could do well
36. I had a hard time concentrating
37. Sometimes my drinking behaviour interfered with my studying
38. This class was very interesting to me
39. I made good use of tools, such as planners, calendars and/or organizers
40. I would have done better if the instructor were better
41. I was pretty sure I would get a good grade.
42. I got easily distracted in this class
43. I skipped this class a lot
44. I enjoyed attending lectures in this class
45. I used goal setting as a strategy in this class
46. I felt pretty confident in my skills and abilities
47. This class was very boring to me
48. I was good at setting specific homework goals
49. I was organized
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Appendix E
Expectancy Flexibility Scale (Study 4)
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

1. My predictions about the future change when I get new information.
2. There are times when I choose to be optimistic.
3. I am optimistic some of the time.
4. I stubbornly refuse to change my expectations.
5. I only raise my expectations when I can imagine things going well.
6. I change my expectations when I receive information I did not expect.
7. I lower my expectations when future outcomes are beyond my control.
8. There is a place for both optimism and pessimism.
9. There are times when I choose to be pessimistic.
10. I try to hope for the best but prepare for the worst.
11. I am usually optimistic unless the potential ‘downside’ is relatively likely or serious.
12. I adjust my expectations for the future in order to cope with the situation.
13. I try to think about all possible outcomes when I think about the future.
14. When thinking about the future, I try to be as realistic as possible.
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Appendix F
Gamblers’ Beliefs Questionnaire (GBQ)
Read each of the following statements carefully. Rate to what extent you agree or
disagree with each statement.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Agree

Neutral

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1.I think of gambling as a challenge
2. My knowledge and skill in gambling contribute to the likelihood that I will make
money
3. My choices or actions affect the game on which I am betting
4. If I am gambling and losing, I should continue because I don’t want to miss a win
5. I should keep track of previous winning bets so that I can figure out how I should bet
in the future
6. When I am gambling, “near misses” or times when I almost win remind me that if I
keep playing I will win
7. Gambling is more than just luck.
8. My gambling wins are evidence that I have skill and knowledge related to gambling
9. I have a “lucky” technique that I use when I gamble
10. In the long run, I will win more money than I will lose gambling
11. Even though I may be losing with my gambling strategy or plan, I must maintain that
strategy or plan because I know it will eventually come through for me
12. There are certain things I do when I am betting (for example, tapping a certain
number of times, holding a lucky coin in my hand, crossing my fingers, etc.) which
increase the chances that I will win
13. If I lose money gambling, I should try to win it back.
14. Those who don’t gamble much don’t understand that gambling success requires
dedication and a willingness to invest some money
15. Where I get money to gamble doesn’t matter because I will win and pay it back
16. I am pretty accurate at predicting when a “win” will occur
17. Gambling is the best way for me to experience excitement.
18. If I continue to gamble, it will eventually pay off and I will make money
19. I have more skills and knowledge related to gambling than most people who gamble
20. When I lose at gambling, my losses are not as bad if I don’t tell my loved ones
21. I should keep the same bet even when it hasn’t come up lately because it is bound to
win
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Appendix G
Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R)
Please be as honest and accurate as you can throughout. Try not to let your response to
one statement influence your responses to other statements. There are no "correct" or
"incorrect" answers. Answer according to your own feelings, rather than how you think
"most people" would answer.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly Agree

1.In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.
2. It's easy for me to relax.
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will.
4. I'm always optimistic about my future.
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.
6. It's important for me to keep busy.
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.
8. I don't get upset too easily.
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me.
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.
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Appendix H
Multidimensional Health Behavior Inventory (MHBI)
The following statements describe a broad range of health-related actions or behaviours
that you may or may not do. Read each statement and indicate how often you do this
behaviour.
1

2

3

4

5

Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Almost Always

1.Take time for relaxation every day
2. Limit red meat in your diet every day
3. Plan for home fire escape
4. Limit fat in your diet every day
5. Check your home for safety
6. Eat red meat more than two times a week
7. Eat fewer calories to lose weight
8. Use biodegradable cleaning products
9. Ask for help from friends when you are in need
10. Avoid being exposed to second hand smoke (someone else smoking at home or at
work)
11. Eat at least one serving or more of red meat on most days (including beef, pork, ham,
bacon, lamb, liver and lunch meat not made from poultry).
12. Use drugs to get high or feel better
13. Test home smoke detector every month
14. Recycle newspaper, glass, and/or other products
15. Discuss problems/concerns with someone close to you
16. Limit sugar in your diet every day
17. Take part in social groups, functions, or classes
18. Eat non-fat or low-fat dairy products
19. Do something good for yourself every day
20. Choose foods with whole grains every day, for example, whole wheat bread instead
of white, brown rice instead of white, etc.
21. Check your cholesterol level at least once a year
22. Seek health information
23. Get adequate sleep every day
24. Check your blood pressure at least twice a year
25. Read food and medicine labels before purchasing or consuming the product
26. Question your health care provider or seek a second opinion
27. Maintain a first aid kit
28. Get 7-8 hours sleep every day
29. Praise people easily
30. Spend time with close friends
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31. Participate in recreational physical activities as walking, biking, dancing or sports
regularly at least twice a week
32. Limit salt in your diet every day
33. Smoke cigarettes every day
34. Drink 5 or more alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, wine coolers, or hard liquor) on one
occasion.
35. Check condition of equipment (Household, recreational, automotive) regularly
36. Limit intake of "sweets" in your diet
37. Do stretching exercises every day
38. Fix things as needed
39. Obtain a regular health check-up when you are not sick
40. Avoid using tobacco products (cigarettes, cigars, pipe chewing tobacco, or snuff)
41. Control stress in your life.
42. Exercise vigorously for at least 20 minutes 3 times a week
43. Keep daily stress levels low
44. Avoid drinking and driving
45. Increase your physical activity to lose weight
46. Run, jog, or swim for exercise at least 3 times per week
47. Drink one or more alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, wine coolers, or hard liquor)
every day
48. Use touch appropriately (hold someone's hand or give someone a hug).
49. Discuss health concerns with health resource person
50. Report unusual or persistent symptoms to a health care provider
51. Drink alcohol and take medications at the same time
52. Limit your intake of alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, wine coolers, or hard liquor).
53. Keep emergency numbers by the telephone (poison control, rescue squad, fire
department)
54. Participate in health care programs (health education, health fair, screening).
55. Eat at least one or more servings of the following items every day: chips, candy bars,
cake, donuts, pastries, muffins, cookies, ice cream, pudding, chocolate
56. Drink alcohol and drive
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Appendix I
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI)
Thinking about the last 12 months…
0

1

2

3

Never

Sometimes

Often

Most of the time

1.Have you bet more than you could really afford to lose?
2. Still thinking about the last 12 months, have you needed to gamble with larger
amounts of money to get the same feeling of excitement?
3. When you gambled, did you go back another day to try to win back the money you
lost?
4. Have you borrowed money or sold anything to get money to gamble?
5. Have you felt that you might have a problem with gambling?
6. Has gambling caused you any health problems, including stress or anxiety?
7. Have people criticized your betting or told you that you had a gambling problem,
regardless of whether or not you thought it was true?
8. Has your gambling caused any financial problems for you or your household?
9. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble?
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Appendix J
Demographics
What is your gender?_____________________
What is your age?_________________
To what racial or ethnic group do you belong?
White/ European
Black/ African/ Caribbean
Latin/ South American
East Asian/ Chinese/ Japanese
South Asian/ Indian/ Pakistani
Aboriginal/ Metis/ First Nations
Middle Eastern
Bi/ Multiracial (please specify) ______________________
Other (please specify) ______________________
Year of Study
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year and beyond
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Your participation is very valuable to us!
To receive your Psychology Participant Pool bonus point, please check the box below
and click SUBMIT. You will be taken to a separate page to enter your name, so that your
personal information is not connected with your questionnaire responses. The study
findings will be posted on the REB website at: www.uwindsor.ca/reb/study-results
Please take me to the bonus point page
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